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Abstract of the Thesis 
The competitive implications of intra-industry diversification (chapter 2), the firm-investor 
network (chapter 3) and resource acquisition across the firm boundary (chapter 4) are of 
central concern to this thesis. The analysis draws on qualitative evidence, a quantitative, 
large-scale, longitudinal panel dataset (chapters 2 and 3), as well as conceptual reasoning 
(chapter 4). The empirical setting of the analysis is the hedge fund industry, which is 
characterised by small, entrepreneurial and knowledge-intensive firms. 
Whereas the three main chapters of this thesis are constructed and presented as stand-alone 
papers, three overarching insights emerge. First, intra-industry diversification impacts firm 
performance and firm survival in non-trivial ways. Whereas the positive effect of intra-
industry diversification on survival seems to be driven by the risk reducing effect of beyond 
sub-sector diversification within an industry, the negative effect on performance seems to be 
driven by within sub-sector diversification, which may create limited value for investors. 
Second, the relationship of investment firms and their customers (i.e. investors) is much more 
multifaceted than the view of ‘investors as passive providers of capital’ would suggest. The 
analysis provides evidence for a performance and survival enhancing impact of the firm-
investor network on the hedge fund firm. Third, moderation of complexity via a differential 
flow of resources is an important, yet underappreciated attribute of the firm boundary, which 
may contribute to the creation of resource asymmetries as a basis for competitive advantage. 
Although the evidence presented in this thesis is based on the empirical setting of the hedge 
fund industry, the findings on intra-industry diversification, the firm-investor network and 
resource acquisition across the firm boundary may generalise to other firms in the (financial) 
services industry.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction to the Thesis 
This thesis is structured into three stand-alone, yet topically connected research papers 
concerned with the competitive implications of (1) intra-industry diversification, (2) the firm-
investor network and (3) resource acquisition across the firm boundary.  
This structure allowed the author to focus on different methods of analysis and different types 
of evidence. Chapters 2 and 3 provide qualitative and quantitative evidence from interviews 
and a longitudinal, large-scale hedge fund panel dataset. By comparison, chapter 4 presents 
conceptual reasoning, which develops an interdisciplinary metaphor in order to derive novel 
insights on how the firm boundary helps to moderate resource complexity via different modes 
of resource acquisition. 
The empirical setting of the thesis is the hedge fund industry. Hedge fund firms (or, used 
synonymously, ‘hedge fund management companies’, abbreviated as ‘HFMCs’) are, 
depending on the jurisdiction, lightly-regulated investment vehicles for ‘accredited’ investors, 
which fulfil certain wealth or income requirements1. As ‘agents of market efficiency2’, hedge 
fund firms attempt to identify and to exploit inefficiencies3 in financial markets (Economist, 
2012). However, as financial markets are dynamic social systems, inefficiencies disappear 
once enough money is engaged in exploiting them (Beunza, Hardie and MacKenzie, 2006). 
The restriction to ‘accredited’ investors allows for the use of advanced and fairly risky 
                                               
1
 To be considered as ‘accredited investors’, institutional investors are required to have assets in excess of USD 
5m whereas natural persons are required to either have assets in excess of USD 1m or an income exceeding 
USD 200,000 p.a. (SEC, 2014). 
2
 A market is understood to be ‘efficient’ if “it is impossible to make economic profits by trading on the basis of 
information” (Jensen, 1978, p. 96). The ‘efficient market hypothesis’ has three main forms. In the weak form, 
this ‘information’ refers to the past price history of the market, whereas in the semi-strong and the strong forms, 
‘information’ refers to all publicly available information and all public and private information, respectively. 
3
 Market inefficiencies (e.g. ‘wrongly’ priced securities, such as stocks or bonds) may disappear through the 
buying or selling activity of market participants, which ‘pushes’ the price of a security close to its underlying 
‘true’ value (e.g. the present value of the future cash flows from a security). 
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investment tools, such as leverage4 and short-selling5 (e.g. Hardie and MacKenzie, 2007). 
These enhanced investment tools allow hedge funds to hedge market risk6 or to profit from 
declining markets with a net short exposure. Since hedge fund firms “characteristically use 
substantial leverage, they play a far more important role in the global securities markets than 
the size of their net assets indicates. Market makers on the floor of the NYSE have estimated 
that during 2004, trades by hedge funds often accounted for more than half of the total daily 
number of shares changing hands” (Malkiel and Saha, 2005, p. 80). Short selling and 
leverage are core characteristics of hedge fund firms because if “hedge funds didn’t sell short, 
all they would be is just leveraged long funds that charge high fees” (Biggs, 2006, p. 21).  
Hedge fund firms engage in various investment strategies ranging from classical long7-short 
equity investing to high-frequency computer-commanded trading. The value creation aspect 
of hedge funds has two components. First, the generation of returns by investing the 
investors’ (i.e. customers’) capital8 . Second, and often underappreciated, the creation of 
returns, which are not or only loosely correlated to other major asset classes (e.g. stocks or 
bonds) in a hedge fund investor’s portfolio (e.g. Fung and Hsieh, 2006). In terms of value 
appropriation, hedge fund firms have a special fee structure, which intends to align the 
incentives of managers and investors. In addition to a management fee (a share of assets 
under management), hedge fund firms also charge an incentive fee, which is a share of the 
                                               
4
 Using ‘leverage’ in investments refers to buying securities with borrowed money. 
5
 A ‘short sale’ is understood to be the sale of a security, which the seller does not own. In order to still sell the 
security, the short seller first has to borrow it, usually from an institutional investor. The security lender receives 
a fee for lending out the security (D’Avolio, 2002). Short sellers bet that the price of a security will fall so that 
they can buy it in the open market (and return it to the security lender) for a lower price than they realised in the 
short sale. 
6
 ‘Hedging’ of market risk refers to the reduction or neutralisation of the risk of price changes that affect all 
securities in a specific market (e.g. all car manufacturers). This can be achieved by simultaneously taking 
matching long and short positions in the stocks of two companies, which are active in the same industry (e.g. 
two car manufacturers). As some hedge funds specialise on taking stock specific risk (i.e. they invest in an 
undervalued stock) they sometimes want to hedge the overall risk of the market the undervalued company is 
operating in. 
7
 Taking a ‘long’ position in a security refers to buying a security. It is the opposite position to a ‘short sale’ or 
taking a ‘short’ position (for more details on short sales, please see footnote 5). 
8
 Please note that the focus of this chapter is on the role of investors as ‘customers’ of the hedge fund firm, not 
as ‘shareholders’ (i.e. equity owners) in the hedge fund firm. 
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investment profits (calculated and paid annually). The standard compensation model used by 
most hedge fund firms is ‘two and twenty’, with 2% fees on assets under management and 
20% fees on investment profits (e.g. Crockett, 2007). Most hedge fund managers’ incentive 
fee payments are subject to ‘high-water marks’, which mandate that incentive fees are only 
payable once the hedge fund has recouped prior losses, which the investor may have incurred 
with the hedge fund investment (e.g. Goetzmann et al., 2003). To further align the incentives 
of investors and managers, hedge fund managers usually have substantial amounts of their 
own private wealth invested in their funds, which indicates that they have ‘skin in the game’ 
(cf. Biggs, 2006) and will not “’put it all on black’ in order to ‘win’ back earlier losses” 
(Clare and Motson, 2009, p. 25). 
The following paragraphs briefly summarise the main chapters of the thesis and point out 
why the hedge fund industry seems to be an interesting research setting for the study of intra-
industry diversification (chapter 2), the firm investor network (chapter 3) and resource 
acquisition across the firm boundary (chapter 4). 
Chapter 2 investigates in a differentiated way how intra-industry diversification is related to 
hedge fund firm survival and performance. The analysis suggests diversification (a) within 
and (b) beyond the sub-sector of the industry as components of intra-industry diversification. 
The results indicate a positive effect of intra-industry diversification on survival, which may 
be driven by the risk reducing effect of beyond sub-sector diversification. By comparison, the 
results provide evidence for a negative effect of intra-industry diversification on performance, 
which seems to be driven by diversification within the sub-sector. Overall, the chapter 
contributes to the emerging literature on intra-industry diversification (e.g. Zahavi and Lavie, 
2013; Tanriverdi and Lee, 2008; Li and Greenwood, 2004; Stern and Henderson, 2004). The 
hedge fund industry seems to be a more fine-grained and homogenous setting for the analysis 
of intra-industry diversification compared to the extant literature, which classified all 
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activities within the same, fairly broad, 4 digit SIC code as ‘intra-industry diversification’ 
(e.g. Zahavi and Lavie, 2013; Stern and Henderson, 2004; Tanriverdi and Lee, 2008). The 
SIC ‘bucket’ of hedge fund firms (SIC 6211; First Research, 2014) would consider a wide 
array of other finance firms, such as stock brokers, mutual funds, investment banks and other 
securities investors as the same ‘industry’. By contrast, this study (along the lines of extant 
research using hedge funds as empirical setting, e.g. de Figueiredo, Meyer-Doyle and 
Rawley, 2013; Miller, 2012; Aragon, 2007) considers the universe of hedge fund firms to 
form the ‘hedge fund industry’. Compared to the broad 4 digit SIC code definition, hedge 
fund firms offer one homogenous type of service, which is investment of customer capital 
into fairly liquid securities for the compensation of a management fee (i.e. a share of assets 
under management) and an incentive fee (i.e. a share of investment profits). 
Chapter 3 is concerned with the relationship between hedge fund firms and their investors, 
particularly with investors’ role beyond the provision of capital. The chapter assembles 
evidence of both qualitative (exploratory expert interviews) and quantitative (large-scale 
panel dataset) kinds to suggest that investors into hedge funds are not only mere providers of 
capital but that they can be active partners in the identification, assessment and execution of 
current and prospective investment opportunities. While the qualitative evidence is used to 
motivate the hypotheses to be tested, the quantitative analyses indicate that hedge fund firms 
with an active firm-investor network tend to show enhanced performance and survival. 
Concerning theory development, this chapter informs and contributes to theories on the active 
involvement and tangible added value of a firm’s customers as for example discussed in the 
literatures on ‘customer innovation’ (e.g. Thomke and von Hippel, 2002; Harhoff et al., 2003; 
von Hippel, 2007; Hienerth et al., 2014) or ‘product co-creation’ (e.g. Prahalad and 
Ramaswamy 2004; Nambisan, 2002; Hoyer et al., 2010). Regarding the study of the active 
firm investor network, the analysis of a large-scale hedge fund panel dataset seems to be a 
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helpful approach to answer calls for more large-scale, quantitative research (e.g. Bogers, 
Afuah and Bastian, 2010) to test and complement the interesting qualitative and conceptual 
insights developed from the extant body of (mostly qualitative) research on customer 
innovation. Furthermore, the hedge fund industry seems to be an interesting context and 
‘conservative setting’ for the study of customer involvement since one may not naturally 
expect customer involvement in such a secretive industry9 with numerous highly specialised 
firms. This setting contrasts with settings in the extant literature where one may expect more 
customer involvement, such as ‘collaborative’ settings like software development (e.g. by 
users via innovation toolkits; Franke and von Hippel, 2003) or settings with lower barriers 
(e.g. in terms of technology or required capital) to produce an innovation (e.g. sports related 
consumer goods; Baldwin et al., 2006; Hienerth, 2006; Luethje et al., 2005). 
Chapter 4 presents a paper based on conceptual reasoning, which is illustrated using 
examples from the hedge fund industry. The chapter develops an interdisciplinary metaphor 
in order to derive novel insights on how the firm boundary helps to moderate resource 
complexity via different modes of resource acquisition. The characteristic of semi-
permeability (to resource flows) of the firm boundary is portrayed as important for the 
creation of resource asymmetries, which in turn seem to be key antecedents to value creation 
and appropriation. The paper suggests that an important, yet underappreciated function of the 
firm boundary is the moderation of two types of resource complexity: the complexity of the 
acquired resource and the complexity of the internal resource set. The analysis draws on 
generalised insights from cell biology and suggests four modes of resource acquisition, which 
depend on the configuration of both types of resource complexity. Regarding the 
                                               
9
 It is difficult for hedge fund firms to protect their intellectual property (De Figueiredo, Meyer-Doyle and 
Rawley, 2013), which may be part of the reason why “hedge fund managers […] fiercely resist offering 
transparency” (Aggarwal and Jorion, 2012, p. 108). Information revealed though transparency may encourage 
competitors to replicate or reverse engineer the trading strategy of a fund. Alternatively, understanding the idea 
behind a trading strategy may give competitors the chance to forecast future trades and enter positions before the 
fund, hence artificially increasing prices (Hedges, 2005). 
14 
 
investigation of resource acquisition across a semi-permeable firm boundary, hedge fund 
firms seem to serve as interesting setting to illustrate the theoretical reasoning. Hedge fund 
firms are small, asset-light, entrepreneurial organisations, which need to acquire resources 
from the environment in order to build a resource asymmetry, which helps them to deliver 
hard-to-imitate value to their customers (i.e. investors). Since hedge fund firms aim to profit 
from temporary inefficiencies in financial markets, they need to keep their resource setup 
aligned with the continuously changing environment. As Thompson (1967) noted, this agility 
in response to changed conditions in the environment is key for firm survival in complex and 
unpredictable environments. 
The final part of this introduction to the doctoral thesis provides some brief notes on the 
authors’ personal PhD journey. 
When the author embarked on the journey of the PhD in 2010, he did not quite realise what a 
profound catalyst a PhD is for the professional and personal development of a young 
researcher. In the first year of the journey, the author and his colleagues were trained in 
quantitative and qualitative methods and were introduced to the different theoretical streams 
in the literature on organisations and strategy. 
The first year also provided the author with his first chance to apply the newly acquired 
knowledge in a challenging but very interesting empirical setting: the global hedge fund 
industry. On the one hand, the setting is challenging because the industry is very secretive 
and data access (both qualitative and quantitative) is difficult. On the other hand, the industry 
is very interesting because it is characterised by small, knowledge-intensive, asset-light firms 
that are lead by a type of ‘elite entrepreneur’. The author enjoyed meeting and discussing his 
research with some of these entrepreneurs, who were narrowly focused experts in their field 
of investing and often had an interestingly erratic personality that evoked both admiration and 
15 
 
a degree of ‘professional fear’ in their employees. While building up connections with hedge 
fund practitioners at various international conferences, the author acquainted himself with 
analysing the TASS database, one of the largest quantitative panel datasets on the hedge fund 
industry. 
The author completed the first year as the best student of the Management PhD student 
cohort and was awarded a Master of Research with distinction. At the beginning of the 
second year, the author was invited to his first international academic conference and had the 
honour to present his research at the ‘4th Annual Hedge Fund Research Conference’ in Paris 
organised by the NYSE Euronext exchange and researchers from CREST, Edhec Business 
School and the University of Toronto. Further conferences followed in the second year, with, 
among others, EURAM 2012 and the AOM 2012. Besides the helpful comments and advice 
from the author’s supervisors and his PhD colleagues, the comments received at these 
conferences helped to substantially improve the theoretical and empirical positioning of the 
research. 
In the third year, the author was fortunate to become a Fulbright Visiting Scholar at the 
Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania from August 2012 to August 2013. In 
addition to regular discussions with his supervisors, the author was able to obtain valuable 
suggestions regarding his research from various scholars at Wharton. Moreover, he was given 
the opportunity to present in the Wharton Management PhD student seminar and the Snider 
Center Research Workshops. Due to the nature of his empirical setting, the author regularly 
‘reached across the aisle’ and met with management as well as finance researchers. In 
addition to refining chapter 2, chapter 4 of the thesis was developed at Wharton, building on 
the coursework and discussions in Dan Levinthal’s PhD course on the economic foundations 
of management. A course on quantitative empirical methods offered by Todd Gormley from 
the finance department substantially improved the author’s knowledge and execution of 
16 
 
large-scale data analysis. In addition to the visit at Wharton in the third year of the PhD, the 
author was invited to present his research at various international conferences, among others 
the European Theory Development Workshop at HEC Paris and the EGOS Colloquium at 
HEC Montréal. 
After the return from Wharton, the author continued his ongoing qualitative enquiry with 
hedge fund managers and developed chapter 3 of this thesis. Furthermore, chapters 2 and 4 of 
this thesis were substantially refined and the author presented his research among others, at 
the SMS conference in Atlanta (where he was selected into the SMS PhD consortium), a 
workshop on firm boundaries at Copenhagen Business School and the Journal of 
Management Studies Conference at Cambridge University. Chapters 2 and 4 of this thesis 
were invited for presentation at the 2014 AOM Annual Meeting in Philadelphia by the BPS 
and OMT division, respectively. 
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Chapter 2 
Intra-Industry Diversification: Implications for Firm Survival and Firm 
Performance 
Evidence from Hedge Fund Firms 
 
2.1 Abstract 
This chapter contributes to the emerging literature on intra-industry diversification by 
investigating in a differentiated way how intra-industry diversification is related to firm 
survival and firm performance. The analysis, which is empirically based in the hedge fund 
industry, shows that the effects of intra-industry diversification on survival and performance 
are complex. It provides some insight into this complexity by proposing two components of 
intra-industry diversification: diversification within and beyond the sub-sector of the 
industry. Whereas the positive effect of intra-industry diversification on survival seems to be 
driven by the risk reducing effect of beyond sub-sector diversification, the negative effect on 
performance seems to be driven by diversification within the sub-sector, which may create 
limited value for investors. Regarding non-linear effects, high levels of intra-industry 
diversification are shown to be negatively related to survival, indicating that even in a context 
of intra industry diversification of small and entrepreneurial firms, adjustment of 
‘overdiversification’ is not frictionless.  
I would like to thank Charles Baden-Fuller and Hans Frankort for their helpful comments on 
developing and refining this chapter. I would also like to thank the following scholars, who 
commented on earlier versions of the paper: Stephen Brown, Naveen Daniel, Christopher 
Geczy, Vincent Glode, Johannes Luger, Ian ‘Mac’ MacMillan, Evan Rawley, Scott Richards, 
Nicolaj Siggelkow and the participants of the 2012 Lyxor/NYSE Euronext Hedge Fund 
Conference, the 2012 AOM Annual Meeting, the 2012 EURAM Annual meeting and the 
2012/2013 Wharton Snider Center Research Workshops. 
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2.2 Introduction 
Diversification within industry boundaries is an empirically highly relevant phenomenon. 
Firms tend to start their operations undiversified, i.e. focused on a single product and usually 
extend their scope first within their industry before moving beyond it. Whereas inter-industry 
diversification usually applies to larger firms10, intra-industry diversification is feasible also 
for small and medium sized firms and is hence “more prevalent than inter-industry 
diversification” (Zahavi and Lavie, 2013, p. 978). 
Along the lines of prior literature, intra-industry diversification is understood as a firm’s 
efforts to expand its product portfolio and thereby moving beyond a specific niche within an 
industry (e.g. Zahavi and Lavie, 2013; Tanriverdi and Lee, 2008; Li and Greenwood, 2004). 
As with related diversification beyond industry boundaries (e.g. Rumelt, 1974; Teece, 1980; 
Peteraf, 1993; Farjoun, 1994; Makides and Williamson, 1996), the main driver of intra-
industry diversification seems to be economies of scope in the use of a firm’s resources (e.g. 
Tanriverdi and Lee, 2008 and Li and Greenwood, 2004) via “resource redeployment across 
related product markets” (Zahavi and Lavie, 2013, p. 980). 
Although the extant intra-industry diversification literature is silent on this point, there seems 
to be a fine line between ‘intra-industry diversification’ and ‘product differentiation’. Product 
differentiation seems to refer to limited, minor adjustments in the characteristics of an 
existing product according to specific customer needs (Clemons, Hann and Hitt, 2002) or 
when a minor customised component or process is applied to an existing product (Lee and 
Tang, 1997). In terms of the underlying resources, it seems that product differentiation can be 
achieved without adjusting the existing set of resources. By comparison, intra-industry 
diversification refers to the expansion of a firm’s product portfolio to a new market niche, 
                                               
10
 Compared to inter-industry diversification, which may happen via mergers and acquisitions of large firms (e.g. 
Bergh and Lawless (1998) focus on Fortune 500 companies), intra-industry diversification is mostly 
‘homegrown’ and occurs through the expansion of a firm’s product portfolio within an industry. 
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which likely caters to different customer needs and requires a stand-alone product and not 
merely minor adjustments/customisations to an existing product. Although intra-industry 
diversification seems to occur due to synergies in the use of resources, a firm’s resource set 
needs to be adjusted and modified for its new application (Zahavi and Lavie, 2013). 
This chapter investigates intra-industry diversification in the context of the hedge fund 
industry, which allows for a more focused analysis of intra-industry diversification compared 
to the extant literature. Considering the broad operationalisation of intra-industry 
diversification in the extant literature, which classified all activities within the same, fairly 
broad, 4 digit SIC code as ‘intra-industry diversification’ (e.g. Zahavi and Lavie, 2013; Stern 
and Henderson, 2004; Tanriverdi and Lee, 2008), the hedge fund industry seems to be a more 
fine-grained and homogenous setting. To illustrate the very broad ‘industry definition’ of the 
4 digit SIC code level, the ‘SIC bucket’ of hedge fund firms (SIC 6211; First Research, 2014) 
would include stock brokers, mutual funds, investment banks and other finance firms as the 
same ‘industry’. By contrast, the firms in the hedge fund industry (i.e. hedge fund 
management companies) offer one homogenous type of service, which is the investment of 
customer capital into fairly liquid securities for the compensation of a management fee (i.e. a 
share of assets under management) and an incentive fee (i.e. a share of investment profits). 
While some hedge fund firms may offer ‘product differentiation’ via minor customisations of 
their existing products according to the needs of specific investors (e.g. adjustment of lock-up 
or redemption notice periods or other contractual clauses), the different products of a hedge 
fund firm may be considered as distinct units, with their own profit and loss calculation and 
catering to different customer needs. 
Despite its empirical prevalence, scholarly attention to the phenomenon of intra-industry 
diversification has been limited. However, first contributors to the subject denote the 
emerging stream of research on intra-industry diversification as “literature” (Tanriverdi and 
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Lee, 2008, p. 382). This chapter focuses on the relationship between intra-industry 
diversification and firm survival, as well as firm performance and contributes in three aspects 
to the nascent literature on intra-industry diversification. 
First, compared to the extant literature on the phenomenon, which either focuses on firm 
survival or firm performance as outcome variable, this chapter investigates both variables. 
Although related, survival and performance are distinct outcome measures with distinct 
antecedents (e.g. Schaffer, 1989; Hill and Birkinshaw, 2007; Kalleberg and Leicht, 1991) and 
hence an investigation of both variables may yield a “better and more complete 
understanding” (Delios and Beamish, 2001, p. 1035) of the studied phenomenon.  
Second, the analysis suggests a more nuanced view of intra-industry diversification by 
proposing the components of within and beyond sub-sector diversification in an industry. 
Regarding survival, and in line with risk reduction arguments (e.g. Bercovitz and Mitchell, 
2007; Lubatkin and Chatterjee, 1994), the analysis shows that intra-industry diversification 
beyond the sub-sector is the key driver behind the survival enhancing effect of intra-industry 
diversification. This contrasts with findings by the only other study on intra-industry 
diversification and survival (Stern and Henderson, 2004) who find no significant effect of 
beyond sub-sector diversification and survival. Regarding performance, the analysis shows 
that intra-industry diversification beyond the sub-sector enhances firm performance while 
within sub-sector diversification decreases performance, contributing to an overall negative 
performance effect of intra industry diversification. This corresponds to and expands upon 
findings in the extant, yet still fairly limited literature on intra-industry diversification (e.g. 
Zahavi and Lavie, 2013 and Tanriverdi and Lee, 2008). 
Third, the analysis investigates non-linear effects of intra-industry diversification on both 
firm survival and performance. While intra-industry diversification is generally survival 
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enhancing, there seems to be a survival decreasing aspect of overdiversification, which 
counters a conjecture by Bercovitz and Mitchell (2007) that problems of overdiversification 
are most relevant to distant inter-industry diversification. Higher levels of intra-industry 
diversification are positively related to firm performance, which is in line with the findings of 
Zahavi and Lavie (2013). 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 3 reviews the related literature, 
whereas section 4 develops the hypotheses to be tested in the empirical analysis. Section 5 
introduces the empirical setting, while sections 6 and 7 provide information about the data 
and the regression models, respectively. Section 8 presents the results of the regression 
analyses whereas section 9 discusses the boundary conditions, contributions and practitioner 
implications of the results. Section 10 concludes. 
2.3 Review of the Related Literature 
The following section provides an overview of related work and positions the chapter in the 
scholarly conversation on intra-industry diversification as an emerging literature 
complementing research on inter-industry diversification. First, however, a brief summary of 
the insights, which research on inter-industry diversification has provided on the link to 
performance and survival, is presented. 
Concerning the debate on the relationship between diversification and performance, most 
scholarly work has investigated inter-industry diversification. In the strategy field, the 
scholarly enquiry started with early seminal contributions from, among others, Rumelt 
(1974), Teece (1980), Bettis (1981) and Rumelt (1982). The early work on diversification 
yielded the important insight that the relationship among the activities in various industries 
matters, specifically that diversification seems to be positively related to performance if the 
businesses of the firm are related. 
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This positive performance effect was largely attributed to resource sharing, i.e. economies of 
scope in the “recurrent use of proprietary knowhow or the common and recurrent use of a 
specialised and indivisible physical asset” (Teece, 1980, p. 223). The shared resource, upon 
which a firm draws when expanding beyond its industry, may be physical or intangible, e.g. 
knowledge related (for example synergies in R&D, Bettis, 1981). In a similar spirit of 
‘resource sharing’, Farjoun (1994, p. 186) notes that “diversification is directed into target 
industries that require resources (e.g., technical and marketing skills) similar to the resources 
of the diversifying firms”. Peteraf (1993, p. 188), who argues that “the prevailing theory of 
diversification can be characterised as resource-based” more generally notes, that a firm’s 
resources seem to determine its business scope: “For an individual firm, whether it is a 
single-line business or widely diversified, the critical task is to use its available resources to 
the greatest end they can support” (Peteraf, 1993, p. 189).  
Markides and Williamson (1996, p. 240) illustrate with an example how resource sharing is 
connected to inter-industry diversification: “the Citizen Watch Company Ltd. claims that its 
diversified products, which include watches, printers for personal computers, floppy disk 
drives, small portable PCs, liquid crystal color TVs, quartz oscillators, and precision 
machine tools and robots, share a common set of advanced, precision technologies that the 
company developed in the course of manufacturing watches.” 
Related to these resource sharing explanations but looking outward towards competitors, 
another possibility for the performance implications are market power explanations, in which 
the firm may cross-subsidise products to ‘price competition out of a market’ (e.g. Berger and 
Ofek, 1995 and Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990). Diversification into unrelated businesses 
however was seen to be less beneficial to performance (Rumelt, 1974; Montgomery and 
Wernerfelt, 1988) and potentially associated with, for example, managerial diseconomies, 
inefficiencies as well as governance and control limits (Markides, 1992). In their summary of 
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the insights of inter-industry diversification research from the 1970s to the late 1990s, Palich, 
Cardinal and Miller (2000) conjecture that the relationship between performance and inter-
industry diversification roughly follows an inverted u-shape, with moderate levels of 
diversification being associated with the highest levels of performance. Benefits of 
diversification however seem to decrease once firms move to diversification into unrelated 
industries. Concerning intra-industry diversification, which Palich, Cardinal and Miller 
(2000, p. 159) call “limited diversification”, the authors conjecture that it may not be 
positively related to firm performance due to “limited opportunities to leverage resources and 
capabilities” (Palich, Cardinal and Miller, 2000, p. 159). 
Compared to the inter-industry diversification link to firm performance, a line of enquiry, 
which has received less attention, seems to be the link between inter-industry diversification 
and survival. This may partly be due to the fact that the majority of prior research has 
investigated the diversification of very large firms (e.g. Fortune 500 firms, Bettis, 1981; 
Rumelt, 1982; Markides and Williamson, 1994; Bergh and Lawless, 1998 or large firms in 
the petroleum industry, Teece, 1980), which are unlikely to fail within a limited observation 
period, hence limiting the variance in the survival variable. Two studies, which have drawn 
the inter-industry diversification-survival link are Cottrell and Nault (2004) and Bercovitz 
and Mitchell (2007). Both studies indicate that in general, diversification seems to be 
positively related to survival. However, there seem to be boundary conditions, such as the 
distance of diversification or the potential survival decreasing effect of overdiversification, 
should a firm not be able to refocus swiftly. The survival enhancing effect may be due to the 
risk reducing characteristic of diversification, which seems to apply especially to related 
diversification (Lubatkin and Chatterjee, 1994). Related diversification best combines the 
portfolio effect of imperfectly correlated cash flows among the lines of operation, while still 
being able to capture potential resource synergies from combining related businesses. 
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Cottrell and Nault, 2004 investigate inter-industry diversification in the wider computer 
software industry corresponding roughly to SIC codes 7371 (computer programming 
services) and 7372 (prepackaged software). The authors find that diversification within a 
software category or hardware platform, in which the firm is already active, is positively 
associated with firm survival, whereas diversification into new software categories or 
servicing new hardware platforms is negatively associated with firm survival. The authors 
attribute the negative survival implications to the higher costs and potential risks a firm is 
exposed to when expanding into new software categories or hardware platforms.  
Bercovitz and Mitchell (2007) point out that when investigating the scope-survival 
relationship, it is important to control for scale as well as profitability. The authors approach 
the ‘scope’ aspect of their investigation from an angle of inter-industry diversification 
looking at the medical and healthcare industries. They find that scope positively impacts 
survival, which may be due to, among others, resource sharing/resource allocation efficiency 
and risk reduction due to imperfectly correlated cash flows from the diversified activities. 
The authors also point to the potential negative effects of overdiversification, which they 
conjecture to be caused by too much unrelated diversification. Contrary to this note, the 
present study shows that also settings of intra-industry diversification are not immune to this 
liability of overdiversification. 
2.3.1 Brief overview of the extant literature on intra-industry diversification. Intra-
industry diversification has been long ignored and is only a nascent field in the strategy 
literature (Zahavi and Lavie, 2013; Tanriverdi and Lee, 2008; Li and Greenwood, 2004). Of 
the few studies that have addressed this emerging domain, most studies conceptualised intra-
industry diversification rather widely (e.g. as diversification within the industries summarised 
under a four digit SIC code) and have focused on firm performance as outcome variable. This 
rather broad definition of intra-industry diversification seems to have been driven by 
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constraints in the empirical datasets the researchers used. Considering this broad empirical 
operationalisation of intra-industry diversification in combination with a fairly wide array of 
different measures of performance, extant studies have – maybe not surprisingly – produced 
mixed results: 
Zahavi and Lavie (2013) study sales growth of firms in the pre-packaged software industry as 
performance measure and find a u-shaped relationship between intra-industry diversification 
and performance. They explain this finding, which is counterintuitive given findings of 
related, inter-industry diversification, with limitations to economies of scope at low levels of 
intra-industry diversification. Overlapping functionality with limited complementary value, 
cannibalisation and redundancy, as well as potential cognitive biases of managers are 
mentioned as possible explanations for this finding. 
In their study of firms in the general insurance industry, Li and Greenwood (2004) have 
focused on return on assets (ROA) as a performance variable and conclude that they “found 
no benefits of intra industry diversification per se" (Li and Greenwood, 2004, p. 1146). Intra-
industry diversification did not show a significant effect on ROA in their analysis. By 
comparison, Tanriverdi and Lee (2008) take market share and sales growth as dependent 
variables and find that intra-industry diversification, depending on the model, is either 
insignificant or it reduces sales growth when it is implemented without a broader strategy 
beyond intra-industry diversification (e.g. platform diversification). 
Stern and Henderson (2004) is the only study, which has investigated the impact of intra-
industry diversification on firm survival. This study made a first attempt at describing intra-
industry diversification as differentiated phenomenon. The authors took into account ‘product 
lines’, which may be considered similar to brands. Cadillac, Pontiac and Saab are mentioned 
for example as ‘product lines’ of General Motors. These ‘product lines’ may be comparable 
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to within sub-sector diversification in the hedge fund industry (e.g. a long short equity fund 
with focus on the US healthcare sector versus a long short equity fund with focus on 
European oil and gas companies). Whereas this shows that there is variance within the 
investment strategy ‘bucket’ of hedge funds, the differences across strategies seem to be 
wider than ‘brand differences’ – e.g. a long short equity fund (investing in stocks) vs. a global 
macro fund (investing in currencies and sovereign debt). In terms of results, Stern and 
Henderson (2004) do not find a significant effect of across line diversification on survival and 
some evidence that within (primary) line diversification enhances survival. In their analyses, 
the authors do not control for performance as variable affecting organisational survival (e.g. 
Bercovitz and Mitchell, 2007) and they do not take into account possible non-linear effects of 
diversification on survival. 
Table 1 summarises the studies and findings in the nascent literature stream of intra-industry 
diversification. 
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Table 1: Summary of studies and findings in the emerging literature stream of intra-
industry diversification 
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2.3.2 Other related work. Although not directly concerned with ‘intra-industry 
diversification’, de Figueiredo and Rawley (2011) investigate the performance implications 
of a subset of hedge fund firms taking the step from a one product to a two product firm. The 
authors find a negative within-firm effect of the ‘1 to 2 fund’ diversification on hedge fund 
firm performance. As their focus is specifically on the first step of diversification (i.e. the 
expansion from 1 to 2 funds), the authors do not investigate intra-industry diversification as a 
wider and potentially more differentiated phenomenon. 
Not related conceptually to the diversification literature but related with regard to the 
empirical setting, Miller (2012) has investigated failure of US hedge fund firms from a lens 
of organisational/entrepreneurial learning. Consistent with the baseline results of the present 
study, the author shows that diversification is negatively related to HFMC failure. However, 
the analysis does not consider performance and scale (i.e. assets under management) as 
potentially important control variables in an investigation of diversification and survival 
(Bercovitz and Mitchell, 2007). Furthermore, as the conceptual focus of the study is not on 
diversification, the fine-grained difference between intra-industry diversification within and 
beyond sub sectors of the hedge fund industry is not investigated. 
2.3.3 Survival vs. performance as outcome variables. Firm performance and survival are 
important outcome variables. The following paragraphs briefly discuss performance and 
survival as outcome variables and propose that investigating both of them in the same study, 
while potentially increasing the complexity of the analysis and the results, may be fruitful as 
it may lead to a “better and more complete understanding” (Delios and Beamish, 2001, p. 
1035) of the studied phenomenon. 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘survival’ as “the continuing to live after some event” 
(OED Online, 2014a). Survival is the most basic measure of ‘performance’ in a sense that it 
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is “a necessary condition for positive profits” (Cottrell and Nault, 2004, p. 1015). Whereas 
firm survival is a somewhat more narrowly focused concept compared to performance, it can 
be understood in various forms, mostly via its opposite outcomes, such as firm failure (e.g. 
divestiture, dissolution, bankruptcy; e.g. Bercovitz and Mitchell, 2007; Delios and Beamish, 
2001, Kalleberg and Leicht, 1991), industry exit (e.g. Stern and Henderson, 2004, 
Sleuwaegen and Onkelinx, 2014), or ‘inactivity’ (e.g. Hill and Birkinshaw, 2008). In 
addition, survival may be considered as a more holistic gauge of ‘performance’ since it 
includes a wider range of stakeholders (compared to performance, which seems to be a 
variable tailored to shareholders and managers): “survival is a meaningful performance 
measure for multiple stakeholders in a business […] survival and failure affect other 
stakeholders, including employees, suppliers, distributors, and communities, who make 
dedicated investments in a particular business” (Bercovitz and Mitchell, 2007, p. 62). 
By comparison, ‘performance’ seems to be a broader concept, which is mirrored in its 
definition in the Oxford English Dictionary: “The quality of execution of […] an action, 
operation, or process; the competence or effectiveness of a person or thing in performing an 
action” (OED Online, 2014b). Compared to the relatively limited operationalisation of 
survival, many different variables may be understood to indicate performance. The following 
list provides illustrative examples rather than being exhaustive: Market-based measures, such 
as sales growth (Zahavi and Lavie, 2013; Tanriverdi and Lee, 2008), sales (Laursen and 
Salter, 2006) or market share (Tanriverdi and Lee, 2008). Accounting-based measures also 
find application, such as growth of gross earnings (Kalleberg and Leicht, 1991) or 
accounting-based measures of returns, such as return on assets or return on equity (e.g. Li and 
Greenwood, 2004; Ray et al., 2013; Hitt, Hoskisson and Kim, 1997; Roberts, 1999). Other 
measures are based on Likert-scale assessments in surveys (Foss et al., 2011; Hill and 
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Birkinshaw, 2008; Delios and Beamish, 2001), or are more unconventional/tailored to a 
specific setting, such as time from initiation to completion (Macher and Boerner, 2006). 
Although survival and performance are popular as outcome variables in the literature, they 
are usually investigated in isolation. Studies typically focus on either survival or 
performance. Rarely are both variables investigated in the same study. The reasons for this 
may lie in data constraints, narrow focus of a study, difficulty of the involved analysis, or 
potential complexity of results (i.e. when the two outcome variables yield seemingly 
conflicting results). 
Survival seems to be the most basic measure of firm ‘performance’, which acts as 
prerequisite for any other measure of performance. Despite this relation of the measures, the 
few researchers who have investigated both performance and survival, have pointed out that 
the measures are distinct. In a conceptual essay, Schaffer (1989, p. 30) points out that profit 
maximisation “does not ‘summarise appropriately the conditions for survival”. Along those 
lines, empirical researchers have noted the “divergent antecedents of these two outcome 
variables – performance and survival” (Hill and Birkinshaw, 2007, p. 441) as a result of 
identifying different drivers of performance and survival. Hill and Birkinshaw (2007, p. 441) 
for example find that corporate venture units with "longer-term and more uncertain objectives 
are more easily closed down when other priorities take precedence within the parent 
company”, regardless of the performance track record. In a study on the performance and 
survival of multinational firms, Delios and Beamish (2001, p. 1028) also note that “survival 
and profitability have different antecedents”. In particular, the authors noted different effects 
of a multinational firm’s host country experience on firm survival and profitability. 
Continuing with the theme that performance and survival are distinct outcome variables 
driven by different factors, Kalleberg and Leicht (1991, p. 137) note in a study on gender and 
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organisational performance that “survival and success are distinct aspects of performance that 
are determined by different processes”. 
In summary, these examples from the literature suggest that performance and survival seem 
to be distinct outcome measures and although they are conceptually related (without survival 
no performance), they seem to be determined by different factors and a positive impact of an 
independent variable on one of these outcome measure does not automatically imply a similar 
effect on the other. 
The emerging literature on intra-industry diversification (as well as most of the work on 
inter-industry diversification) has predominantly focused on performance as outcome 
variable. Whereas performance may be an adequate outcome variable for large corporations 
and their endeavours of inter-industry diversification (e.g. Bergh and Lawless, 1998), most 
firms in developed as well as developing countries tend to be small and entrepreneurial, yet 
very important for the economy11. The focus on small, entrepreneurial firms may imply that 
survival is a useful outcome variable in addition to performance, since failure is a very real 
threat for small, entrepreneurial firms (Freeman et al, 1983). 
2.4 Development of Hypotheses 
This thesis chapter investigates the effect of intra-industry diversification on survival and 
performance. Six hypotheses are developed and tested. The first three hypotheses (H1-H3) 
relate to the relationship between intra-industry diversification and firm survival whereas the 
second three hypotheses (H4-H6) relate to the relationship between intra-industry 
diversification and firm performance. 
2.4.1 The effect of intra-industry diversification on firm survival. In order to create a 
connection point to prior research on intra-industry diversification (e.g. Zahavi and Lavie, 
                                               
11
 For example research by the World Bank using a sample of 99 countries showed that SMEs with less than 50 
people were responsible for 32% of the jobs created (Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2011). 
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2013), diversification and survival (e.g. Bercovitz and Mitchell, 2007), as well as studies 
investigating diversification in the hedge fund context (e.g. de Figueiredo and Rawley, 2011), 
hypothesis 1 predicts that intra-industry diversification enhances firm survival. This may be 
the case because of risk reduction. Firms as a whole become less exposed to volatility in one 
product market in a sense that environmental shocks or changes in customer preferences in 
one product can be ‘levelled out’ by another product. Due to these dissimilarities in product 
markets, “the cash flows of different product lines correlate imperfectly, so that product line 
breadth reduces the variance, and thus the overall risk, of the business” (Bercovitz and 
Mitchell, 2007, p. 65). This reasoning seems to be in line with the ‘practical’ statement of the 
general manager of a hedge fund (AUM category: 250m-500m), who noted: “If you have 
multiple products, you are not as hard hit if something adversary happens”. 
H1: Intra-industry diversification is positively related to firm survival. 
However, “business expansion does not come without costs and beyond some point, the costs 
may outweigh the benefits of greater breadth” (Bercovitz and Mitchell, 2007, p. 66). This 
may be relevant for survival if firms cannot easily or cheaply re-narrow their level of intra-
industry diversification. Bercovitz and Mitchell (2007) claim that this may only happen if a 
firm overstretches its scope in an exercise of inter-industry diversification. The present paper 
however puts this to an empirical test and argues that the negative consequences of 
overdiversification may also exist as far as intra-industry diversification is concerned. This 
may be due to increasing costs per unit of additional diversification, e.g. due to managerial 
diseconomies of scale or higher complexity of management (Markides, 1992). Moreover, 
small, entrepreneurial firms may not have enough spare resources to re-narrow their business 
scope. 
H2: High levels of intra-industry diversification are negatively related to firm survival. 
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This paper views intra-industry diversification not as a homogenous phenomenon but 
identifies finer sub-categories: diversification within and beyond a subsector of an industry. 
This goes beyond the different ‘brands’ as used by Stern and Henderson (2004). They argue 
that more closely related diversification enhances firm survival since resources can be shared 
across products. While this seems intuitive, Zahavi and Lavie (2013) show evidence that 
close intra-industry diversification may lead to limited economies of scope in the use of 
resources and may introduce new costs due to cognitive biases (i.e. ‘negative transfer effects’ 
occurring in the application of resources to seemingly similar, yet distinct products). 
Furthermore, overlapping functionality, redundancy or cannibalisation with respect to other 
products of the firm may be additional forces, which put the firm at a higher risk of failure. 
In addition to arguments involving the efficient or inefficient sharing or distribution of 
resources across diversified operations, the risk reducing perspective of diversification also 
seems to merit consideration. According to the argument above regarding the imperfect 
correlation of cash flows across different products (e.g. Bercovitz and Mitchell, 2007; 
Lubatkin and Chatterjee, 1994), one may expect that diversification beyond a sub-sector 
(within the same industry) to have higher survival benefits for the firm than the 
diversification within one sub-sector. Since activities within the same industry (regardless if 
within or beyond the sub-sector) seem to have a degree of relation, resource sharing may 
apply to both components. The portfolio effect of imperfectly correlated cash flows among 
the lines of operation seems to especially apply to beyond sub-sector diversification within 
the same industry. Combined this leads to the following hypothesis: 
H3: Intra-industry diversification beyond sub-sectors has a stronger survival enhancing 
effect than diversification within sub-sectors of an industry. 
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2.4.2 The effect of intra-industry diversification on firm performance. Although the 
general inter-industry diversification literature has found a positive performance effect of 
related diversification (e.g. Rumelt, 1974; Rumelt, 1982; Teece, 1980; Bettis, 1981; Palich, 
Cardinal and Miller, 2000), scholars investigating intra-industry diversification have shown 
evidence that close intra-industry diversification may be negatively associated with 
performance (e.g. Zahavi and Lavie, 2013; Tanriverdi and Lee, 2008), for example due to 
“negative transfer” (Zahavi and Lavie, 2013, p. 979): Negative transfer indicates that 
“learned behavior can generate negative consequences when a practice is applied with no 
adjustments in a context that is slightly different from the context in which learning originally 
occurred”. 
Along the lines of these results in the extant literature on intra-industry diversification, it is 
hypothesised that intra-industry diversification is negatively related to performance. 
Compared to the extant studies on intra-industry diversification and performance, which have 
largely investigated sales growth or market share as performance measures (Zahavi and 
Lavie, 2013 and Tanriverdi and Lee, 2011), or accounting based performance measures (e.g. 
return on assets, Li and Greenwood, 2004), this chapter investigates return on invested capital 
as performance measure. 
H4: Intra-industry diversification is negatively related to firm performance. 
Similar to hypothesis 2, a non-linear relationship between intra-industry diversification and 
performance is investigated. As pointed out by Zahavi and Lavie (2013), economies of scope, 
such as effective resource sharing or resource redeployment, may materialise at higher levels 
of intra-industry diversification. At the same time, potential negative effects of very close 
intra-industry diversification such as provision of limited complementary value, redundancies 
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with existing products or ‘negative transfer’ may be mitigated by a greater distance of intra-
industry diversification. In summary, the following hypothesis is stated: 
H5: High levels of intra-industry diversification are positively related to firm performance. 
With respect to the components of intra-industry diversification, i.e. diversification within 
and beyond a sub-sector of the industry, an interesting duality arises, which prior literature 
has not postulated and tested empirically. 
If the proposed logic of Zahavi and Lavie (2013) applies, one would hypothesise to see 
opposite performance effects for the suggested two components of intra-industry 
diversification. Diversification within the sub-sector is fairly close intra-industry 
diversification, which may have negative performance effects since the adjustment of 
resources to seemingly similar, yet distinct uses can lead to ‘negative transfer effects’ “since 
managers may fail to recognize subtle yet critical differences across the firm’s closely related 
products” (Zahavi and Lavie, 2013, p. 982). “Believing that a product should be managed 
according to practices that have been developed for related products, managers may 
inappropriately apply existing resources” (Zahavi and Lavie, 2013, p. 982), which may result 
in the negative impact of within sub-sector diversification on performance. This negative 
impact may be intensified by the provision of limited complementary value to customers, 
which may entail cannibalisation in the sales of closely related products in addition to the 
increased costs from ‘negative transfer’. 
By comparison, diversification beyond the sub-sector may alleviate the effects of negative 
transfer since the more pronounced differences between the products may make the required 
adjustments in the firm’s resource set more evident. Hence, at this greater ‘distance’ of intra-
industry diversification, the synergies and efficiency gains in the use of a firm’s resources 
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(e.g. Tanriverdi and Lee, 2008 and Li and Greenwood, 2004) via “resource redeployment 
across related product markets” (Zahavi and Lavie, 2013, p. 980) may materialise. 
H6: Intra-industry diversification beyond sub-sectors is positively related to firm 
performance while intra-industry diversification within sub-sectors is negatively related to 
firm performance. 
Figure 1 explicates the causal imagery to be tested in the empirical analysis of this chapter 
and summarises the presented hypotheses. 
 
Figure 1: Summary of hypotheses. 
 
2.5 The Empirical Setting 
The setting for the empirical analysis is the global hedge fund industry. As noted in the 
introduction, hedge funds firms are lightly-regulated, pooled investment vehicles for 
‘sophisticated’ investors. Their restriction to ‘sophisticated’ investors allows for the use of 
advanced but also fairly risky investment techniques such as leverage or short-selling (Hardie 
and MacKenzie, 2007). Managers are usually compensated not only with a management fee 
(e.g. 2% of assets under management, AUM) but also a performance fee (e.g. 20% of positive 
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investment returns). There are several reasons why the hedge fund industry seems to be an 
adequate setting to investigate the relationship between intra-industry diversification and firm 
survival, as well as firm performance. 
First, hedge fund firms are small, focused and knowledge-driven entrepreneurial firms, which 
usually start up with one product (i.e. one investment fund). In this industry, which is shaped 
by numerous small firms, failure is an integral part of the industry (the average firm only 
survives for a bit more than five and a half years12). Various authors have commented on the 
short-lived nature of hedge funds, for example Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1999, p. 
92): “The downside to managing hedge funds is that they frequently disappear. The rate of 
attrition of hedge funds is relatively high” or investment veteran Barton Biggs (2012, p. 
xviii): “it is a battle – the battle for investment survival”. The meaning of survival in the 
hedge fund industry was aptly summarised by Nobel laureate Myron Scholes (2004, p. 10): 
“Most hedge funds are organized as ‘hunter’ groups that will not survive for many 
generations. That is, few have figured out how to build a business or a ‘farm’ to create an 
enterprise that has franchise value […] Survivorship, however, is proof of a value added 
activity” [emphasis added].  
Second, the hedge fund industry provides a narrower focus on a setting of intra-industry 
diversification compared to the broad operationalisation on the 4 digit SIC code level 
prevalent in the extant literature on intra-industry diversification (e.g. Zahavi and Lavie, 
2013; Stern and Henderson, 2004; Tanriverdi and Lee, 2008). Although not stated 
specifically in extant research, the operationalisation of intra-industry diversification at the 4 
digit SIC code level implies that the boundaries of an industry are understood to be fairly 
wide. While “a precise and meaningful definition of an industry is a vain objective” 
(Robinson, 1956, p. 361), and resulting classifications may lead to arbitrary groupings 
                                               
12
 Analysis based on empirical dataset used in this thesis. Please see Table 2 for further descriptive statistics. 
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(Nightingale 1978; Porac and Thomas, 1990), it seems somewhat daring to consider firms 
with the same 4 digit SIC codes as part of the same industry as it covers very different 
products and activities. In the case of Zahavi and Lavie (2013), the ‘prepackaged software 
industry’ (SIC 7372) includes different products (e.g. data processing software, computer 
games, operating systems, programming software) as well as different functions (such as  
publishing, design, production). To make the point even clearer, if one looks at the SIC 
‘bucket’ of the hedge fund industry (SIC 6211; First Research, 2014) one would consider 
stock brokers, mutual funds, investment banks and other securities investors all as the same 
‘industry’. This present research focuses on the hedge fund industry as a focused intra-
industry setting of fairly homogenous firms (compared with 4 digit SIC code categories). 
Conceptually, this focus is important since the broad approach to intra-industry 
diversification via 4 digit SIC codes may have contributed to the mixed results on intra-
industry diversification in the extant literature. 
Third, the compensation of hedge fund managers does not ‘naturally’ require or incentivise 
them to engage in intra-industry diversification since their compensation is based on assets 
and not the number of products under management. Hence, having multiple products is not 
necessarily a ‘natural state’ a firm converges to once it matures. Nevertheless, the proportion 
of multi vs. single-product firms has increased from 50% in 1994 to 78% in 201213.  
2.6 Data and Variables 
2.6.1 Dataset. The dataset comes from the Lipper TASS hedge fund database with monthly 
observations between January 1994 and November 2012. The TASS hedge fund database is 
widely used for hedge fund research (e.g. Baden-Fuller, Ferriani, Mengoli, and Torlo, 2013; 
Bollen and Pool 2012; Agarwal, Daniel and Naik 2009; Fung, Hsieh, Naik and Ramadorai, 
                                               
13
 For more details and an illustration of the year-by-year development, please see Figure 4. 
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2008, etc.) and is considered to be one of the most comprehensive commercial datasets (e.g. 
de Figueiredo and Rawley, 2011).  
For the analysis, funds of funds were excluded from the dataset since they are not just an 
‘investment style’ but represent, as additional intermediary, a different firm from ‘regular’ 
hedge fund management companies. In order to deal with outliers, all variables (except those 
ranging between 0 and 1) were winsorised at the 1% and 99% tails (cf. Klein and Zur, 2009). 
Since assets under management (in log) are an important control variable and the returns of 
the management company are calculated by weighing the returns of the underlying funds by 
AUM (please see variable definition below), observations with missing AUM were excluded. 
The overall sample size is 219,479 firm-month observations of 3,295 HFMCs. 
Since managers self-report their information to hedge fund databases, potential biases in 
hedge fund databases were discussed in the literature (e.g. Liang 2000; Fung and Hsieh, 
2006). Survivorship bias and selection bias may be considered as categories of potential bias. 
In order to account for survivorship bias, the dataset includes both operating and defunct 
funds. In a database of only ‘live’ funds, the estimates (for example of returns) may be biased 
upwards since the database only covers survivors. Lower performing HFMCs may have 
closed down and dropped out of the database. To avoid this bias, the database used for this 
research is composed of life and dead funds (i.e. funds are retained (and not dropped out of) 
the database, even if they are dead). Selection bias may exist because reporting to hedge fund 
databases is voluntary. In fact, some hedge fund managers may opt to not report to any 
database due to poor performance, while others may decide to not report to a database 
because their fund has reached an optimal size and does not need to attract additional capital. 
Hence, no hedge fund dataset represents the full universe of firms active in the hedge fund 
industry. Since it is impossible to measure the unobservable number of funds, which did not 
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register with any database, Fung and Hsieh (2006, p. 11) conclude that “neither the 
magnitude nor the direction of the net effect of selection bias is clear”. 
2.6.2 Variable definitions. The analysis focuses on two dependent variables: hedge fund 
firm performance and survival. Hedge fund firm performance is measured by the returns of 
the hedge fund firm. The returns of the hedge fund firm i in month t are the returns of the 
underlying funds j weighted by assets under management in t-114: 
HFMC Return i, t = 
∑ j, t-1(	
	j,t) 
∑ j, t-1
  
The dependent variable of the analysis is hedge fund firm failure. A hedge fund firm is 
defined as dead if all its underlying funds stopped reporting (e.g. Grecu, Malkiel and Saha, 
2007) to the database and at least one underlying fund was classified as ‘liquidated’. Of the 
3,295 hedge fund management companies in the sample, this definition classifies 941 firms 
(28.6%) as ‘dead’. This variable is operationalised for the fixed effects panel OLS regressions 
by a dynamic indicator variable that takes the value of one in the 12 months prior to the date 
that the hedge fund management company ‘died’. For the Cox regressions, the indicator 
variable was recoded to turn one only in the month that the hedge fund firm died. 
The main explanatory variable is intra-industry diversification, which is the number of fund 
products offered by the HFMC – i.e. the number of funds a hedge fund firm manages in any 
given month15 between 1994 and 2012. The focus on the hedge fund industry may allow for a 
more focused perspective on intra-industry diversification compared to the broad four digit 
SIC code conceptualisation of an ‘industry’ used in other studies (e.g. Zahavi and Lavie, 
2013; Stern and Henderson, 2004; Tanriverdi and Lee, 2008). 
                                               
14
 Since the calculation of the AUM-weighted returns for the management company requires assets under 
management, observations with missing AUM were excluded from the analysis. 
15
 This variable as well as the other variables are dynamically calculated for every firm-month observation in the 
dataset. 
42 
 
In further analyses, this variable of intra-industry diversification is broken down into its 
components of within and beyond sub-sector diversification: 
(1) Diversification beyond the sub-sector: This variable denotes the number of unique 
investment strategies offered by a HFMC’s funds under management (every fund 
belongs to one investment strategy ‘bucket’). Investment strategies are fairly broad 
‘buckets’ for the classification of what a HF does. The 11 investment strategies in the 
TASS database are the following: convertible arbitrage, dedicated short bias, 
emerging markets, equity market neural, event driven, fixed income arbitrage, global 
macro, long short equity hedge, managed futures, multi-strategy and options strategy. 
As every hedge fund firm offers at least one fund, the minimum of this variable is 1. 
(2) Diversification within the sub-sector: This variable denotes the difference between the 
number of funds and the number of unique investment strategies offered by the hedge 
fund firm. This measure of intra-investment strategy diversification reflects the 
number of additional funds the firm manages within its unique investment strategies. 
For focused hedge fund firms with only one fund, the minimum of this variable is 0 
(i.e. the firm does not offer additional funds within its unique strategy). 
The basic idea behind the components of intra-industry diversification is that a HFMC, which 
has funds in two (or more) of these investment strategy buckets is more diversified than a 
HFMC, which has two (or more) funds within the same investment strategy bucket16. The 
following example may further clarify the meaning and operationalisation of the intra-
industry diversification variable and its components: A HFMC offers a total of 5 funds in two 
unique investment strategy buckets (e.g. long short equity hedge and event driven). The 
firm’s score on the ‘intra-industry diversification’ variable is 5. Its score on intra-industry 
                                               
16
 An example for two funds in the bucket of ‘long short equity hedge’ would be the following: one long short 
equity hedge fund with focus on US pharmaceuticals and one long short equity hedge fund with focus on 
European retailers. 
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diversification beyond the sub-sector is 2 (because its funds offer 2 unique investment 
strategies) whereas the firm’s score on intra-industry diversification within sub-sectors is 3 
(because it offers 3 additional funds within these two investment strategies)17. 
The analysis includes several control variables, such as the standard deviation, skewness and 
kurtosis of returns, as well as the hedge fund firm’s size (natural logarithm of assets under 
management), age and the ‘active firm-investor network’, which chapter 3 of this thesis 
focuses on (for the detailed definition of this variable, please refer to chapter 3.4.2.1). Capital 
flows, a further control variable, are defined as follows (e.g. Agarwal, Daniel and Naik, 2009; 
Fung, Hsieh, Naik and Ramadorai 2008):  
HRMC Flows i,t = 
	i,t		i, t-1	(		
	i, t)
		i, t-1
 
In addition, Fung and Hsieh eight factor alphas were estimated. All alpha measures were 
calculated in a rolling window regression with a ‘learning period’ of 12 months. Following 
the standard method of Fung and Hsieh (2001 and 2004), the fund returns above the risk free 
rate are regressed against the following eight factors, the constant in the regression is ‘alpha’: 
1. Equity factor (S&P 500), 2. equity size factor (Russell 2000 less S&P 500), 3. emerging 
market factor (MSCI Emerging Market Index), 4. bond market factor (constant maturity 
adjusted ten-year Treasury bond yield), 5. bond credit spread factor (change in Moody’s 
BAA credit spread over a constant-maturity adjusted 10 year Treasury bond yield) and three 
trend-following option factors formed from excess returns on portfolios of lookback straddles 
for 6. bonds, 7. currencies and 8. commodities18. Table 2 presents the summary statistics. 
                                               
17
 Please note that this firm would have the same intra strategy diversification score if it had 3 funds in the ‘long 
short equity hedge’ bucket and 2 funds in the ‘event driven’ bucket or vice versa. The firm’s number of 
additional funds across unique investment strategy buckets is 3 in both cases. 
18
 Further information on the eight risk factors and the composition of the model can be found on David Hsieh’s 
homepage: http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~dah7/HFRFData.htm  
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics and correlations. (HFMC = Hedge Fund Management 
Company)19 
                                               
19
 Please note that the high correlation between intra-industry diversification and its components is due to the 
construction of the component variables, i.e. Intra-industry Diversification = Beyond Sub-sector Diversification 
+ Within Sub-sector Diversification. In terms of multicollinearity, this is not a concern since the components of 
intra-industry diversification and its combined measure do not appear in the same regression. 
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2.7 Regression Models 
In the first step of the empirical analysis, the effect of intra-industry diversification on the 
survival of hedge fund firm i in month t is investigated using the following model (OLS fixed 
effects panel regression): 
HFMC Failurei,t = 0 + 1 Intra-Industry Diversification i,t  
  
+ 2 Intra-Industry Diversification Squared i,t 
  + 3 Active Firm-Investor Network i,t + 4 HFMC Return i,t  
  + 5 Standard Deviation of Returns i,t +  6 Skewness of Returns i,t  
  + 7 Kurtosis of Returns i,t + 8 HFMC 8 Factor Alpha i,t  
  + 9 HFMC Flows i,t+ 10 HFMC ln AUM i,t 
  
+ 11 HFMC Age i,t + i + t +  i,t  
i reflects the hedge fund firm fixed effects in order to account for unobserved firm-level 
heterogeneity and  t reflects year fixed effects. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroscedasticity and are clustered on the level of the hedge fund firm in order to account for 
within-firm correlation over time. 
In a second regression model, the same regressions are run with Intra-industry 
Diversification broken down into its components, Within and Beyond Sub-sector 
Diversification.  
In addition to the OLS fixed effects panel regressions, the survival analyses (using the same 
covariates as specified above) were rerun using a Cox regression (e.g. Miller, 2012). The Cox 
model takes the following functional form  
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hi(t) = h(t) exp (xi), 
hi is the mortality hazard rate at time t for firm i. h(t) is the unspecified baseline mortality 
hazard rate whereas xi is a vector of covariates (the same as in the OLS fixed effects panel 
model) and  is a vector of coefficients belonging to the covariates. 
The effect of intra-industry diversification on the performance of the hedge fund firm i in 
month t is investigated using the following model (OLS fixed effects panel regression):  
HFMC Returni,t = 0 + 1 Intra-Industry Diversification i,t 
  + 2 Active Firm-Investor Network i,t + 3 HFMC LnAUM i,t  
  
+ 4 HFMC Age i,t + i + t +  i,t 
i reflects the hedge fund firm fixed effects in order to account for unobserved firm-level 
heterogeneity and  t reflects year fixed effects. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroscedasticity and are clustered on the level of the hedge fund firm in order to account for 
within-firm correlation over time. 
2.8 Results 
The first section shows some descriptive evidence on multi fund hedge fund firms for the 
observation period between 1994 and 2012. The second section shows the results of the 
regression analysis. 
Figure 2 illustrates the data distribution of the intra-industry diversification variable by 
number of firm month observations (as pointed out in the description of the dataset, the 
overall sample size is 219,479 firm-month observations). As illustrated by the figure, the 
hedge fund industry is characterised by fairly focused firms since the majority of the firm-
month observations come from firms with low levels of intra-industry diversification. 
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However, it seems important to note, that even firms, which later diversify, tend to start their 
operations undiversified20, which contributes to the skew of the distribution towards low 
levels of diversification. 
 
Figure 2: Histogram of data distribution of the intra-industry diversification variable. 
This graph shows the distribution of the intra-industry diversification variable by firm-month 
observation (as pointed out in the description of the dataset, the overall sample size is 
219,479 firm-month observations). 
 
Intra-industry diversification in the hedge fund industry (i.e. a hedge fund firm offering 
multiple hedge fund products) has become more prevalent in the past decade as a graphical 
analysis over the observation period indicates. Figure 3 illustrates the average number of 
funds per hedge fund firm, whereas Figure 4 splits funds active in a certain year by their 
affiliation with a non-diversified or an intra-industry diversified firm. 
                                               
20
 This was also noted in the literature, for example by Zahavi and Lavie (2013). 
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Figure 3: Average number of funds per hedge fund firm (HFMC). 
 
Figure 4: Shares of non-diversified versus intra-industry diversified hedge fund firms. 
This graph illustrates the split of the hedge funds active in a given year by affiliation with an 
intra-industry diversified vs. a non-diversified hedge fund management company (HFMC). 
This split is illustrated by columns depicting the number of funds active each year in the two 
categories. The line chart (units on the secondary axis) illustrates this development as share 
of funds in the TASS database. 
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Regarding the results of the regression analysis, the first step in the investigation is an 
analysis of how intra-industry diversification affects HFMC survival. Table 3 shows the 
results from the fixed effects OLS panel regressions whereas Table 4 shows the results from 
the Cox regressions. 
Hypothesis 1 stated that intra-industry diversification is positively related to firm survival. 
Overall, the results of the regression analyses (column 1 of Tables 3 and 4) seem to support 
this hypothesis since intra-industry diversification is negatively related to hedge fund firm 
failure. Concerning the OLS panel fixed effects regression, a one unit increase in the active 
firm-investor network variable is associated with a 0.0114 unit decrease in HFMC failure, 
ceteris paribus. Consistent with the results on the panel OLS fixed effects regression, also the 
Cox regressions show a negative relation between firm mortality rates and intra-industry 
diversification (Table 4). A one unit increase in intra-industry diversification decreases 
mortality hazard by 15% (=exp (−0.1650) − 1). 
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Table 3: Analysis of the impact of intra-industry diversification on HFMC failure (OLS 
Panel Fixed Effects Regression). The death variable is operationalised with a dynamic 
indicator variable that takes the value of one in the 12 months prior to the date that the hedge 
fund management company ‘died’ (as it enters the ‘failure zone’). All standard errors are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the HFMC level. Coefficients marked with 
***, ** and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
 
With respect to the control variables, the active firm investor network is negatively related to 
HFMC failure across the different models, however only significantly so (at conventional 
levels) in the Cox models (for more details on the active firm-investor network, please see 
chapter 3 of this thesis).  
Intra-Industry Diversification -0.0114*** -0.0303***
(.0018) (.0051)
Intra-Industry Diversification Squared 0.0019***
(.0004)
Beyond Sub Sector (Intra-Industry) Diversification -0.0340***
(.0063)
Within Sub Sector (Intra-Industry) Diversification -0.0072***
(.0021)
Active Firm-Investor Network -0.0087 -0.0069 -0.0085
(.0057) (.0057) (.0057)
HFMC Return -0.0716*** -0.0720*** -0.0709***
(.0109) (.0108) (.0108)
Std Deviation of HFMC Return -0.0995 -0.1028 -0.1043
(.0757) (.0757) (.0753)
Skewness of HFMC Return -0.0022 -0.0021 -0.0021
(.0016) (.0016) (.0016)
Kurtosis of HFMC Return 0.0018* 0.0018* 0.0017*
(.0009) (.0009) (.0009)
HFMC 8 Factor Alpha -0.0011 -0.0012 -0.0012
(.0029) (.0029) (.0029)
Flows HFMC -0.0333*** -0.0337*** -0.0330***
(.0047) (.0047) (.0047)
HFMC Ln Assets Under Mgmt -0.0225*** -0.0213*** -0.0225***
(.0023) (.0023) (.0023)
Age of HFMC (in years) 0.0132*** 0.0131*** 0.0131***
(.0020) (.0021) (.0019)
_cons 0.3403*** 0.3419*** 0.3615***
(.0398) (.0398) (.0405)
Firm Fixed Effects YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES
Within R-Squared 0.0640 0.0654 0.0650
Number of Firm-Month Observations 180,664 180,664 180,664
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses
Standard Errors Clustered by HFMC
Hedge Fund Management Company (HFMC) Failure
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The results regarding the other control variables seem intuitively plausible (and in line with 
prior research at the level of analysis of the hedge fund, not the firm, e.g. Liang, 2000, 
Gregoriou, 2002, Amin and Kat, 2003): returns, flows and assets under management are 
negatively related to HFMC failure whereas firm age and kurtosis of returns (fatter tails) are 
positively related to HFMC failure. In the Cox models, also standard deviation and skewness 
are negatively associated with HFMC failure. 
Table 4: Analysis of the impact of intra-industry diversification on HFMC hazard (Cox 
Regression). The death variable is operationalised with a dynamic indicator variable that 
takes the value of one in the month the HFMC ‘died’. The table reports the mortality hazard 
rates for each variable in exponential form (standard errors in parentheses). Coefficients 
marked with ***, ** and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
 
Regarding hypothesis 2, which stated that high levels of intra-industry diversification are 
negatively related to hedge fund firm survival, the results in both Tables 3 and 4 (column 2) 
Intra-Industry Diversification -0.1650*** -0.2775***
(.0369) (.0870)
Intra-Industry Diversification Squared 0.0149
(.0100)
Beyond Sub Sector (Intra-Industry) Diversification -0.5123***
(.1374)
Within Sub Sector (Intra-Industry) Diversification -0.1033**
(.0411)
Active Firm-Investor Network -0.4013*** -0.3983*** -0.4149***
(.1529) (.1533) (.1527)
HFMC Return -5.7607*** -5.7712*** -5.7494***
(.8564) (.8563) (.8560)
Std Deviation of HFMC Return -3.9465*** -3.9928*** -4.1034***
(1.2327) (1.2327) (1.2354)
Skewness of HFMC Return -0.1923*** -0.1918*** -0.1917***
(.0492) (.0492) (.0492)
Kurtosis of HFMC Return 0.0875*** 0.0872*** 0.0871***
(.0294) (.0294) (.0294)
HFMC 8 Factor Alpha -0.0476 -0.0475 -0.0489
(.1296) (.1296) (.1296)
Flows HFMC -1.7743*** -1.7812*** -1.7846***
(.1795) (.1797) (.1801)
HFMC Ln Assets Under Mgmt -0.3385*** -0.3341*** -0.3401***
(.0220) (.0222) (.0220)
Age of HFMC (in years) 0.0269*** 0.0271*** 0.0278***
(.0086) (.0086) (.0086)
Chi-Squared 597.9*** 599.9*** 605.9***
Number of Firm-Month Observations 180,664 180,664 180,664
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
HFMC Mortality Hazard Rate (Exponential Form)
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indicate that the squared term of intra-industry diversification is positively associated with 
HFMC failure (however not significantly so in the Cox model). This seems to provide initial 
support for the conjecture that it is not easily possible for a HFMC to smoothly re-narrow its 
intra-industry diversification, without being at an increased risk of failure. This finding seems 
to counter the note of Bercovitz and Mitchell (2007, p. 66) that at “the product line level and 
the product sub-sector level […] firms […] are able to subtract obsolete or conflicting 
product lines without damaging their survival chances”. The results indicate that 
overdiversification even in a setting of intra-industry diversification, cannot be rectified in a 
frictionless manner. 
Hypothesis 3 conjectures regarding the components of intra-industry diversification that 
diversification beyond sub-sectors has a stronger survival enhancing effect than 
diversification within sub-sectors. As indicated by column three of Tables 3 and 4, also this 
hypothesis seems to be supported. Both components of intra-industry diversification seem to 
be negatively related to hedge fund firm failure. However, the failure decreasing effect 
(judged by absolute coefficient size) of beyond sub-sector diversification is 4.72 times and 
4.96 times larger than within sub-sector diversification in the OLS panel fixed effects 
regression and the Cox regressions, respectively. This insight contrasts with the findings of 
Stern and Henderson (2004) since they do not find a significant effect of ‘across line 
diversification’. In addition to the different operationalisation of beyond sub-sector 
diversification, another reason for the different results may be that these researchers focus on 
the four digit SIC code as fairly broad understanding of intra-industry diversification. 
Overall, this result seems to be in line with the ‘insurance effect’ of diversification (e.g. 
Bercovitz and Mitchell, 2007; Lubatkin and Chatterjee, 1994). The strong survival enhancing 
effect of beyond sub-sector diversification may be due to imperfectly correlated cash flows 
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from different products, which are within the same industry but in different sub-sectors and 
hence likely less correlated than products within the same sub-sector. 
Moving to hedge fund firm performance as a dependent variable, hypothesis 4 stated that 
intra-industry diversification is negatively related to hedge fund firm performance. The 
results of the analysis presented in Table 5, column 1 show evidence in support of this 
conjecture. Ceteris paribus, a one unit increase in intra-industry diversification is associated 
with a 3 basis point decrease in monthly hedge fund returns. On an annualised basis21, this 
return increase corresponds to 36 basis points. Given average annual returns of hedge fund 
firms of circa 12 percent this seems to be an economically small, yet noteworthy effect (i.e. 3 
percent of annual average performance). This finding is in line with the negative performance 
effect of intra-industry diversification that Zahavi and Lavie (2013) and Tanriverdi and Lee 
(2008) find. However, compared to these studies on intra-industry diversification and 
performance, which have largely investigated sales growth or market share as performance 
measures (Zahavi and Lavie, 2013 and Tanriverdi and Lee, 2011), this chapter investigates 
return on invested capital as performance measure. 
Hypothesis 5 stated that high levels of intra-industry diversification are positively related to 
firm performance. This conjecture, which was derived from insights presented by Zahavi and 
Lavie (2013), is supported by the results of the analysis. The squared term of the intra 
industry diversification measure is significantly and positively related to monthly hedge fund 
firm returns. However, judging from the coefficient size, the economic impact of the effect 
seems to be rather small. 
                                               
21
 Since returns are usually reported on a per annum basis, the effects on monthly returns were annualised, 
which corresponds to usual practice in hedge fund (e.g. Asness, Krail and Liew, 2001 or Liang, 2001) and other 
finance research (e.g. Petengrill, Sundaram and Mathur, 1995 or Statman, 2000). 
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Taking together the findings on hypotheses 4 and 5, this result provides another point of 
evidence that the performance dynamics of intra-industry diversification are indeed different 
to what scholars have found when investigating related inter-industry diversification. In 
contrast to the insights of an inverted u-shape relationship between diversification and 
performance as identified by studies on inter-industry diversification (e.g. Palich, Cardinal 
and Miller, 2000), the intra-industry diversification context seems to show a regular u-shape 
relationship between diversification and performance (Zahavi and Lavie, 2013). 
Hypothesis 6 stated that intra-industry diversification beyond sub-sectors is positively related 
to firm performance while intra-industry diversification within sub-sectors of one industry is 
negatively related to firm performance. This investigation of the performance implications of 
the suggested components of intra-industry diversification is to the best of the author’s 
knowledge novel in the literature. The results presented in Table 5, column 3, show evidence 
in support of this hypothesis. 
Ceteris paribus, a one unit increase in beyond sub-sector diversification is related to a 7 basis 
point increase in monthly hedge fund firm returns, whereas a one unit increase in within 
sector diversification is related to a 5 basis point decrease in returns. On an annualised basis, 
the return increase from beyond sub-sector diversification corresponds to 84 basis points 
whereas the decrease from within sub-sector diversification corresponds to 60 basis points. 
Given average annual returns of hedge fund firms of circa 12 percent this seems like an 
economically noteworthy effect (i.e. 7 and -5 percent of annual average performance, 
respectively). 
This result expands the findings on the performance implications of intra-industry 
diversification by Zahavi and Lavie (2013). It provides additional insights on the driver 
behind the negative performance effect of intra-industry diversification. Close intra-industry 
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diversification indeed seems to create performance decreasing difficulties for the firm, such 
as limited economies of scope in the sharing of resources across products or limited 
complementary value created for customers. By contrast, diversification beyond the sub-
sector is positively related to hedge fund firm performance.  
The investigation of the components of intra-industry diversification brought some 
clarification to the seemingly paradoxical results that intra-industry diversification is 
positively related to firm survival but negatively related to firm performance. The 
performance and survival enhancing effect of beyond sub-sector diversification is consistent 
across models. The negative effect on performance is driven by within sub-sector 
diversification, which seems to still have a minor survival enhancing effect, but reduces firm 
performance. 
Table 5: Analysis of the impact of intra-industry diversification on HFMC returns 
(OLS Panel Fixed Effects Regression). Coefficients marked with ***, ** and * are 
significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
 
Intra-Industry Diversification -0.0003*** -0.0009***
(.0001) (.0003)
Intra-Industry Diversification Squared 0.0001*
(.0000)
Beyond Sub Sector (Intra-Industry) Diversification 0.0007*
(.0004)
Within Sub Sector (Intra-Industry) Diversification -0.0005***
(.0001)
Active Firm-Investor Network 0.0007* 0.0008* 0.0007*
(.0004) (.0004) (.0004)
HFMC Ln Assets Under Mgmt -0.0009*** -0.0008*** -0.0009***
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Age of HFMC (in years) -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002
(.0003) (.0003) (.0003)
_cons 0.0222*** 0.0222*** 0.0213***
(.0025) (.0025) (.0025)
Firm Fixed Effects YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES
Within R-Squared 0.0267 0.0267 0.0267
Number of Firm-Month Observations 215,626 215,626 215,626
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses
Standard Errors Clustered by HFMC
Hedge Fund Management Company (HFMC) Returns
56 
 
2.9 Discussion 
This paper engaged theoretically and empirically with the phenomenon of intra-industry 
diversification and its nascent literature. It investigated two aspects of intra-industry 
diversification: (1) the potential components of intra industry diversification and their effect 
on firm performance and survival and (2) nonlinearities in the relationship between intra-
industry diversification and performance, as well as survival. 
The results in the chapter show a non-trivial relationship between intra-industry 
diversification, performance and survival. Regarding survival, the results indicated that intra-
industry diversification and its components (beyond and within sub-sector diversification) 
enhance survival. Overdiversification may hurt survival, indicating that the readjustment of 
diversification is not easy and frictionless as Bercovitz and Mitchell (2007) conjecture for 
settings of diversification within an industry. Comparing to the few studies on inter-industry 
diversification (Bercovitz and Mitchell, 2007 and Cottrell and Nault, 2004), the survival 
enhancing effect, as well as the indicated inverted u-shape relationship (high levels of 
diversification decrease survival), seems to prevail in both settings of intra- and inter-industry 
diversification. 
Regarding performance, the analysis revealed that while beyond sub-sector diversification is 
positively related to firm performance, within sub-sector diversification is negatively related 
to performance and driving the overall effect of intra-industry diversification on performance. 
This provides some more details on the negative relationship, which also Zahavi and Lavie 
(2013) and Tanriverdi and Lee (2008) find. Furthermore, the analysis of nonlinear 
components confirms the finding of Zahavi and Lavie (2013) that high levels of 
diversification are positively related to performance. The more fine-grained empirical 
analysis of the components of intra-industry diversification seems to provide support for and 
extend the resource-based explanations of the intra-industry diversification – performance 
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relationship. The analysis in this chapter helps to establish the boundaries of when intra-
industry diversification has positive versus negative performance consequences based on the 
‘distance’ of a firm’s diversification within an industry. While diversification within the sub-
sector as fairly ‘close’ intra-industry diversification may have negative performance 
consequences due to ‘negative transfer effects’ (Zahavi and Lavie, 2013) in the redeployment 
of resources, the benefits of the modification and adjustment of firm resources to other 
products may materialise as far as ‘more distant’ intra-industry diversification beyond the 
sub-sector is concerned. 
Overall, this result provides another point of evidence that the performance dynamics of 
intra-industry diversification seem to be different to what scholars have found when 
investigating inter-industry diversification (Zahavi and Lavie, 2013). Putting in context the 
results of intra-industry diversification (a u-shaped relationship between diversification and 
performance) with the results of inter-industry diversification (an inverted u-shaped 
relationship between diversification and performance, e.g. Palich, Cardinal and Miller, 2000) 
the following schematically depicted overall relationship emerges (please see Figure 5). For 
intra-industry diversification, performance may begin to increase once the firm moves into 
different sub-sectors of the industry, whereas for inter-industry diversification, performance 
may begin to decrease once the firm diversifies into unrelated industries. 
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Figure 5: Schematic depiction of the potential performance-diversification relationship 
drawing on insights from studies of intra- and inter-industry diversification. 
 
2.9.1 Boundary conditions. As with any research findings, it may enhance the understanding 
of the findings if their boundary conditions are considered.  
Whereas the context of the hedge fund industry provides a narrow setting for the 
investigation of intra-industry diversification and adds colour to the extant empirical research, 
which has mainly focused on the context of software and information technology (e.g. 
Tanriverdi and Lee, 2008 and Zahavi and Lavie, 2013), it may also slightly underestimate the 
benefits of resource sharing as component of intra-industry diversification. This is the case 
since investor (i.e. customer) capital is normally not easily transferrable between hedge fund 
products since investors usually commit capital directly to a fund of their choice, not the 
overarching firm. Overall, this may slightly underestimate the resource sharing component of 
intra-industry diversification. 
This research is rooted in a setting of ‘homegrown’ intra-industry diversification. Compared 
to the inter-industry diversification of large firms, which may happen via acquisitions (e.g. 
Bergh and Lawless (1998) focus on Fortune 500 companies), this ‘homegrown’ intra-industry 
Intra-Industry Diversification Inter-Industry Diversification
Performance
Degree of 
Diversification
Beyond
Sub-Sector
Related Unrelated
Relation
Within
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diversification seems to have received little scholarly attention. Since ‘homegrown’ 
diversification seems to require fewer resources than ‘diversification by acquisition’, it may 
apply to a larger share of firms. Nevertheless, it seems important to point out this boundary 
condition since ‘homegrown diversification’ and ‘diversification by acquisition’ may be 
governed by slightly different dynamics. 
2.9.2 Contributions. The paper advances the nascent literature on intra-industry 
diversification in four areas. 
First, instead of focusing exclusively on performance or survival as outcome variables, this 
paper investigates both variables, which is novel with respect to intra-industry diversification. 
In fact also for the literature on inter-industry diversification, the joint investigation of these 
two variables seems to have been widely ignored (Bercovitz and Mitchell (2007) is a rare 
exception). However, it may be rewarding to investigate both variables as it may lead to a 
“better and more complete understanding” (Delios and Beamish, 2001, p. 1035) of the 
studied phenomenon.  
The joint analysis of both measures in this chapter showed the seemingly paradoxical result 
that intra-industry diversification is positively related to firm survival while being negatively 
related to firm performance. Given that prior literature emphasised that these outcome 
measures are distinct in their nature and have different drivers (e.g. Schaffer, 1989; Hill and 
Birkinshaw, 2007, Delios and Beamish, 2001) this finding may be regarded as noteworthy 
but not paradoxical. The analysis of the components of intra-industry diversification provided 
a novel insight into these dynamics by showing that diversification beyond the sub-sector of 
the industry is positively related to both survival and performance, while diversification 
within the sub-sector is still positively related to survival yet negatively related to 
performance. This finding indicates that the potentially performance decreasing effects of 
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intra-industry diversification (i.e. limited economies of scope, overlapping functionalities 
with other products, etc.) seem to be especially prevalent for diversification within a sub-
sector. The survival enhancing effect (especially of beyond sub-sector diversification) seems 
to be driven by risk reduction via multiple products with imperfectly correlated cash flows 
(e.g. Bercovitz and Mitchell, 2007; Lubatkin and Chatterjee, 1994). 
Second, the analysis investigates non-linear effects of intra-industry diversification on both 
survival and performance. Whereas the analysis finds evidence in support of the recently 
discovered u-shaped relationship between intra-industry diversification and performance 
(Zahavi and Lavie, 2013), which may be valuable in its own right, the non-linear effect of 
intra-industry diversification on firm survival has not been investigated yet. The findings in 
this paper contrast with a conjecture by Bercovitz and Mitchell (2007, p. 66) that 
overdiversification is not an issue for focused or relatedly diversified firms since at “the 
product line level and the product sub-sector level […] firms […] are able to subtract 
obsolete or conflicting product lines without damaging their survival chances”. The analysis 
in this chapter shows that even as far as intra-industry diversification is concerned, firms may 
not be able to frictionlessly adjust their level of diversification since high levels of intra-
industry diversification are positively related to firm failure. This qualification of the note of 
Bercovitz and Mitchell (2007) may be attributed to the fact that this chapter looks at hedge 
fund firms, which are small and entrepreneurial entities, whereas Bercovitz and Mitchell 
(2007) looked at larger firms in an inter-industry diversification context (i.e. medical devices, 
healthcare services). 
Third, the paper proposes a more nuanced view of intra-industry diversification, which helps 
to explain its effects on survival and performance. It proposes that intra-industry 
diversification is not a homogenous phenomenon but that there may be finer subcategories of 
intra-industry diversification: within and beyond sub-sectors of an industry. The analysis 
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describes these components of intra-industry diversification and shows their relative 
importance. Regarding survival, beyond sub-sector diversification contributes most strongly 
to the survival enhancing effect of intra-industry diversification. This finding contrasts with 
the result of the only other study on intra-industry diversification and survival (Stern and 
Henderson, 2004), who find that beyond sub-sector diversification (beyond the primary line 
of business) did not matter for survival. The discrepancy may be due to two factors. First, 
Stern and Henderson (2004) focus on the four digit SIC code as fairly broad 
operationalisation of intra-industry diversification. Second, they conceptualise business lines 
in a sense of ‘brands’ compared to the categories of within and beyond sub-sector 
diversification proposed in this chapter. 
Fourth, as briefly pointed out above, this chapter has a narrow empirical focus on intra-
industry diversification within the hedge fund industry. The operationalisation of intra-
industry diversification in the extant literature is rather broad (i.e. the 4 digit SIC Code, e.g. 
Zahavi and Lavie, 2013; Stern and Henderson, 2004; Tanriverdi and Lee, 2008), which seems 
to be partially due to granularity constraints in the researchers’ data. It is somewhat daring to 
consider firms with the same 4 digit SIC codes as part of the same industry as it covers very 
different products and activities. If one looks at the SIC classification of the hedge fund 
industry (SIC 6211, First Research, 2014) one would consider stock brokers, mutual funds, 
investment banks and other securities investors all as the same ‘industry’. This chapter 
focuses on the hedge fund industry as a focused intra-industry setting of fairly homogenous 
firms (compared with 4 digit SIC code categories). Although the 4 digit SIC code category is 
an operationalisation of intra-industry diversification, it seems to matter conceptually since 
this broad approach to intra-industry diversification may have contributed to the mixed 
results regarding intra-industry diversification in the literature (e.g. Zahavi and Lavie, 2013; 
Tanriverdi and Lee, 2008; Stern and Henderson, 2004; Li and Greenwood, 2004). 
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2.9.3 Potential implications for practice. Considering a wider audience of practitioners 
involved in similar settings characterised by small, asset-light firms, as well as “knowledge 
intensity and lack of intellectual property protection, the hedge fund sector appears 
representative of many other service sectors in the economy” (de Figueiredo, Meyer-Doyle 
and Rawley, 2013, p. 849). 
This study may contribute to a more fine-grained understanding of intra-industry 
diversification and its effects among practitioners. The analysis points out that the highest 
survival and performance benefits of intra-industry diversification seem to be achieved by 
beyond sub-sector diversification within the same industry. Hence it may be worthwhile for 
managers to consider leveraging their resources beyond their sub-sector for potentially 
enhanced performance and less correlated cash flows as an ‘insurance’ related to higher 
chances of survival. However, beyond sub-sector diversification may be more challenging to 
realise than within sub-sector diversification since customers may sometimes prefer highly 
specialised firms, which ‘stick to their knitting’ and focus on one sub-sector only. 
2.10 Conclusion 
In conclusion, this chapter presented empirical evidence on the effect of intra-industry 
diversification on two outcome measures: firm survival and firm performance. The chapter 
took a differentiated view on the phenomenon and attempted to advance the nascent 
academic literature on intra-industry diversification by investigating the components of intra-
industry diversification, as well as the nonlinearities in the relationship between intra-industry 
diversification, survival and performance. 
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Chapter 3 
Beyond Providers of Capital: The Importance of the Firm – Investor 
Network for Hedge Fund Firm Performance and Survival 
 
3.1 Abstract 
This chapter assembles evidence of both qualitative (exploratory expert interviews) and 
quantitative (large-scale panel dataset) kinds to suggest that investors into hedge funds are 
not only mere providers of capital but that they can be active partners in the identification, 
assessment and execution of current and prospective investment opportunities. The analysis 
indicates that hedge fund firms with an active firm-investor network beyond the provision of 
capital show enhanced performance and survival. From a theoretical perspective, the insights 
in this chapter inform and contribute to theories on the active involvement and tangible added 
value of a firm’s customers. 
 
 
I would like to thank Charles Baden-Fuller and Hans Frankort for the insightful discussions 
as well as the helpful input on this chapter. Furthermore, I would like to thank all the 
conversation partners from the industry (at hedge funds, investments banks, university 
endowments, family offices, as well as one central bank and one financial regulator) for their 
time and interesting hands-on industry insights. 
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3.2 Introduction 
Hedge fund firms are service providers. They provide the service of investment management 
to their customers, who are sophisticated investors (Fung and Hsieh, 1999), such as high net 
worth individuals, family offices, pension funds or endowment funds. The service they 
provide to these customers is the investment of customer capital in the identification and 
exploitation of market inefficiencies (e.g. Economist, 2012) according to their expertise and 
the investment policy of the firm. The investors as customers pay fees for this service and 
after a certain period, they exit the investment. In the literature on hedge funds (e.g. Bollen 
and Pool, 2012; Jagannathan, Malakhov and Novikov, 2010; Agarwal, Daniel and Naik, 
2009; Titman and Tiu, 2011) investors are assumed to be passive and the (hedge fund) firm-
investor relationship does not go beyond the mere provision of capital with occasional 
monitoring of investment results. 
This chapter takes the provision of capital to a hedge fund firm as the starting point for the 
investigation of the hedge fund firm-customer (i.e. investor) relationship. Please note that the 
focus of this chapter is on the role of investors as ‘customers’ of the hedge fund firm, not as 
‘shareholders’ (i.e. equity owners) in the hedge fund firm. 
The analysis in the chapter assembles evidence of both quantitative and qualitative kinds to 
suggest that the provision of capital enables a rich and ongoing exchange of information 
between the firm and potentially knowledgeable investors on the identification, assessment 
and execution of current and future investment opportunities. The analysis includes a 
qualitative part of limited scope (25 exploratory expert interviews), which informed the 
hypothesis development for the quantitative analysis. The triangulation (Flick, 2009) across 
data sources (qualitative and quantitative data) and methods of analysis, as well as the 
consistency of the qualitative and quantitative results, may yield some confidence about the 
validity of the presented concept of the active firm-investor network. 
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This active firm-investor network seems important for firms in the hedge fund industry since 
financial markets are dynamic social systems, in which inefficiencies (i.e. profit opportunities 
for hedge funds) disappear once enough money is engaged in exploiting them (Beunza, 
Hardie and MacKenzie, 2006). The firm-investor network may translate into tangible 
outcomes along the dimensions of firm profitability and survival. In particular, the empirical 
analysis suggests that an active firm-investor network is positively related to hedge fund firm 
performance and survival. 
Regarding the conversation in the literature, this chapter attempts to contribute to the 
literature on customer innovation, but also holds insights for the finance literature on hedge 
funds, as well as the literature in the sociology of finance on hedge funds. 
Although the extant customer innovation literature has provided convincing evidence that 
customers are an important force for innovation, four areas seem to have received little 
attention in the scholarly conversation in this literature: 
First, the vast majority of studies in the customer innovation literature have taken a 
customer/user-centric approach (e.g. von Hippel, 2007; Hienerth, 2006; Harhoff et al., 2003; 
Luethje et al., 2005), which ignored the competitive consequences for firms (i.e. producers). 
The present study focuses on the firm-level and investigates how an active firm-customer 
network impacts hedge fund firm profitability and survival. Second, this chapter attempts to 
answer calls for more large-scale, quantitative research (e.g. Bogers, Afuah and Bastian, 
2010) to test and complement the interesting qualitative and conceptual insights developed 
from the extant body of (mostly qualitative) research on customer innovation. Third, the 
study links to findings in the literature that organisational practices and characteristics may be 
important ‘enablers’ of customer innovation and knowledge transfer from customers (e.g. 
Foss et al, 2011 and Foss, Lyngsie and Zahra, 2013). The analysis shows that that ‘outward 
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looking’ (observable by an outsider, e.g. a customer) organisational characteristics (e.g. as 
used in the composition of the empirical proxy measure for the active firm-investor network) 
may provide an important ‘docking point’ to invite customers to engage with the firm and to 
share their expertise. Fourth, the hedge fund industry seems to be an interesting context and 
‘conservative setting’ for the study of customer involvement since one may not naturally 
expect customer involvement in such a secretive industry with numerous highly specialised 
firms. This setting contrasts with settings in the extant literature where one may expect more 
customer involvement, such as ‘collaborative’ settings like software development (e.g. by 
users via innovation toolkits; Franke and von Hippel, 2003) or settings with lower barriers (in 
terms of technology, required capital) to produce an innovation (e.g. sports related consumer 
goods, Baldwin et al., 2006; Hienerth, 2006; Luethje et al., 2005).  
With regard to the literatures on hedge funds in finance and the sociology of finance, this 
chapter points out that hedge fund investors, who are usually portrayed to take a passive or 
monitoring role, may also be active partners in the creation, assessment and execution of 
investment ideas. Additionally, the active hedge fund firm-investor relationship may be 
considered as a potentially interesting type of ‘market’. Researchers in the sociology of 
finance have usually investigated the technology enabled interaction of market participants in 
highly liquid, standardised and transparent markets (e.g. stocks, bonds or standardised 
derivatives; e.g. MacKenzie, 2012). This study provides a first insight on the idiosyncratic 
hedge fund firm-investor ‘market’, where the exchange of a homogenous good (i.e. capital) 
forms the basis of a relationship, in which a heterogeneous and tailored good (information) is 
exchanged. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 3 reviews the related literature, 
whereas section 4 introduces the qualitative and quantitative data, as well as the methods of 
analysis. Section 5 shows the findings of the exploratory qualitative enquiry with hedge fund 
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experts and develops the hypotheses to be tested in the quantitative analysis. Section 6 
provides the results of the quantitative analysis whereas section 7 discusses the boundary 
conditions, contributions and practitioner implications of the qualitative and quantitative 
results. Section 8 concludes. 
3.3 Review of the Related Literature 
The following review of the literature portrays how this chapter relates to extant scholarly 
work in the fields of (1) strategy and innovation (i.e. customer innovation), (2) finance (i.e. 
studies on hedge funds) and (3) the sociology of finance. 
3.3.1 Literature in strategy and innovation (i.e. studies on customer/user innovation). 
The literature on customer/user innovation is of relevance to this research since the 
phenomenon of the active (hedge fund) firm-investor network, which helps with the 
identification, assessment and execution of investment ideas, may be considered as engaging 
with customers in innovation and co-creation of products. 
In terms of definitions, ‘customers’ or ‘users’ are defined as firms or individuals “that expect 
to benefit from using a design, a product, or a service”. Conversely, ‘firms’ or the ‘producers’ 
“expect to benefit from selling a design, a product, or a service” (both quotes: Baldwin and 
von Hippel, 2011, p. 1400). 
This section reviews the related literature and points out four areas in the customer innovation 
literature, which this chapter aims to contribute to by investigating the consequences of 
customer innovation for the firm (i.e. the producer of a good or service). Hence, this chapter 
takes a firm-centric view of customer innovation. 
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In the first section, this review of the literature provides insights on users/customers as 
innovators, whereas in the second section, it elaborates on the positive and negative 
consequences of customer/user innovation for firms. 
Regarding customers as innovators, the main body of the literature on customer innovation 
has shown that customers can be independent innovators (Bogers, Afuah and Bastian, 2010) 
who create or upgrade their own products. Customers, independently of manufacturers, 
engage in product innovation for the benefit of enhanced in-house use (e.g. Thomke and von 
Hippel, 2002). Customer innovation experienced a boost with the advent of new technologies 
(e.g. personal computer, internet, etc.), which substantially decreased communication and 
design costs. Going forward, “technological trends suggest that both design costs and 
communication costs will be further reduced over time” (Baldwin and von Hippel, 2011, p. 
1410).  
Due to improved connectivity between users (e.g. via the internet and other means of 
communication), some users share their innovation with the rest of the user community. They 
are incentivised to do so (1) since they see the activity as fun (negative cost), (2) because of 
the reputation and acknowledgement they receive within their communities, or (3) due to 
their potentially increased value on the employment market (Harhoff et al., 2003). User 
innovation can function independently of manufacturers if users are motivated to innovate, 
share their findings freely and are able to produce the innovations cost effectively (von 
Hippel, 2007). 
Although a majority of the customer innovation literature has focused on the customer, with 
firms playing a secondary or no role at all (von Hippel et al., 2011; von Hippel, 2007; Luethje 
et al., 2005; Harhoff et al., 2003), some authors have provided initial insights on the firm-
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level consequences of customer innovation. These consequences can be positive and 
negative. 
Concerning the positive consequences, firms can use the innovative power of their customers 
by providing them with firm-specific tool kits for independent innovation and product 
customisation (Thomke and von Hippel, 2002; von Hippel and Katz, 2002) or they can focus 
on ‘lead users’ at the technological frontier, which may serve as a "need forecasting 
laboratory" (von Hippel, 1986, p. 791) for the general market since their present needs will be 
reflected in the general needs of ordinary users in the future. Baldwin and von Hippel (2011, 
p. 1411) note that through “monitoring and incorporating lead-user innovations into their own 
offerings, producer innovators may enhance their product and service offerings while at the 
same time reducing their design costs and increasing their likelihood of success in the 
marketplace”. Lilien et al. (2002) showed in a case study at 3M that compared to traditional 
innovation projects, projects involving lead users generate substantially increased innovation 
performance as measured by sales projections (approx. 8 times of a traditional project). 
The conversation in the literature around co-creation of products with customers also points 
to potential advantages for firms, who actively engage with their customers. Nambisan (2002) 
notes that with respect to new product development, customers, in addition to being users, 
can be a passive information source and active co-creators. Prahalad and Ramaswamy (2004, 
p. 11) argue that the customer is not separate from the value creation process and that the 
roles of customers and producers converge into a situation where customers and producers 
are "collaborators in co-creating value and competitors for the extraction of economic value". 
Along these lines, Laursen and Salter (2006) find that openness of a firm to external sources 
of information increases innovation performance. Hoyer et al. (2010) identify several 
advantages of co-creation, such as a better understanding of customer needs, improved 
quality, decreased risk and increased market acceptance of new products.  
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Concerning the potentially negative consequences for firms, new competitors can emerge 
from user innovators. In some cases, user-innovators have a cost advantage over firms and 
capitalise on the opportunity of low-cost production (Hienerth et al., 2014) by 
commercialising their innovation and entering the market as user-manufacturers. This market 
can either be an existing market or a new market or niche, which user-manufacturers may 
enter before established companies (Baldwin et al., 2006; Bogers, Afuah and Bastian, 2010). 
Along those lines, Baldwin and von Hippel (2011, p. 1399) conjecture that “innovation by 
individual users and user firms […] are modes of innovating that increasingly compete with 
and may displace producer innovation in many parts of the economy”. Additional downsides 
for firms who involve customers in the creation of new products include intellectual property 
and secrecy concerns (Bogers, Afuah and Bastian, 2010), dependence on customers and the 
introduction of additional complexity (Franke and Piller, 2003) in the process of developing 
new products. 
Table 6 summarises examples on active customer involvement from the literature on 
customer innovation. Please note that the purpose of this table is to illustrate rather than to be 
representative. 
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Table 6: Related literature on active customers in the field of customer innovation  
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Although the extant customer innovation literature has provided convincing evidence that 
customers are an important force for innovation, four areas seem to have received little 
attention in the scholarly conversation in this literature: 
First, as the vast majority of studies in the customer innovation literature have taken a 
customer/user-centric approach (e.g. von Hippel, 2007; Hienerth, 2006; Harhoff et al., 2003; 
Luethje et al., 2005), the competitive consequences for firms (producers) in terms of firm 
performance and firm survival have largely been ignored22. The present study takes a firm 
perspective and investigates how an active firm-customer relationship impacts hedge fund 
firm profitability and survival using qualitative as well as quantitative data. 
Second, in their review of the literature on customer innovation, Bogers, Afuah and Bastian 
(2010, p. 871) note: “To date, most research exploring users as innovators is based on case 
studies or other small-sample studies. […] In general, the research stream on users as 
innovators will greatly benefit from empirically testing (on a larger scale) the ideas and 
propositions that it puts forward”. This chapter attempts to answer this call for more large-
scale, quantitative research to test and complement the interesting qualitative and theoretical 
insights developed from the extant body of (mostly qualitative) research on customer 
innovation. This chapter combines qualitative and quantitative evidence: It motivates, 
describes and illustrates the active firm-investor network using qualitative data, while it 
subsequently investigates in a large-scale, longitudinal panel dataset how an active firm-
investor network impacts firm performance23 and firm survival. 
                                               
22
 Of course, it has been studied in general terms, how innovation affects firm performance and survival. The 
extant literature, which investigated the general innovation-performance or innovation-survival relationships, 
however largely focused on innovation by the firm, attributing no particular role to customers (e.g. Fontana and 
Nesta, 2009; Cefis and Marsili, 2006; Roberts, 1999; Banbury and Mitchell, 1995). 
23
 In the few quantitative studies that deal with customer involvement in product development, revenue is often 
used as performance variable (Lilien et al., 2002 or Laursen and Salter, 2006). This operationalisation however 
neglects the cost side of the profitability equation (profit = revenue – cost). 
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Third, as firm-level consequences in general have not been in the focus of the discussion 
around customer innovation, an area that seems to have been underattended in the literature is 
the specification of organisational characteristics, which enable (or constrain) an engagement 
with customers. A notable study in this field is Foss et al. (2011), which emphasises that 
inward looking organisational practices (e.g. intensive vertical and lateral communication, 
rewarding employees for acquiring and sharing knowledge, delegation of decision rights) are 
important for the link between customer knowledge and innovation. Organisational practices 
and elements of organisational design, which link the firm to external knowledge sources 
(e.g. customers) were identified to not only be useful for the initial recognition but also for 
the ongoing exploitation of opportunities (Foss, Lyngsie and Zahra, 2013). This chapter links 
to these findings in the literature by showing that ‘outward looking’ (i.e. observable by an 
outsider, e.g. a customer) organisational characteristics (e.g. as used in the composition of the 
empirical proxy measure for the active firm-investor network; for more details, please see 
chapter 3.4.2.1) may provide an important ‘docking point’ to invite customers to engage with 
the firm and to share their expertise in the recognition, assessment and execution of 
investment opportunities. 
Fourth, most prior studies on customer innovation were situated in the manufacturing sector 
(e.g. machinery manufacturers, petroleum & chemical industry, the high tech & IT/computer 
industry (e.g. semiconductors, software) or “sports-related consumer goods and other leisure-
time activities” (Bogers, Afuah and Bastian, 2010, p. 859), such as whitewater kayaking (e.g. 
Hienerth et al., 2014). A study of the implications of customer involvement in the hedge fund 
industry seems to be a unique setting considering the empirical context of the extant literature 
(a loosely related study in terms of industry context is Oliveira and von Hippel (2011), which 
studies user innovation in the banking industry). The hedge fund industry seems to be an 
interesting context and ‘conservative setting’ for the study of customer involvement since one 
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may not naturally expect customer involvement in such a secretive industry with numerous 
highly specialised firms. This setting contrasts with settings where one may expect more 
customer involvement, such as ‘collaborative’ settings like software development (e.g. by 
users via innovation toolkits; Franke and von Hippel, 2003) or settings with lower barriers (in 
terms of technology, required capital) to produce an innovation (e.g. sports related consumer 
goods; Baldwin et al., 2006; Hienerth, 2006; Luethje et al., 2005).  
3.3.2 Literature on hedge funds in the field of finance. As far as hedge fund investors (the 
customers of hedge fund firms) are concerned, the extant finance literature seems to have 
ignored the active, co-creating role, hedge fund investors can play in the identification, 
assessment and execution of investment ideas. 
Instead, the literature in finance (largely implicitly) assumed investors to be passive providers 
of investment capital (e.g. Bollen and Pool, 2012; Jagannathan, Malakhov and Novikov, 
2010; Agarwal, Daniel and Naik, 2009; Titman and Tiu, 2011), which engage in a careful due 
diligence before making an investment and passively monitor the hedge fund during the time 
of investment (Brown et al., 2012 and 2008; Agarwal et al., 2013). The debate around hedge 
funds and their investors in the finance literature has mainly focused on three areas: 
First, scholars engaged in identifying drivers of hedge fund performance (e.g. risk exposure; 
Fung and Hsieh 2001 and 2004, Amin and Kat, 2003b, Titman and Tiu, 2011; Bollen and 
Whaley, 2009), which is a key concern from the perspective of investors because they want 
to identify funds, which will outperform going forward. Among the factors associated with 
hedge fund performance are manager characteristics (Li et al., 2011), disclosure and 
transparency (Agarwal et al., 2013; Aragon, Hertzel and Shi, 2013), fee structures (Agarwal, 
Daniel and Naik, 2009) and contractual clauses (Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross, 2003; Amin 
and Kat, 2003b), such as lockup restrictions (Aragon, 2007), which decide when and how 
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much of the hedge fund returns actually end up with investors (Dichev and Yu, 2011). 
Triggered by spectacular hedge fund failures or hedge fund fraud, another concern for 
investors connected to performance is the correctness and accuracy of returns reported by 
hedge funds (Bollen and Pool, 2012; Liang, 2003) and the danger for the survival of a hedge 
fund firm coming from operational risk (i.e. failed internal procedures or inadequate 
disclosure of legal or regulatory problems; Brown, Goetzmann, Liang, and Schwarz, 2008, 
2009 and 2012). 
Second, as far as investor behaviour is concerned, investors seem to exhibit ‘return-chasing’ 
behaviour, where capital allocations are based on past hedge fund returns (Ramadorai, 2013; 
Fung et al., 2008). Related to this debate of return chasing is the research on performance 
persistence. If performance of hedge funds was persistent, chasing of past returns may be a 
sensible strategy for investors. Although studies could empirically identify some level of 
performance persistence (mostly in the short to medium term), returns in hedge funds overall 
are not performance persistent (Jagannathan et al., 2010; Agarwal and Naik, 2000). 
Third, the finance perspective on hedge funds is concerned with financial portfolio 
management (e.g. Markowitz, 1959) and the risk and return consequences for the overall 
portfolio if an investor allocates a part of her capital to hedge funds. Among the factors noted 
is a diversification benefit, which originates from hedge fund returns exhibiting a low 
correlation with returns of stocks or bonds (Edwards, 1999). However, the higher moments of 
the return distribution, such as skewness or kurtosis and non-linear payoffs associated with 
specific trading strategies (Agarwal and Naik, 2004) also play a role in assessing the potential 
benefits of adding hedge funds to a portfolio (Amin and Kat, 2003a). 
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Overall, the finance literature has assumed a passive or at best monitoring role of hedge fund 
investors without mentioning a potential symbiotic, co-creating function of investors in the 
identification, assessment and execution of investment opportunities.  
The hypothesis development in this chapter is grounded in rich qualitative ‘micro’ data from 
expert interviews with hedge fund managers and other actors in the industry, an approach 
rarely taken by finance studies, which tend to focus on the investigation of aggregated 
‘macro’ behaviour of economic actors.  
Considering the qualitative and quantitative evidence provided in this chapter, the silence in 
the literature about the active, co-creating role of investors seems striking, since hedge fund 
managers and investors perceived the role of investors to encompass more than the mere 
provision of capital and regular monitoring. This chapter provides first evidence and 
documentation of the phenomenon of the active firm-investor network and makes an initial 
attempt to describe and make explicit this hitherto largely tacit practitioner knowledge. 
3.3.3 Literature in the field of sociology of finance. Although not primarily concerned with 
the implications of the firm-customer relationship, the literature in the area of the sociology 
of finance (a branch of the wider field of economic sociology; e.g. Granovetter, 1985; 
Fligstein, 1990; Zuckerman, 1999) has provided new insights on actors in financial markets. 
Using largely qualitative data, such as interviews or ethnographic observation research, 
sociologists of finance conceptualise financial markets as large social systems, in which 
human actors as well as technological artefacts (e.g. trading systems) interact. This interest in 
the combination of the human and the technological component of financial markets has lead 
this field to focus on technology-intensive empirical settings, such as high frequency trading 
(MacKenzie et al., 2012), the pricing and trading of complex financial instruments 
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(MacKenzie, 2011 and MacKenzie, 2012) or arbitrage trading in the age of quantitative 
finance (Beunza and Stark, 2004 and Beunza et al., 2006).  
In qualitative enquiries about the interaction of human actors and technology, hedge funds 
sometimes served as settings. For example in a case study (MacKenzie, 2003), which 
describes sociological aspects of arbitrage, such as the possibility that arbitrageurs know and 
imitate each other, as factors contributing to the collapse of the hedge fund Long Term 
Capital Management. Another example is a study by Hardie and MacKenzie (2007), which 
describes the ‘agencement’ (i.e. assemblage of human beings and technological artefacts) of a 
hedge fund as an ‘economic actor’. An additional interesting application of the hedge fund 
context using a sociology of finance/strategy perspective relates to networks of hedge funds 
with their service providers (Baden-Fuller et al., 2013). 
The discourse in the sociology of finance has mainly relied on observation research and 
interview data and rarely linked the observations involving one or a limited set of firms to 
larger, quantitative macro data providing insights on the aggregate behaviour of firms in an 
industry. This chapter attempts to address this gap by linking qualitative insights on the firm-
investor network to the analysis of a large-scale dataset on the hedge fund industry. 
Furthermore, the sociology of finance literature has mainly focused on the interaction (aided 
by technology) of economic actors in liquid markets, buying and selling homogenous and 
standardised products through continuous market making (e.g. MacKenzie, 2012). The 
present study sheds first light on the firm-investor relationship as a potentially interesting 
second type of ‘market’, which seems more idiosyncratic, less liquid and less transparent. 
Here, the exchange of a homogenous good (i.e. capital) forms the basis of an investment 
relationship, in which a heterogeneous good (i.e. information/knowledge) is exchanged. 
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3.4 Qualitative and Quantitative Data and Methods of Analysis 
This thesis chapter utilises both qualitative and quantitative data. The following paragraphs 
introduce the data and describe the methods of analysis. 
3.4.1 Qualitative Data and Methods of Analysis 
The qualitative section draws on expert interviews with hedge fund managers, investors and 
other stakeholders in the hedge fund industry (e.g. regulators, bankers). In general, the 
exploratory qualitative enquiry is limited in its extent and only serves as input to the 
hypotheses development for the quantitative data analysis on a large-scale hedge fund 
dataset. The following paragraphs provide information about how interview partners were 
accessed and selected and how the researcher prepared, executed and analysed the interviews. 
3.4.1.1 Accessing interview partners. “Research access to hedge funds is hard. The sector 
is a discreet one, partly through necessity (the non-solicitation requirement), partly through 
choice, with many hedge-fund managers traditionally shunning personal publicity” (Hardie 
and MacKenzie, 2007, p. 61). 
The study of hedge fund firms and their leaders (i.e. hedge fund managers) and other 
stakeholders (e.g. investors, regulators) is the study of an elite in the financial industry. 
Hence, access to interview partners is a major challenge, as pointed out by Hardie and 
MacKenzie (2007) and Kvale and Brinkmann (2009, p. 147): "Obtaining access to the 
interviewees is a key problem when studying elites”. This may be part of the reason why 
there are only few studies, which collected qualitative data in the hedge fund industry 
(notable exceptions include: MacKenzie, 2003, Hardie and MacKenzie, 2007 and Simon, 
Millo, Kellard, and Engel, 2010). The partners and employees of investment management 
firms usually shy the limelight and maintain a very low public profile in order (a) to avoid 
drawing unnecessary public scrutiny to their investment activities and (b) to avoid providing 
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outsiders with information or clues about their closely held, proprietary investment approach. 
The investment profession, and hedge funds in particular, have received a lot of bad press 
recently where they were portrayed as “akin to financial pirates, preying on the innocents” 
(Kroijer, 2010, p. ix). Resentments against investment managers, particularly hedge fund 
firms, may vary by cultural setting as one interviewee pointed out: “In Germany it is almost a 
cultural taboo to deal with hedge funds”. This conversation partner described the origin of the 
professional as well as the emotional criticism hedge funds receive with a vivid metaphor: 
“when a pub fight breaks out you often don’t hit the guy who started the fight but the one 
whom you hate the most”. 
Despite these barriers, the researcher obtained access to hedge fund practitioners via a two-
tiered strategy: (1) attending talks by hedge fund practitioners in university settings, 
particularly at Cass Business School, the Wharton School and London Business School and 
(2) attending/presenting at various international flagship conferences directed to a practitioner 
audience in the following years: 2011 (London), 2012 (Paris, London), 2013 (New York, 
London) and 2014 (Paris). Informal contacts made at the conference were invited to a 
conversation. Conversation partners had to be leaders of their firms with substantial industry 
experience (Flick, 2009). Leadership in their firms (i.e. partners, investment managers) seems 
important because this increases the likelihood that conversation partners’ views have an 
impact on reality, i.e. that views and opinions are translated into action in the firm. People 
with different angles on the hedge fund industry were selected, most importantly hedge fund 
managers and hedge fund investors (i.e. ‘producers’ and ‘customers’), in order to obtain a 
variety of viewpoints, which may mitigate potential biases or ‘common views’ prevalent 
within one stakeholder group. 
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25 experts shared their thoughts in conversations of c. 45 minutes in length. With 19 of these 
experts the researcher was able to arrange a meeting in person (preferred option) whereas 6 
experts were interviewed via telephone. 
The 25 hedge fund practitioners belonged to 14 different firms. The interviewees were split 
up in 14 practitioners from hedge funds, 5 practitioners from institutional investors 
(university endowments, family offices, insurance companies), 3 practitioners from one of the 
world’s leading financial regulators, one practitioner from an investment consultancy, one 
practitioner from one of the world’s four largest central banks and one practitioner who was a 
former investment manager and managing director at one of the nine bulge bracket 
investment banks. 
In terms of job rank, 13 of these practitioners were partners or investment directors at their 
firms with an industry experience between 10 and 25 years, 4 practitioners were senior 
portfolio managers with industry experience between 5 and 10 years, 8 were investment 
analysts or specialists such as legal, regulatory or operations professionals with an industry 
experience between 3 and 20 years. 
In terms of geography, 15 of the interviewees were based in the UK, 6 of the interviewees 
were based in the US, 3 of the interviewees were based in Germany and 1 interviewee was 
based in Hong Kong. The interviews were conducted in 2013 (with the exception of two 
interviews, which were conducted in 2012 and early 2014, respectively). All interviews were 
open-ended in structure and were conducted by the author. The participants were assured full 
anonymity in terms of their person as well as their firms, which is why this chapter only 
provides job ranks for people and AUM categories for firms. 
In terms of organisational characteristics of the hedge fund firms in the study, their size was 
small to medium, with average assets under management of USD 534m and an average 
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number of 16 employees. Their investment focus was mostly in equity and corporate debt 
(and some commodities and real assets) of small to medium-sized companies in developed 
countries with the large majority of investments being in Europe and the United States. 
3.4.1.2 Preparation of the interviews. An important part of the preparation for the 
interviewer is to demonstrate familiarity with the industry. The author did this by pointing out 
his research focus and professional experience in the finance industry. Knowledge about the 
current issues and topics of debate in the industry was obtained through attendance of 
specialist practitioner conferences and reading of the financial and trade press (i.e. specialist 
publications for the hedge fund industry). In expert interviews in particular, it is important 
that the interviewee perceives the interviewer as knowledgeable, which makes spending time 
on the interview worth their while. Expert interviews "demand a high level of expertise from 
the interviewer” and the confidentiality concerns of experts and elites often lead to 
“reservations about tape recording" (both quotes: Flick, 2009, p. 168). Due to the high 
secrecy level of the industry and the seniority of most interviewees, practitioners were not 
comfortable with being voice recorded. During the conversation, handwritten notes were 
taken as a ‘condensed account’ (Spradley, 1979) which were typed up and extended right 
after the conversation (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009; Flick, 2009). 
In order to be perceived as knowledgeable partner, it is important that the interviewer is 
familiar with the CV of the interviewed person. The researcher did this before every 
interview with the help of the company webpage, the LinkedIn profile of the interview 
partner or materials the company provided (e.g. organisational chart). Kvale and Brinkmann, 
(2009, p. 147) summarise the challenge of the interviewer being a co-expert in the following 
way: "The interviewer should be knowledgeable about the topic of concern and master of the 
technical language, as well as be familiar with the social situation and biography of the 
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interviewee […] knowledge of the interview topic will gain respect and be able to achieve an 
extent of symmetry in the interview relationship". 
3.4.1.3 Execution of the Interviews. In the beginning of each interview, the researcher 
briefly recapped why he is interested in the hedge fund industry and how his academic and 
professional experience relates to the industry. Along the lines of Spradley (1979), Kvale and 
Brinkmann, (2009) and Flick (2009), the interviewer acted as an attentive listener who posed 
open questions at the beginning and follow-up questions that emerged out of what the 
conversation partner said (mostly to have him or her elaborate on a certain point mentioned). 
The interviews usually had two parts: After the introduction, the conversation first started out 
with some general comments from practitioners on the researcher’s topics of interest (e.g. 
hedge fund survival, performance and diversification). The extensiveness of the discussion 
around this part depended on the interview partner’s specific expertise and willingness to 
share thoughts about the research findings. The second part was open in structure and dealt 
with the interview partners’ thoughts on which factors make the hedge fund firm successful 
over the long term. The topic of the firm-investor network evolved and took shape as 
interesting issue in the course of these exploratory practitioner conversations. 
3.4.1.4 Processing and structuring of the answers. After the interviews, the researcher tried 
to identify themes in what the conversation partner noted (i.e. what he/she described as 
important in influencing the success of the HFMC). The researcher then compared these 
themes with factors influencing the success of a hedge fund as identified in the literature. It 
may be expected (and to some extent reassuring) that many of the mentioned themes have 
been noted the literature. Chapter 3.5 presents the qualitative evidence on the active firm-
investor network, as well as the ‘side themes’ influencing hedge fund success identified in the 
exploratory qualitative enquiry. 
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3.4.1.5 Potential biases associated with the qualitative enquiry. The exploratory expert 
interviews may be subject to several biases that have been identified to affect qualitative 
research. Along the lines of Collier and Mahoney (1996, p. 59), bias is understood as 
“systematic error that is expected to occur in a given context of research, whereas "error" is 
generally taken to mean any difference between an estimated value and the "true" value of a 
variable or parameter, whether the difference follows a systematic pattern or not”. 
This section will discuss the following three categories of bias: (1) selection bias, as well as 
biases introduced to the study by (2) interview partners and (3) the researcher (i.e. 
investigator bias).  
First, selection bias may occur when selection processes occur in the design of the study or 
the studied phenomenon (Collier and Mahoney, 1996). In the exploratory qualitative enquiry, 
the main selection process, which occurred, is the selection of interview partners. This 
selection of interview partners seemed to have been a two sided selection, where the 
researcher made contact with (e.g. at conferences, please see chapter 1) and invited industry 
experts for a conversation, however the selected interview partners also chose to agree to 
engage in a conversation with the researcher. Selection bias could mean that the observed 
phenomenon of the firm-investor network is overstated in the sample compared to the overall 
population. This concern seems to be alleviated by the main empirical analysis in this 
chapter, i.e. the investigation of the survival and performance consequences of the firm-
investor network in a large-scale quantitative dataset. 
A related concern to the classical selection bias is that the qualitative enquiry may shed light 
on the phenomenon only from the perspective of one group of actors. This bias of a ‘common 
lens’ on the phenomenon was alleviated by construction of a diverse sample of interview 
partners (Daly and Lumley, 2002). The researcher talked about the firm-investor network not 
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only with experts from hedge fund firms, but also from investors, a regulator, a central bank, 
an investment consultancy and an investment bank.24  
Second, among the biases introduced by the respondents may be recall bias (Huber and 
Power, 1985), in which they have difficulties recalling events or their experience relating to 
the studied phenomenon. This bias was alleviated since a large majority of the interview 
partners (23 out of 25) were involved with the firm-investor network in their current 
occupation. Furthermore, the interview partners may not have the information of interest 
(Huber and Power, 1985) or may not be in a position to shape the firm according to their 
opinions (Flick, 2009). In order to ensure that interview partners’ opinions had a tangible 
impact on their firms, interview partners had to be leaders with considerable experience and 
authority to impact the direction of their firms. Impression management and retrospective 
sensemaking may be further potential biases in qualitative research introduced by the 
interview partners. The diverse sample with a variety of perspectives (hedge fund managers, 
investors, regulators, etc.) seems to alleviate this concern, since it seems not likely that 
“varied informants will engage in convergent retrospective sensemaking and/or impression 
management” (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007, p. 28). 
Third, regarding biases introduced by the researcher (‘researcher bias’ (Eisenhardt, 1989) or 
‘investigator bias’ (Sutton, 1997)), it is important to acknowledge that interviewing often 
includes a subjective element as "knowledge is constructed in the interaction between 
interviewer and interviewee" (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009, p. 2), which seems to give each 
interview a ‘unique’ character. This especially seems to be the case since the interviewer is 
part of the knowledge creation during the interview. The acknowledged, active role of the 
researcher may however also be considered as an advantage as it may “come to highlight 
                                               
24
 A trade-off in this approach of constructing a sample with diverse perspectives however was that in most 
firms, only one respondent was interviewed. 
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specific aspects of the phenomena investigated and bring new dimensions forward, 
contributing to a multiperspectival construction of knowledge" (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009, 
p. 170). As interviews could not be tape recorded, this subjective element may extend to the 
researcher’s notes and written records of the exploratory interviews. 
In general, discussions of potential bias revolve around the underlying concern that the 
research findings may not be generalisable to a wider set of firms (e.g. Collier and Mahoney, 
1996; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Shah and Corley, 2006; Eisenhardt, 1989; Sutton, 
1997). Compared to studies, which use only qualitative research, this chapter identified a 
phenomenon (the firm-investor network) through qualitative research, which is subsequently 
tested in a large-scale quantitative dataset. This triangulation across data sources and 
analysis techniques may provide enhanced confidence about the generalisability of the 
phenomenon. In fact, analysing the organisational characteristics of the firms in the 
qualitative study gave the researcher a sense of the way in which the studied firms, which 
showed an active firm-investor network, may be distinctive (Collier and Mahoney, 1996) 
compared to the ‘average firm’ in the industry. This in turn informed the construction of the 
proxy measure (please see chapter 3.4.2.1 for further details). 
 
3.4.2 Quantitative Data and Methods of Analysis 
In a second step, the impact of the firm-investor network on HFMC survival and performance 
is investigated using a large-scale quantitative dataset. This triangulation (Flick, 2009) across 
data sources and methods (qualitative and quantitative data analysis), as well as the 
consistency of the qualitative and quantitative results may yield some confidence about the 
validity of the presented concept of the firm-investor network. 
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This quantitative application of the idea of the hedge fund firm-investor network draws on a 
large-scale hedge fund panel dataset, which was also used in the previous chapter of this 
thesis. Although a quantitative dataset does not provide evidence as deep and rich as the 
interviews, it provides a perspective on whether the idea, which emerged from the 
practitioner conversations, may hold up across a large-scale sample of the hedge fund 
industry. 
3.4.2.1 Creation of a firm-investor network proxy for use in the large-scale dataset. 
Analysing the statements made by the interview partners, as well as the organisational 
characteristics of the firms, which participated in the exploratory expert interviews, gave the 
researcher an idea how firms that showed an active firm-investor network, may be distinctive 
(Collier and Mahoney, 1996) compared to the ‘average firm’ in the hedge fund industry. 
These insights from the qualitative research informed the construction of the proxy measure.  
Since the TASS database is a commercial database targeted at institutional investors 
interested in investing in hedge fund firms, the database does not offer explicit information 
on investors. Based on the qualitative enquiry and supplemented by evidence in the 
practitioner and academic literature, a proxy measure was created using important 
organisational characteristics, which turned out to be common to firms with an active firm-
investor network. For more details on how the components of the proxy measure relate to the 
qualitative enquiry, please see Table 7. 
In addition to evidence from the qualitative enquiry, insights on the location and expertise of 
hedge fund investors, as well as profit opportunities under market inefficiencies were taken 
from the practitioner (Prequin, 2013; Ernst and Young 2013; Prequin 2012) and academic 
literature (Chordia et al., 2005; La Porta et al., 1997; Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001; 
Dvorak, 2005; Leuz et al., 2009). 
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The proxy measure is composed of the following three elements:  
(1) Co-Location: The first criterion of the proxy is that the hedge funds are located where 
the majority of hedge fund investors are located. The three main geographical areas 
where hedge fund investors are located are North America (US and Canada), Europe 
and Japan. Evidence in the Ernst and Young 2013 Hedge Fund Survey showed that 
51% of hedge fund investors come from North America, 44% from Europe and 5% 
from Asia, mainly Japan (Ernst and Young, 2013 and Prequin, 2013). 
Co-location of funds and investors may be an important aspect of the development of 
an active firm-investor network since it may facilitate in-person meetings for 
discussion and exchange of in-depth investment information. A managing partner of a 
firm in the USD 250-500m AUM category indicated that private investors (high net 
worth individuals), as well as family offices are especially interested in such (regular) 
meetings.  
The investment director of natural resource/commodity investments at a larger fund 
(AUM category: USD 1-5bn) viewed the potential virtues of co-location from a 
different angle: His firm has its core investor base in the country where its 
headquarters are located. With more ‘exotic’ investments, such as natural resources or 
commodities, regular face-to-face meetings with investors seem to be necessary to 
educate the investors regarding the asset class, as well as its legal and tax 
implications. Furthermore, face-to-face meetings help to overcome career risk 
concerns of the institutional investor's investment officers, who often do not want to 
take the risk (and responsibility) for potential investment losses in a newly entered 
asset class. 
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This co-location may not only be a matter of coincidence but some firms seem to 
purposefully invest into being close to their investors. This is illustrated by the firm of 
one conversation partner (investment manager; AUM category: USD 1-5bn), which 
opened new offices in large cities in Eastern Europe and Central Europe in order to be 
close to current and future investors as well as potential new investments. The 
closeness to potential new investments may arise naturally since investment ideas 
generated from the firm-investor network seem to be likely in the ‘home market’ of 
the investor, which ties to the second component of the proxy: ‘investment focus’. 
Please note that the proxy measure understands co-location in a fairly broad sense, not 
as location in a specific country but as location of a hedge fund in a geographic region 
where research indicated that a majority of the hedge fund investors are located (i.e. 
Europe, North America or Japan; Ernst and Young, 2013 and Prequin, 2013). This 
takes into account the increasing integration of economic regions such as North 
America and Europe, where country borders seem to decrease in importance for the 
demarcation of ‘co-location’. 
(2) Investment Focus: The second component of the proxy is that the location of the 
hedge fund (in one of the three regions where investors are predominantly located: 
North America, Europe or Japan, as described in the previous point above) has to 
match with the geographic investment focus of the fund. 
In connection to the previous point, the firm of the interviewed investment manager 
(AUM category: USD 1-5bn) has local offices in 4 different countries and initiates 
and monitors investments in these markets from the local offices in these countries 
(investment focus: renewable energy, healthcare). A partner at a different hedge fund 
firm (AUM category: USD 1-5bn) noted that sparring of ideas for future investments 
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(and solving of potential issues with problematic current investments) happens among 
others during annual visits of cornerstone investors to the premises of the fund and to 
selected underlying portfolio companies. The location of the firm, its main investor 
base (among others a large Northern European pension fund and a Western European 
railway pension scheme) and its investment focus are in Europe. 
This match of location and investment focus in regions where HF investors are 
located seems important because investors may be especially knowledgeable partners 
as far as their home investment market is concerned (e.g. Dahlquist and Robertsson, 
2001; Dvorak, 2005 and Leuz et al., 2009). Along those lines, the Prequin 2012 
Hedge Fund Study (Prequin, 2012) found that investors’ leading regional preferences 
for hedge fund investment are North America (51%), Europe (27%) and Asia (14%). 
As with the previous point, please note that the match of location and investment 
focus is done on the level of the region, not the individual country (an example of a 
‘match’ of the first two proxy criteria would be ‘location of fund = Europe’ and 
‘investment focus of fund = Europe’). 
(3) Focus on less information efficient assets: In addition to being located in hedge fund 
investors’ regions and having a match between location and investment focus, the 
emphasis on less information efficient assets seems important for the value add of an 
active firm-investor network. If hedge fund firms focus on very information efficient 
assets (e.g. large capitalization25 stocks) there may not be a lot of information benefit 
the firm-investor network can provide. This limited benefit seems to be due to the 
widespread attention and coverage these large cap stocks (e.g. Apple, Inc.) receive in 
                                               
25
 Market capitalisation is the market value of a company (market capitalisation = current share price * shares 
outstanding). ‘Small capitalisation’ or ‘small cap’ is understood to be the lowest quartile of firms on an equity 
market ranked by market capitalisation. ‘Large cap’ is the top quartile of companies ranked by market 
capitalisation and ‘mid cap’ are the two quartiles in between small and large cap (e.g. Bauman, Conover and 
Miller, 1998). 
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the media as well as investment bank research (i.e. it is harder to note a piece of 
information or generate an investment thesis which has not been articulated or acted 
upon by another market participant). 
However if the firm focuses on small and medium cap firms, the pricing inefficiencies 
in these stocks may be a lot higher (i.e. there are more profit opportunities; e.g. 
Chordia et al., 2005; La Porta et al., 1997). 
Firms in the qualitative part of the study with an active firm-investor network seem to 
exhibit this focus on small and medium market capitalisation stocks. For example, a 
partner of a firm located in Europe (AUM category: USD 1-5bn) focused on 
European companies in the small and medium market capitalisation range. The hedge 
fund firm invested for example in stocks of a Northern European news and publishing 
company (market capitalisation: ca. EUR 150m), a Spanish firm in the food 
production industry (market capitalisation: ca. EUR 2bn), and a German machine tool 
producer (market capitalisation: ca. EUR 2bn). Along the same lines, the firm of an 
interviewed Managing Partner (AUM category: USD 250-500m) invested in small 
cap firms such as a natural resources exploitation company (market cap: ca. € 40m) 
and a biotech company (market cap: ca. € 350m) 
In summary, the proxy measure for the active firm-investor network measures the number of 
funds offered by the hedge fund firm, which fulfil all of the three components of the proxy 
described above. This means they are (1) located in the region of investors, (2) the funds’ 
investment focus matches with its geographic region of location and (3) the funds focus on 
less information efficient assets (i.e. small and mid cap stocks). 
As illustration of the measurement of the active-firm investor network proxy variable, a 
hedge fund firm, which offers two funds, which are (1) located in Europe, (2) have their 
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investment focus in Europe and (3) invest in small or medium capitalisation stocks in Europe 
(for example one of the funds specialises in industrials and the other fund specialises in 
consumer goods) would receive a score on the proxy measure of 2. An assumption of the 
proxy measure is that all three conditions have to be fulfilled in order for an active firm-
investor network to be present. Hence, the score on the proxy measure would not change if 
the hedge fund firm offered other funds, which do not fulfil the three conditions of the proxy 
outlined above (e.g. an additional fund, which specialises on large cap stocks).  
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Table 7: Connection between the components of the proxy measure and insights from 
the qualitative data26   
                                               
26
 If available, the interview evidence was augmented by additional information from the hedge fund firms’ or 
the investee companies’ home pages. 
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 c
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 m
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 m
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xploitatio
n
 co
m
p
a
ny
 (m
a
rk
et
 cap
:
 ca
.
 
€
 40
m)
 a
nd
 
biote
ch
 co
m
pa
ny
 (m
a
rket
 cap:
 c
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3.4.2.2 Dataset and variable definitions. The same quantitative dataset as in chapter 2 is 
used for the empirical analysis. The data for the empirical analysis comes from the Lipper 
TASS hedge fund database with monthly observations between January 1994 and November 
2012. The overall sample size is 219,479 firm-month observations of 3,295 HFMCs. 
For the analysis, funds of funds were excluded from the dataset since they are not just an 
‘investment style’ but represent, as additional intermediary, a very different firm from 
‘regular’ hedge fund management companies. In order to deal with outliers, all variables 
(except those ranging between 0 and 1) were winsorised at the 1% and 99% tails (cf. Klein 
and Zur, 2009). 
The analysis focuses on two dependent variables: hedge fund firm performance and survival. 
Hedge fund firm performance is measured by the returns of the hedge fund firm. The returns 
of the hedge fund firm i in month t are the returns of the underlying funds j weighted by 
assets under management27 (AUM) in t-1: 
HFMC Return i, t = 
∑ j, t-1(	
	j,t) 
∑ j, t-1
  
The second dependent variable is hedge fund firm failure. A hedge fund firm is defined as 
dead if all its underlying funds stopped reporting (e.g. Grecu, Malkiel and Saha, 2007) to the 
database and at least one underlying fund was classified as ‘liquidated’ in the database. Of 
the 3,295 hedge fund management companies in the sample, this definition classifies 941 
firms (28.6%) as ‘dead’. This variable is operationalised for the fixed effects panel OLS 
regressions with a dynamic indicator variable that takes the value of one in the 12 months 
prior to the date that the hedge fund management company ‘died’ (marking the ‘failure zone’ 
                                               
27
 Since the calculation of the AUM-weighted returns for the management company requires assets under 
management, observations with missing AUM were excluded from the analysis. 
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of  a firm). For the Cox regressions, the indicator variable was recoded to turn one only in the 
month that the hedge fund firm died. 
Firm failure is a basic, yet unambiguous and important variable to gauge the impact of the 
firm-investor network. This variable seems especially useful in a setting such as the hedge 
fund industry, where the risk of failure is real to the firms since they tend to be small and 
entrepreneurial, without ‘corporate fat pads’ to buffer shocks from the environment. 
Considering survivorship as the flipside of failure, Nobel laureate and hedge fund manager 
Myron Scholes, understands hedge fund firm survivorship as “the proof of a value added 
activity” (Scholes, 2004, p. 10). 
The main explanatory variable is the ‘active firm-investor network’, which denotes the 
number of funds under the management of the hedge fund firm, which fulfil the three criteria 
detailed above (1. location in Europe, North America or Japan; 2. match of location and 
investment focus; 3. focus on informationally less efficient assets). 
The analysis includes several control variables such as the standard deviation, skewness and 
kurtosis of returns, as well as the hedge fund firm’s size (natural logarithm of assets under 
management), the firm’s age and its degree of intra-industry diversification (i.e. how many 
fund products the HFMC has under management; the focus of chapter 2 in this thesis). 
Capital flows to the hedge fund firm are a further control variable. The relative flows of 
capital for hedge fund firm i in month t are defined as follows (e.g. Agarwal, Daniel and 
Naik, 2009; Fung, Hsieh, Naik and Ramadorai 2008):  
HRMC Flows i,t = 
	i,t		i, t-1	(		
	i, t)
		i, t-1
 
In addition, Fung and Hsieh eight factor alphas were calculated. All alpha measures were 
calculated in a rolling window regression with a ‘learning period’ of 12 months. Following 
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the standard method of Fung and Hsieh (2001 and 2004), the fund returns above the risk free 
rate are regressed against the following eight factors, the constant in the regression is ‘alpha’: 
1. Equity factor (S&P 500), 2. equity size factor (Russell 2000 less S&P 500), 3. emerging 
market factor (MSCI Emerging Market Index), 4. bond market factor (constant maturity 
adjusted ten-year Treasury bond yield), 5. bond credit spread factor (change in Moody’s 
BAA credit spread over a constant-maturity adjusted 10 year Treasury bond yield) and three 
trend-following option factors formed from excess returns on portfolios of lookback straddles 
for 6. bonds, 7. currencies and 8. commodities28.  
3.4.2.3 Regression Models. The effect of the ‘active firm-investor network’ on the returns of 
the hedge fund firm is investigated using the following OLS fixed effects panel regression:  
HFMC Returni,t = 0 + 1 Active Firm-Investor Network i,t  
  + 2 Intra-Industry Diversification i,t + 3 HFMC LnAUM i,t  
  
+ 4 HFMC Age i,t + i + t +  i,t 
i reflects the hedge fund firm fixed effects in order to account for unobserved firm-level 
heterogeneity and  t reflects year fixed effects. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroscedasticity and are clustered on the level of the hedge fund firm in order to account for 
within-firm correlation over time. 
The effect of the ‘active firm-investor network’ on the survival of the hedge fund firm i in 
month t is investigated using the following model (OLS fixed effects panel regression): 
HFMC Failurei,t = 0 + 1 Active Firm-Investor Network i,t + 2 HFMC Return i,t  
  + 3 Standard Deviation of Returns i,t + 4 Skewness of Returns i,t  
                                               
28
 Further information on the eight risk factors and the composition of the model can be found on David Hsieh’s 
homepage: http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~dah7/HFRFData.htm  
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  + 5 Kurtosis of Returns i,t + 6 HFMC 8 Factor Alpha i,t  
  + 7 HFMC Flows i,t+ 8 Intra-Industry Diversification i,t 
  
+ 9 HFMC ln AUM,t + 10 HFMC Age i,t + i + t +  i,t  
i reflects the hedge fund firm fixed effects in order to account for unobserved firm-level 
heterogeneity and  t reflects year fixed effects. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroscedasticity and are clustered on the level of the hedge fund firm in order to account for 
within-firm correlation over time. 
In addition to the OLS fixed effects panel regression, a Cox regression (e.g. Miller, 2012) 
was run with the same covariates. The Cox model takes the following functional form: 
hi (t) = h(t) exp (xi) 
hi is the mortality hazard rate at time t for firm i. On the right hand side of the equation, h(t) is 
the unspecified baseline mortality hazard rate whereas xi is a vector of covariates (the same as 
in the OLS fixed effects panel model) and  is a vector of covariate coefficients. 
3.5 Findings of the Qualitative Enquiry and Development of Hypotheses for the 
Quantitative Analysis 
As indicated in the description of the qualitative methods, themes influencing the success and 
competitiveness of a hedge fund firm were identified from the qualitative evidence and 
compared to the insights the literature provides. Before the discussion of the qualitative 
evidence focuses on the ‘main theme’ of this chapter (i.e. the active firm-investor network), 
this section introduces other ‘side themes’ that were identified in the qualitative enquiry. 
Table 8 provides an overview of the identified themes other than the active firm-investor 
network and links them to works in the literature on hedge funds, which correspond to and 
reflect these themes. 
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Table 8: ‘Side-themes’ other than the active firm investor network influencing hedge 
fund firm competitiveness 
Th
e
m
e
E
vid
e
n
ce
 in
 Q
u
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 D
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 b
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Table 8 (continued) 
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Among the ‘side themes’ influencing a hedge fund firm’s competitiveness is the hedge fund 
firm’s past performance (i.e. the hedge fund firm’s performance track record). The 
practitioners mentioned the phenomenon that investors chase returns and allocate capital to 
firms, which outperformed in the (recent) past. However, a good past performance record 
may not only imply capital inflows from (new) investors as a partner of a fund (AUM 
category: USD 1-5bn) pointed out: Existing investors may also decide to realise their profits 
and redeem their investment. An interest around hedge fund performance can also be 
identified in the finance literature on hedge funds, which studied for example hedge fund 
‘return chasing’ and performance persistence (Jagannathan et al., 2010; Agarwal and Naik, 
2000; Fung, Hsieh, Naik and Ramadorai, 2008), returns for investors (Dichev and Yu, 2011), 
or the survival enhancing impact of positive hedge fund performance (Baquero., ter Horst and 
Verbeek, 2005, Liang, 2000 or Gregoriou, 2002). 
Other themes influencing the competitiveness of a hedge fund firm identified in the 
exploratory qualitative enquiry were internal factors such as leverage, organisational 
procedures as well as the investment approach of the hedge fund firm. While regulators 
expressed hedge fund leverage as their single biggest concern regarding systemic risk from 
hedge funds, hedge fund managers noted that the risk coming from inadequate internal 
procedures or deficient management of internal knowledge tends to be underestimated – an 
assessment that is mirrored in the extant literature on operational risk (e.g. Brown, 
Goetzmann, Liang and Schwarz 2008, 2009 and 2012). The investment approach and 
investment time horizon are important factors identified by practitioners since the value add 
of the hedge fund firm (i.e. its expertise in an investment strategy) and the time period capital 
needs to be committed, has to be clear to investors (among others to justify the fairly high 
fees that hedge fund firms charge). 
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As far as external stakeholders are concerned, themes such as alignment of interest, networks, 
transparency and external risk factors seemed to be important to practitioners. Alignment of 
interest is ensured via co-investment of the hedge fund manager or the hedge fund firm’s 
employees with the regular investors. Networks to external stakeholders other than investors 
(e.g. service providers such as prime brokers or external consultants) are also seen as an 
important factor influencing the competitive position of a hedge fund. A theme, which is also 
reflected in the sociology of finance and strategy literature on hedge funds (e.g. Baden-Fuller 
et al., 2013; de Figueiredo, Meyer-Doyle and Rawley, 2013; Simon et al., 2010). In the light 
of recent hedge fund scandals, transparency was identified as a factor influencing the success 
of a hedge fund firm. Practitioners pointed out that consistency (across all investors) in the 
transparency question is key and that transparency requirements seem to have increased 
recently because it has become more difficult to raise fully discretionary, intransparent funds, 
especially for young, not well established hedge fund firms. Related to transparency are 
external risk factors, which can adversely affect the hedge fund firm’s competitive position. 
Among these risk factors are political risks (e.g. expropriation) and reputation risks (e.g. 
through non-sustainable, environmentally harmful activities). These kinds of external risks 
seem to be especially prevalent in commodity investments, which depend on the exploitation 
of a natural resource (e.g. crude oil, coal or metals). 
3.5.1 The Active Firm-Investor Network  
With regard to the ‘main theme’, i.e. the active firm-investor network, the results of the 
exploratory qualitative enquiry may hint at possible implications of an active firm-investor 
network for hedge fund performance and survival. The insights from the expert interviews are 
taken to develop hypotheses for the quantitative data analysis. 
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The qualitative evidence suggests that information exchange between the hedge fund firm 
and its investors is not a one-off event for a particular investment but an ongoing 
conversation. This ongoing conversation may have a positive effect on a firm’s performance 
and survival. However, it seems important to note that an active firm-investor network also 
comes at a price since a continued conversation demands an enhanced time investment on the 
side of the firm, as well as the investor. In conversations, investment managers described the 
intensive contact with investors to be sometimes “tedious” and “operationally more 
intensive” (senior analyst of fund in the USD 250-500m AUM category). The founding 
partner in the same firm seemed to be in ‘continuous contact’ with investors, which 
sometimes gave him an aura of ‘unhealthy busyness’ (he compulsively checked his e-mails 
and responded to apparently urgent ones three times in a circa 30 minute conversation). 
3.5.2 The Active Firm-Investor Network –Effects on Hedge Fund Firm Performance  
The interview evidence indicated that in addition to providing capital, investors seem to 
provide hedge fund firms with non-monetary, information-related benefits: (1) as general 
sparring partners for an investment idea and (2) as sector experts with deep industry-specific 
knowledge and networks. In summary, these information related benefits seem to be 
positively related to hedge fund firm performance. 
3.5.2.1 The investor as general sparring partner. Institutional investors (e.g. pension 
funds, university endowments and family offices) and high net worth individuals seem to 
have a wealth of exposure to investment ideas in various industries. Hence, they can provide 
general advice on an investment idea in a sense of a ‘sanity check’. Investors obtain an 
extensive overview of new investment ideas and trends in the asset management industry 
because hedge fund firms pitch their investment ideas to these investors in the hope to obtain 
a capital allocation. Hence, investors are in a good position to assess the competitive strength 
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and profitability of a new trading or investment idea since they have a feel for (1) competitors 
offering a related product and (2) how much capital is already ‘chasing’ a specific investment 
or trading idea. 
In addition to hands-on advice on a particular investment, investors can also provide high-
level guidance for an investment fund’s strategy as the managing partner and CIO of a 
proprietary investment unit of a large European single family office noted. The sole aim of 
the investment unit is to invest and increase the (liquid) wealth of the family (its single 
customer). Although the family did not interfere in daily investment decision making, it 
provided overall guidance on the temporal (i.e. long-term), sector (focus on manufacturing, 
medical devices, chemicals) and style (i.e. active ownership, concentrated portfolio, in-depth 
& in person due diligence) orientation of the investments. 
3.5.2.2 The investor as provider of specific sector knowledge and networks. Since many 
investors, especially family offices and high net worth individuals, have earned their fortunes 
in specific industries, these types of investors can equip the hedge fund with deep sector 
expertise and networks to important players in the industry. However, also here, the 
alignment of interest is important, as a senior analyst (AUM category: USD 250-500m) 
pointed out: “[You have to] leverage the knowledge of your investors and get the experts of 
the field to invest with you and to align their incentives with yours […]. It’s all about 
alignment of interest and trust. Especially because you can’t be the expert of all industries 
you are investing in”. 
A partner, as well as an analyst (both at the same firm, AUM category: USD 250-500m) 
illustrated the benefit of investors’ expertise with an example where one of their fund’s 
cornerstone investors is a successful serial entrepreneur in the biotech industry and the 
investor played a key role in identifying and assessing the hedge fund firm’s biotech 
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investments. These ‘industry-rooted’ investors often not only draw on their own expertise but 
leverage their personal network of contacts in the industry to come up with (a) potential 
investment targets and (b) a differentiated opinion on a shortlist of potential investment 
targets.  
After the execution of an investment, investors may stay involved, for example via board 
appointments (evidence provided by partner at fund in the AUM category USD 250-500m) at 
investee companies. Investors can also be important ‘bridge builders’ as an example provided 
by a partner at a hedge fund firm (AUM category: USD 1-5bn) illustrates: This fund is 
specialised on activist investments into mid-sized, publicly listed companies. Once the fund 
has taken a stake in a company, the fund managers found it very difficult to get into a 
conversation with the firm’s management because the managers feared that the fund would 
use its investor muscle to replace them. This fund however has the strategy to cooperate with 
the existing management of a firm. This ‘friendly intent’ could only be credibly 
communicated via the industry contacts of an investor in the fund. This investor reached out 
to his personal network in the industry and got across the message to the firm that “they are 
nice people” and that the hedge fund firm has the intent to improve the company in close 
cooperation with the existing management. Only after this ‘third party reference’ did the 
management start an open dialogue with the activist hedge fund firm. 
Overall, the evidence from the explorative qualitative enquiry seems to indicate that an active 
firm investor network may improve the investment decision making for a hedge fund firm 
and may link the hedge fund firm to valuable sources of information. Hence it seems 
appropriate to hypothesise that an active firm-investor network enhances hedge fund firm 
performance. 
H1: An active hedge fund firm – investor network enhances hedge fund firm performance. 
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3.5.3 Active Firm-Investor Network –Effects on Hedge Fund Firm Survival  
In addition to performance implications, the qualitative evidence hints at a potentially 
positive relationship between an active firm-investor relationship and firm survival. Although 
performance and survival seem to be distinct outcome measures (e.g. Schaffer, 1989; Hill and 
Birkinshaw, 2007; Kalleberg and Leicht, 1991), investigating both measures may be fruitful 
as it may lead to a “better and more complete understanding” (Delios and Beamish, 2001, p. 
1035) of the studied phenomenon29. 
3.5.3.1 The Investor as Advisor Regarding the Operations and Organisational Setup of 
the Firm. An active firm-investor network may not only entail an ongoing conversation 
about current and future investment opportunities, but may also include advice and feedback 
on the operations and the organisational setup of a hedge fund firm, conversation partners 
from hedge funds as well as investors pointed out. This may include advice on the efficiency 
of a hedge fund firm’s internal ability to execute investments, internal operational procedures, 
tax implications of certain investments, key man risk30, the quality/adequacy of a fund’s 
service providers (e.g. recommendation of an international law firm, which is well 
established in a particular jurisdiction the fund wants to invest in) or other aspects related to a 
hedge fund firm’s ‘operational risk’, which is understood as “the risk of direct or indirect loss 
resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external 
events” (Brown, Goetzmann, Liang, and Schwarz, 2012). 
Related to hedge fund operational risk is the investors’ requirement of transparency in the 
ongoing conversation with the hedge fund firm. A Senior Investment Associate at an 
Endowment Fund (AUM category: > 5bn USD) noted that transparency is a key factor and 
                                               
29
 For further details, please see chapter 2.3.3 for a detailed discussion of studying the two outcome measures of 
performance and survival. 
30
 Since many hedge fund firms are small, entrepreneurial entities, ‘key man risk’ refers to the danger that a 
hedge fund firms ceases to survive once the entrepreneurial founder dies or decides to step down. 
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that he only invests in transparent firms that are willing to show him the underlying 
investments on a regular basis. 
3.5.3.2 Generation of a Series of Transient Investment Advantages. “Hedge funds 
operate in highly competitive markets, where information and trading advantages are 
unlikely to be maintained for long” (Dichev and Yu, 2011, p. 248).  
Hedge funds exploit inefficiencies in information and structure of financial markets. Such 
inefficiencies could be securities whose prices do not reflect their ‘true’ (e.g. fundamental or 
temporarily adequate) value. As financial markets are dynamic social systems of actors 
interconnected by technology (e.g. Beunza and Stark, 2004 and Beunza et al., 2006, 
MacKenzie, 2012, Hardie and MacKenzie, 2007) these inefficiencies become very small or 
disappear once enough capital is engaged in their exploitation. A practitioner illustrated this 
by noting that the investment “space becomes crowded and the [hedge fund’s] strategy stops 
working”. 
The investor network seems to be an especially useful asset when the firm is looking for a 
new profit opportunity to exploit as substitution for (or in addition to) existing investments. 
Hedge fund firms, which only try to exploit one inefficiency in a particular market and which 
have not cultivated an active investor network, may have limited room to pivot once their 
initial investment thesis stops to produce satisfactory returns. As their current ‘wave’ of 
competitive advantage rolls out, they do not have a procedure to identify and catch the next 
‘wave’ of profitable investment opportunities (e.g. McGrath, 2013a and 2013b). 
In the network of investors, no single investor will likely have expertise in all the fund’s 
current and prospective investment opportunities. In some investments, the investor will be 
able to contribute expertise. In others, the investor will be a mere provider of capital. For the 
investors, it seems beneficial to be part of such a network (with diverse industry expertise) 
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since it “provides access to otherwise closed investments” as a senior hedge fund analyst 
(AUM category: USD 250-500m) pointed out. Investors get the chance to participate in 
investment opportunities they would not normally have invested in due to lacking awareness 
of or expertise in a specific sector. An important prerequisite for the firm-investor network to 
materialise its benefits seems to be the ability of the fund manager to pick the right investor-
advisors for each investment. 
This ‘investor network’ approach, which involves the investors as knowledgeable partners, 
may create a strong engagement and commitment of investors. This seems especially true for 
high net worth individuals as a comment of the senior analyst indicates: “You engage with 
your investors in a specific topic […] it gives the rich people something to talk about at the 
cocktail parties because they know exactly what they invested in”. 
Overall, the evidence from the exploratory qualitative enquiry seems to indicate that an active 
firm investor network may help to improve the operations at a hedge fund firm. Furthermore, 
the firm-investor network may be a valuable resource for a hedge fund firm to stay 
competitive beyond an initial investment idea. It may help to build a series of profitable, yet 
transient investment opportunities, which in their aggregate may contribute to enhanced 
survival. 
H2: An active hedge fund firm – investor network enhances hedge fund firm survival. 
 
Table 9 presents a summary of statements practitioners made in the expert interviews and the 
resulting predicted effects, which informed the hypothesis development in preparation of the 
quantitative analysis. 
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Table 9: Summary of hypothesis development based on the qualitative data  
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3.6 Quantitative Application of the Concept of the ‘Active Firm-Investor Network’ 
The following paragraphs present the results of the quantitative application of the concept of 
the active firm-investor network and test the hypotheses developed on the basis of the 
exploratory qualitative enquiry with practitioners. Table 10 presents the summary statistics 
and correlations of the variables used in the quantitative analysis. 
Table 10: Descriptive statistics and correlations. (HFMC = Hedge Fund Management 
Company)31 
 
Regarding the effect of an active firm-investor network, hypothesis 1 stated that an active 
hedge fund firm-investor network enhances hedge fund firm performance. The analysis finds 
support for this hypothesis. Table 11 shows the results of the OLS panel fixed effects 
regressions and indicates that, ceteris paribus, a one unit increase in the active firm investor 
network variable is associated with an increase in hedge fund firm monthly returns by 7 basis 
points. On an annualised basis, this return increase corresponds to 84 basis points. Given 
average annual returns of hedge fund firms of circa 12 percent this seems like an 
economically notable effect (i.e. 7 percent of average annual performance). 
                                               
31
 Please note that the failure variable displays the specification as under the OLS panel fixed effects models: A 
dynamic indicator variable that takes the value of one in the 12 months prior to the date that the hedge fund 
management company ‘died’. 
Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. Firm Death 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 1.00
2. HFMC Return 0.01 0.05 -0.15 0.17 -0.05 1.00
3. Active Firm-Investor Network 0.10 0.37 0.00 8.00 -0.03 0.01 1.00
4. Std Deviation of HFMC Return 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.17 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 1.00
5. Skewness of HFMC Return -0.04 0.76 -2.13 1.98 -0.03 0.08 -0.01 0.07 1.00
6. Kurtosis of HFMC Return 2.95 1.19 1.50 7.80 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.06 -0.07 1.00
7. HFMC 8 Factor Alpha 0.00 0.29 -1.08 1.07 -0.01 0.04 0.00 -0.04 0.00 -0.02 1.00
8. Flows HFMC 0.01 0.18 -0.96 0.85 -0.06 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.04 0.00 0.01 1.00
9. Intra-Industry Diversification 2.03 1.81 1.00 11.00 -0.03 -0.02 0.05 -0.11 -0.05 -0.02 0.00 0.00 1.00
10. HFMC Ln Assets Under Mgmt 17.61 2.06 12.64 22.70 -0.10 0.00 0.03 -0.26 -0.06 -0.03 0.00 0.05 0.42 1.00
11. Age of HFMC (in years) 5.79 4.67 0.19 21.13 0.00 -0.03 0.08 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 0.01 -0.08 0.19 0.28 1.00
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With respect to the control variables, hedge fund assets under management are negatively 
related to hedge fund firm performance. This finding corresponds to and confirms findings in 
the finance literature on the hedge fund product level: smaller hedge funds tend to perform a 
bit better (e.g. Agarwal, Daniel and Naik, 2009, Ammann and Moerth, 2005). Intra-Industry 
diversification is negatively related to hedge fund performance (for a detailed discussion of 
intra-industry diversification, please see chapter 2 of this thesis). 
Table 11: Analysis of the impact of an active firm-investor network on hedge fund 
management company (HFMC) performance (OLS Panel Fixed Effects Regression). All 
standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the HFMC level. 
Coefficients marked with ***, ** and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
Hypothesis 2 states that an active hedge fund firm-investor network enhances hedge fund 
firm survival. The empirical investigation draws on two models for the empirical analysis: 
OLS panel fixed effects regressions and Cox regressions. Table 12 shows the results of the 
OLS panel fixed effects regressions. The analysis shows that the ‘active firm-investor 
network’ is negatively associated with hedge fund firm failure, although the coefficient is not 
significant at conventional levels (it is significant at the 13% level). The impact of the control 
Active Firm-Investor Network 0.0007*
(.0004)
Intra-Industry Diversification -0.0003*** -0.0003***
(.0001) (.0001)
HFMC Ln Assets Under Mgmt -0.0009*** -0.0009***
(.0001) (.0001)
Age of HFMC (in years) -0.0002 -0.0002
(.0003) (.0003)
_cons 0.0223*** 0.0222***
(.0025) (.0025)
Firm Fixed Effects YES YES
Year Fixed Effects YES YES
Within R-Squared 0.0267 0.0267
Number of Firm-Month Observations 215,626 215,626
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses
Standard Errors Clustered by HFMC
Hedge Fund Management Company (HFMC) Returns
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variables seems institutively plausible (and in line with prior research on hedge funds at the 
level of analysis of the hedge fund product, e.g. Liang, 2000; Gregoriou, 2002; Amin and 
Kat, 2003). Returns, capital flows from investors, assets under management and intra-
industry diversification of the HFMC are negatively related to firm failure, whereas a higher 
kurtosis of returns (i.e. fatter tails) as well as firm age are positively related to firm failure. 
Table 12: Analysis of the impact of an active firm-investor network on HFMC failure 
(OLS Panel Fixed Effects Regression). The death variable is operationalised with a 
dynamic indicator variable that takes the value of one in the 12 months prior to the date that 
the hedge fund management company ‘died’ (as it enters its ‘failure zone’). All standard 
errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the HFMC level. Coefficients 
marked with ***, ** and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
 
Active Firm-Investor Network -0.0087
(.0057)
HFMC Return -0.0717*** -0.0716***
(.0109) (.0109)
Std Deviation of HFMC Return -0.1004 -0.0995
(.0757) (.0757)
Skewness of HFMC Return -0.0022 -0.0022
(.0016) (.0016)
Kurtosis of HFMC Return 0.0018* 0.0018*
(.0009) (.0009)
HFMC 8 Factor Alpha -0.0011 -0.0011
(.0029) (.0029)
Flows HFMC -0.0334*** -0.0333***
(.0048) (.0047)
Intra-Industry Diversification -0.0116*** -0.0114***
(.0018) (.0018)
HFMC Ln Assets Under Mgmt -0.0225*** -0.0225***
(.0023) (.0023)
Age of HFMC (in years) 0.0131*** 0.0132***
(.0020) (.0020)
_cons 0.3392*** 0.3403***
(.0398) (.0398)
Firm Fixed Effects YES YES
Year Fixed Effects YES YES
Within R-Squared 0.0639 0.0640
Number of Firm-Month Observations 180,664 180,664
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses
Standard Errors Clustered by HFMC
Hedge Fund Management Company (HFMC) Failure
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Whereas the failure decreasing effect of the active firm-investor network is not significant at 
conventional levels in the OLS panel fixed effects regressions, the Cox regressions show a 
significant negative relation between firm mortality rates and an active firm investor network. 
Table 13 shows the hazard rates (and standard errors) for each covariate in exponential form. 
A one unit increase in the ‘active firm investor network’ variable decreases mortality hazard 
by 33% (=exp (-0.4013)-1). Regarding control variables, returns32, flows, assets under mana-
gement, intra-industry diversification and skewness of returns are negatively related to firm 
mortality. Kurtosis of returns (fatter tails) and age are positively related to firm mortality. 
Table 13: Analysis of the impact of an active firm-investor network on HFMC hazard 
(Cox Regression). The death variable is operationalised with a dynamic indicator variable 
that takes the value of one in the month the HFMC ‘died’. The table reports the mortality 
hazard rates in exponential form (standard errors in parentheses). Coefficients marked with 
***, ** and * are significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
 
                                               
32
 The large size of the coefficient of HFMC Return is due to the way returns are coded. A 1% return is coded as 
“0.01” and not as “1”. Hence a one unit increase in the present notation indicates an increase by 100 percentage 
points. The same applies to HFMC Flows. 
Active Firm-Investor Network -0.4013***
(.1529)
HFMC Return -5.7735*** -5.7607***
(.8577) (.8564)
Std Deviation of HFMC Return -3.9511*** -3.9465***
(1.2362) (1.2327)
Skewness of HFMC Return -0.1911*** -0.1923***
(.0492) (.0492)
Kurtosis of HFMC Return 0.0910*** 0.0875***
(.0294) (.0294)
HFMC 8 Factor Alpha -0.0472 -0.0476
(.1299) (.1296)
Flows HFMC -1.7952*** -1.7743***
(.1795) (.1795)
Intra-Industry Diversification -0.1670*** -0.1650***
(.0371) (.0369)
HFMC Ln Assets Under Mgmt -0.3403*** -0.3385***
(.0220) (.0220)
Age of HFMC (in years) 0.0251*** 0.0269***
(.0086) (.0086)
Chi-Squared 589.76*** 597.9***
Number of Firm-Month Observations 180,664 180,664
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
HFMC Mortality Hazard Rate (Exponential Form)
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This analysis finds partial support for hypothesis 2. The active firm-investor network seems 
to be negatively related to hedge fund firm failure. Whereas this failure decreasing effect is 
consistent across both panel OLS and Cox regressions, it is however only statistically 
significant at conventional levels in the Cox regressions.  
Overall, the results of the quantitative analysis seem to broadly support the conjectures from 
the qualitative data. The triangulation of data, methods and analysis techniques, as well as the 
consistency of the qualitative and quantitative results may yield some confidence about the 
validity of the presented concept of the active firm-investor network. 
3.7 Discussion 
Overall, this chapter provided qualitative and quantitative evidence that hedge fund investors 
may add value beyond the mere provision of capital. Specifically, the analysis indicates that 
an active firm-investor network is positively related to hedge fund firm performance and 
survival. Active investors engage in an ongoing conversation with the firm and serve as 
sparring partners for the identification, assessment and execution of investment ideas. 
An active firm-investor network may help a hedge fund firm to become a going concern 
business that performs and survives beyond the shelf life of a specific investment 
opportunity. Along those lines, Nobel laureate Myron Scholes (2004, both quotes p. 10) 
considers hedge fund survivorship as “proof of a value added activity”, which many firms in 
the industry don’t manage to deliver: “Most hedge funds are organized as ‘hunter’ groups that 
will not survive for many generations. That is, few have figured out how to build a business 
or a ‘farm’ to create an enterprise that has franchise value, where the whole is greater than the 
sum of the parts”. 
3.7.1 Boundary conditions. As with any research findings, it may enhance the understanding 
of the findings if their limitations and boundary conditions are considered. 
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First, with respect to the data sources and the question of generalisability, it seems important 
to note that the exploratory qualitative enquiry was limited in its scope (25 industry experts), 
which limits the ‘generalisability’ of the findings. However, the qualitative enquiry seems 
useful since it provides first evidence regarding the richness of the firm-investor relationship 
beyond the mere provision of capital, which informed the hypothesis development for the 
subsequent quantitative analysis. The results of the quantitative analysis indicate that an 
active firm-investor network is positively associated with hedge fund firm performance and 
survival. This triangulation (Flick, 2009) across data sources and methods (qualitative and 
quantitative data analysis) with reasonably consistent results may yield some confidence 
about the validity of the presented concept of the ‘active firm-investor network’. 
Nevertheless, a limitation of the quantitative analysis is that the large scale hedge fund 
dataset did not contain explicit information on investors in hedge fund firms. Availability of 
information on investors (e.g. number of investors, types of investors, intensity of interaction 
with the hedge fund firm, etc.) may have made possible a more direct and more fine-grained 
analysis of the impact of the active firm-investor network on hedge fund firm survival and 
performance. Investor data, however, is very sensitive and highly competition relevant, which 
is why hedge fund firms would not reveal it voluntarily. 
As indicated by the quantitative operationalisation of the active firm-investor network, the 
concept seems to apply particularly well to hedge fund firms, which recruit their investors 
from the geographical region where they are located and which have their investment focus in 
the same region where their investors are located. In addition, the investment firms, which 
have an active firm-investor network seem to invest in informationally less efficient assets 
(such as mid and small capitalisation stocks). Consequently, if a potential replication study 
would focus on hedge fund firms with these characteristics, it seems likely that an active 
firm-investor network could be observed. 
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The investors in these types of funds tend to be high net worth individuals or family offices, 
potentially with expertise and contacts in a specific sector. In most cases, this deep sector 
expertise comes from the fact that the individuals or families may have generated their wealth 
in a certain sector (e.g. healthcare, real estate, etc.). High net worth individuals, family offices 
and endowments seem to have a long-term investment horizon and seem likely to build long-
term relationships with their asset managers (Lerner et al., 2007). An ongoing conversation 
about current and future investment opportunities may be a vital part of the establishment of 
these long-term relationships. 
Second, the hedge fund-investor network is not exclusively a source of valuable information, 
as it may sometimes lead to ‘bad’ trades or investments. An interview partner leading the 
hedge fund unit at one of the world’s top 4 central banks indicated that investors sometimes 
‘push’ the hedge fund firm to initiate a new investment. These trades or investments may 
follow a herd of other investors doing the same, which can lead to ‘tourists’ in the same trade. 
Tourists indicate that the managers stray from their specialty area and may not be fully 
informed about the risks and potential downsides of a trade. In case the hedge fund engages 
in an investment, which was proposed by an investor, it seems important that the fund 
management runs a deep internal due diligence on the suggestion instead of ‘blindly’ 
following the investor’s advice. In this due diligence both the potential profitability, as well 
as the fit with the hedge fund firm’s current investment profile seem important. The 
phenomenon has received scholarly attention, e.g. by Simon et al. (2010), a study which 
provides the Porsche (long) / Volkswagen (short) trade as a case example for a potentially 
dangerous ‘consensus trade’. 
Third, whereas the hedge fund firm-investor network may add value, it may, under certain 
conditions, be copied by competitors. For an outsider or even an investor, the active network 
of a hedge fund firm to its investors seems to be hard to observe in its totality and is hence 
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hard to copy. However, an interview with a former managing director and investment 
portfolio manager at one of the nine ‘bulge bracket’ investment banks indicated that 
personnel turnover may be a key threat to the seeming inimitability of the firm-investor 
network. When senior investment managers leave to set up their own firm or join competitor 
firms, it is likely that they know the composition of the overall investor network and that they 
will contact the same investors for their own fund raising, thereby partially or fully 
replicating the firm-investor network. An investment manager in a fund (AUM category: 
USD 1-5bn) indicated that a firm can address this problem by only having the partners 
involved in fund raising. The partners then ‘own’ the relationships with the firm’s investors 
(i.e. they are the key contact point for the investors). Since the partners in a hedge fund firm 
are ‘locked-in’ by ownership of an equity stake in the hedge fund management company, 
they seem to be the people least likely to leave the firm. 
3.7.2 Contributions. This chapter aims to contribute to the literature on customer innovation, 
but also holds insights for research on hedge funds in the fields of finance and the sociology 
of finance. 
With respect to the customer innovation literature, this chapter contributes to the scholarly 
conversation in the following four areas:  
First, the vast majority of studies in the customer innovation literature have taken a 
customer/user-centric approach in which the firm (i.e. the ‘producer’) played at best a 
secondary role or no role at all (e.g. von Hippel et al., 2011; von Hippel, 2007; Luethje et al., 
2005; Harhoff et al., 2003). This chapter focuses on the firm-level instead of the customer 
level by analysing a large-scale, longitudinal dataset on hedge fund firms. 
Second, in their review of the literature on customer innovation, Bogers, Afuah and Bastian 
(2010, p. 871) note: “To date, most research exploring users as innovators is based on case 
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studies or other small-sample studies. […] In general, the research stream on users as 
innovators will greatly benefit from empirically testing (on a larger scale) the ideas and 
propositions that it puts forward”. This chapter attempts to answer this call for more large-
scale, quantitative research to test and complement the interesting qualitative and conceptual 
insights developed by the extant body of (mostly qualitative) research on customer 
innovation. Using a large scale, longitudinal panel dataset, the quantitative analysis shows 
that an active firm-investor network is positively related to hedge fund firm performance and 
survival. 
Third, the study links to findings in the literature that organisational characteristics may be 
important ‘enablers’ of customer innovation and knowledge transfer from customers (e.g. 
Foss et al, 2011 and Foss, Lyngsie and Zahra, 2013). The analysis shows that that ‘outward 
looking’ (observable by an outsider, e.g. a customer) organisational characteristics (e.g. as 
used in the composition of the empirical proxy measure for the active firm-investor network) 
may provide an important ‘docking point’ to invite customers to engage with the firm in an 
active firm-investor network. 
Fourth, the hedge fund industry seems to be an interesting context and a ‘conservative 
setting’ for the study of customer involvement since one may not naturally expect customer 
involvement in such a secretive industry with numerous highly specialised firms. These firms 
exist in order to provide investors (i.e. their customers) with the service of investment 
management. High levels of customer involvement are not expected in the hedge fund 
industry since at very high levels of involvement, investors may come close to ‘defeating the 
purpose’ of paying (via management and incentive fees) a hedge fund firm for providing the 
service of investment management. This setting contrasts with settings in the extant literature 
where one may expect more customer involvement, such as ‘collaborative’ settings like 
software development (e.g. by users via innovation toolkits; Franke and von Hippel, 2003) or 
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settings with lower barriers (e.g. in terms of technology and required capital) to produce an 
innovation (e.g. sports related consumer goods; Baldwin et al., 2006; Hienerth, 2006; Luethje 
et al., 2005).  
With regard to the literatures on hedge funds in finance and the sociology of finance, this 
chapter emphasises that hedge fund investors may be active partners in the creation, 
assessment and execution of investment ideas. This complements and extends the passive or 
monitoring role that the finance literature has assumed hedge fund investors to take. Since 
researchers in the sociology of finance have usually investigated the technology enabled 
interaction of market participants in highly liquid, standardised and transparent markets (e.g. 
stocks, bonds or standardised derivatives; e.g. MacKenzie, 2012), the active hedge fund firm-
investor relationship may be considered as a potentially interesting different type of ‘market’ 
where the exchange of a homogenous good (i.e. capital) forms the basis of a relationship, in 
which a heterogeneous and tailored good (information) is exchanged.  
3.7.3 Potential implications for practice. For hedge fund practitioners, it may be insightful 
to see that an active firm investor network may be a potentially underappreciated source of 
competitive advantage. Depending on their area of expertise and investment orientation, 
investors may be valuable sources of knowledge for the identification, assessment and 
execution of investment ideas and potentially also regarding the operations of the hedge fund 
firm. This chapter showed evidence that investing into an active network with knowledgeable 
investors may ‘pay off’ in terms of enhanced hedge fund firm performance and survival. 
However, a note of caution seems appropriate since cultivating and maintaining an active 
conversation may be a strenuous effort. An interview partner noted that the intensive contact 
with investors can be “tedious” and “operationally more intensive”. 
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On a more general note, the findings on the active role of investors may apply to a wider 
range of alternative investment firms, such as private equity or real asset (e.g. real estate) 
investment firms. As hedge fund firms are for the most part small, entrepreneurial entities, 
which are characterised by “knowledge intensity and lack of intellectual property protection”, 
insights from the hedge fund sector have been noted to potentially be “representative of many 
other service sectors in the economy” (both quotes: de Figueiredo, Meyer-Doyle and Rawley, 
2013, p. 849). 
3.8 Conclusion 
In conclusion, this chapter presented qualitative evidence that the hedge fund firm-investor 
relationship may be richer and more nuanced than the mere provision of capital. An active 
firm-investor network provides the stage for an ongoing information exchange regarding the 
identification, assessment and execution of investment ideas. A quantitative analysis showed 
that an active firm-investor network is positively associated with hedge fund performance and 
survival. The consistence of results across this triangulation of data sources and methods may 
yield reasonable confidence about the validity of the presented concept of the firm-investor 
network. From a theoretical perspective, the insights in this chapter inform and contribute to 
theories on the active involvement and tangible added value of a firm’s customers. 
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Chapter 4 
The Firm Boundary as Semi-Permeable Membrane 
 
4.1 Abstract 
The firm boundary unites two opposing functions: separation and permeability. It 
simultaneously isolates the firm from and connects it with the environment. Focusing on a 
resource-based view of the firm, more specifically resource flows across the firm boundary, 
this chapter suggests that semi-permeability of the firm boundary is important for the creation 
of a resource asymmetry, which in turn is a key antecedent to value creation and 
appropriation. The analysis develops an interdisciplinary metaphor in order to derive novel 
insights on how the firm boundary moderates two types of resource complexity: the 
complexity of the acquired resource and the complexity of the internal resource set. The 
analysis draws on generalised insights from cell biology and proposes four modes of resource 
acquisition, which depend on the configuration of both types of resource complexity. The 
conceptual reasoning is illustrated using examples from the hedge fund industry. 
 
I would like to thank Daniel Albert, Charles Baden-Fuller, Markus Becker, Matthew Bidwell, 
Julian Birkinshaw, Hans Frankort, Ali Aslan Guemuesay, Rahul Kapoor, Dan Levinthal, 
Elaine Liu , Ian ‘Mac’ MacMillan, Marshall Meyer, Dan Raff, Thomas Roulet and the 
participants of the 2014 Journal of Management Studies Conference at the University of 
Cambridge, the 2014 Conference on Firm Boundaries at Copenhagen Business School, the 
2013 European Theory Development Workshop at HEC Paris, the 2013 EGOS Annual 
Meeting and the 2012/2013 Wharton Snider Center Research Workshops for their very 
helpful comments. 
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4.2 Introduction 
Value creation and appropriation may be considered as the basis of business activity because 
economic actors are, among others, “motivated by the possibility of capturing economic 
gains” (Coff, 2010, p. 711). Resources seem to be an important prerequisite for value 
creation. Some resources may be of strategic importance in a sense that they are (1) “limited 
in supply or costly to imitate” (Leiblein and Miller, 2003) and (2) able to alter the 
‘architecture’ of the value creation process. The accumulation of these resources inside the 
firm seems to create an asymmetry compared to the environment, which may be essential to 
the firm as potential source for value creation and appropriation (Schoemaker, 1990). 
Resource acquisition via transport across the firm boundary seems to be an important 
antecedent in the creation of these vital resource asymmetries because most firms do not 
possess all the required resources ex ante in order to ‘autarkically’ create value for the 
customer (Schilling and Steensma, 2002). Resource acquisition involves the firm boundary as 
part of the firm, which enables a differential flow of resources. This differential resource flow 
seems to be important for the creation of valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable 
(VRIN; Kraaijenbrink, Spender and Groen, 2010) resource sets since “resource asymmetries 
occur because of differential flow of resources” (Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001, p. 431). 
The conceptual analysis in this paper sheds light on how the firm boundary may enable this 
differential flow of resources. The firm boundary is understood to encompass all the 
resources the firm controls. Since resource transport across the firm boundary has the goal of 
obtaining full control over the ‘imported’ resource so that it can be integrated into the 
existing firm internal resource set, this process may be understood as ‘resource acquisition’. 
Control over the resources within the firm boundary seems important for two reasons: First, 
control over a resource gives the firm the opportunity to create an interacting bundle of 
resources, which may be a key aspect of creating hard to imitate value for the customer. 
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Second, control over resources may enable the firm to appropriate a large share of the created 
value (Barney, 1986). 
One ontological communality of the firm boundary and a biological cell membrane is the 
characteristic of ‘semi-permeability’, which enables a differential flow of resources and 
allows the firm boundary to act as a barrier from and as a bridge to the environment. In order 
to ensure a functioning differential flow of resources as basis of a resource asymmetry, a key 
function of the firm boundary is the moderation of complexity in two areas: (1) the 
complexity of the acquired resource and (2) the complexity of the internal resource setup. 
Complexity is understood in a sense of Simon (1962) as interconnectedness of parts. More 
specifically, Simon (1962, p. 468) defines a complex system as “one made up of a large 
number of parts that interact in a nonsimple way”. This ‘interaction of parts’ may sometimes 
be observable, but in other cases it may not be clear (1) which parts participate in the 
interaction and (2) how the parts interact, leading to uncertainty about cause and effect 
relationships (Barney, 1999). Simon’s (1962) definition seems to be along the lines of 
Thompson33 (1967, p. 10) who describes this interplay between uncertainty and certainty (i.e. 
clarity about cause and effect relationships) in organisations: “we will conceive of complex 
organizations as open systems, hence indeterminate and faced with uncertainty, but at the 
same time subject to criteria of rationality and hence needing determinateness and certainty”. 
In order to analyse how this differential flow of resources may work and how the firm 
boundary may moderate the two areas of complexity, this paper conceptualises the firm 
boundary as semi-permeable membrane. The analysis draws on generalised insights from cell 
biology, specifically molecule transport across the cell membrane, and suggests four modes 
                                               
33
 Thompson’s (1967, p. 6) note on interdependence: “Approached as natural system, the complex organization 
is a set of interdependent parts which together make up a whole because each contributes something and 
receives something from the whole, which in turn is interdependent with some larger environment.” 
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of resource acquisition, which depend on the complexity of the acquired resource and the 
complexity of the internal resource set. 
There are three unique components to this paper, which attempt to contribute to the literature 
on firm boundaries. First, semi-permeability of the firm boundary is examined as a key 
attribute to create a resource asymmetry via the contemporaneous isolation and inflow of 
resources. Second, the paper sheds light on an important, yet hitherto underappreciated 
function of the firm boundary regarding the acquisition of resources: the firm boundary as 
moderator between the complexity of the target resource (i.e. its degree of interdependence 
with other resources in the environment) and the complexity of the overall internal resource 
setup of the firm (i.e. the degree of interdependence of resources inside the firm). The 
analysis considers four combinations of these two types of complexity and suggests specific 
modes of resource acquisition. These modes of resource acquisition are drawn from a stylised 
dichotomy of bundled versus focused resource acquisition, which the paper develops. Third, 
while a focus of the literature has been on resource access via other forms34 than full control / 
ownership (e.g. knowledge resources created or transferred in technology alliances; Frankort, 
2013), this paper focuses on resource acquisition and integration under the umbrella of 
hierarchical governance, a field of enquiry that so far seems to have seen little differentiated 
analysis. 
The following sections provide insights on the status of the literature and develop the core 
proposition of the paper, namely that semi-permeability of the firm boundary and its ability to 
moderate complexity are antecedents to the creation of a resource asymmetry, which in turn 
may be a key determinant of how much value the firm can create and appropriate. Examples 
from the hedge fund industry help to illustrate the conceptual reasoning. 
                                               
34
 Grant and Baden-Fuller (2004, p. 62) provide an insightful list of a variety of organisational arrangements and 
governance mechanisms that lie between market and hierarchy. 
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4.3 Review of the Related Literature 
4.3.1 Value creation and appropriation. Value creation and appropriation may be 
considered as the basis of business activity as economic actors seem to be, among others, 
“motivated by the possibility of capturing economic gains” (Coff, 2010, p. 711). However, 
value for the customer has to be created before (a part of) it can be appropriated by the firm 
(Alvarez and Barney, 2004). The total value created will “ultimately be distributed across 
stakeholders” (Coff, 2010, p. 713), hence firms have to master a dual challenge of creating 
value and keeping a more or less large share of it (Shoemaker, 1990). Important stakeholders 
for value creation and appropriation seem to be the providers of resources necessary to create 
the value for the customer. If the resources are owned by the firm, a big chunk of the value 
will be appropriated by the firm, else, the providers of the resources will capture a part of the 
created value (Barney, 1986). 
For hedge fund firms, the value creation aspect has two components. First, the creation of 
financial returns using the investors’ capital. Second, and often underappreciated, the creation 
of returns, which are not or only loosely correlated to other major asset classes (e.g. equity) in 
a hedge fund investor’s portfolio (e.g. Fung and Hsieh, 2006). The value appropriation aspect 
is also split into two components: a ‘management fee’ on assets under management (usually 
between 1% and 2 %) and an ‘incentive fee’ on the profits a fund makes (usually between 
15% and 20%; e.g. Clare and Motson, 2009). Providers of resources for the value creation of 
the hedge fund firm are the hedge fund’s employees (e.g. Hardie and MacKenzie, 2007), as 
well as data providers (e.g. Bloomberg terminals, e.g. Albinus, 2011), other service providers 
(e.g. prime brokers, auditors, law firms; e.g. Simon et al., 2010 and Baden-Fuller et al., 2013) 
or even investors (please see chapter 3 of this thesis for an investigation of the active role of 
investors). 
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4.3.2 ‘Asymmetry’ as basis for interdependence and value creation. In order to 
distinguish itself from competitors, the firm has to build a resource ‘asymmetry’ vis-à-vis its 
environment. This asymmetry seems to be built by specialisation of resources and bundling 
of these specialised resources (Thompson, 1967) within the boundaries of the firm. As 
“complex organizations cannot be self sufficient” (Thompson, 1967, p. 49), specialisation 
entails acquiring resources from the environment. Hence, with specialisation, firms or other 
market actors “wish to be interdependent” (Thompson, 1967, p. 16). However, the downside 
of this interdependence due to specialisation is the increased dependence on the environment 
and the intensified impact of uncertainty originating in the firm’s environment. Uncertainty 
may exist in the environment since it “does not fully disclose the alternatives available or the 
consequences of those alternatives” (Thompson, 1967, p. 9). Consequently, specialisation 
makes the organisation an “open system” (Thompson, 1967, p. 10), which may be able to 
build a distinctive resource set as basis for delivering value to customers. However, the 
resource set of the firm also has to maintain flexibility in order to react to shocks in the 
environment. As illustrated in the following sections, the firm boundary fulfils a crucial role 
for building this resource asymmetry and maintaining flexibility. Not only does it help to 
acquire the resources to build a resource asymmetry (e.g. Dierickx and Cool, 1989), it also 
protects the specialised resources from ‘diffusing’ into the environment. A firm’s technical 
core35 may be a specialised set of resources, which, as Thompson (1967) suggested, firms 
attempt to ‘buffer’ from the environment (Hargadon, Davis and Weick, 2003). 
The literature on the resource based view of the firm (e.g. Barney, 1986 and 1991; 
Wernerfelt, 1984; Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Peteraf, 1993) has noted resource asymmetries 
vis-à-vis the environment as an important component of value creation since resources useful 
                                               
35
 As Hargadon, Davis and Weick (2003, p. 499) note, “Thompson himself is vague in defining the technical 
core”, however Thompson seems to use the term rather broadly, as his understanding of ‘technology’ suggests: 
“We are thus using the term technology in its broad sense as a system of techniques” (Thompson and Bates, 
1957, p. 325). 
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for the distinction from competitors (1) do not seem to be available freely and (2) do not 
seem to have a uniform quality (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Thompson, 1967). These resource 
asymmetries normally play out as difference between the resource endowment of the firm 
and its environment (which includes other firms). Along these lines, Wernerfelt (2011, p. 
1369) notes that “a few resources are such that only one firm can have them, with patents 
being the clear example”. In the same vein, Afuah (2003, p. 34) points out that “competitive 
advantage in the face of technological change rests on firm-specific, difficult-to-imitate, and 
costly-to-trade resources”. Amit and Zott (2001, p. 497) link resources directly to value 
creation: “specialized resources […] (which are heterogeneous within an industry, scarce, 
durable, not easily traded, and difficult to imitate), may lead to value creation”, which Adner 
and Kapoor (2010, p. 306) tie back to competitive advantage: “A firm’s competitive 
advantage depends on its ability to create more value than its rivals”. 
It seems important to bear in mind that resource asymmetry mainly comes from ‘architectural 
resources’, i.e. resources, which are able to alter the ‘architecture’ of the firm’s value creation 
process. Conversely, ‘flow resources’, i.e. basic resources (e.g. commodities, raw materials, 
etc.), which are an input that ‘flows through’ the firm’s value creation process, are 
homogenous and largely abundant in their nature. They are an input to but do not alter the 
value creation process of the firm and hence do not tend to contribute to the creation of a 
resource asymmetry vis-à-vis the environment. 
4.3.3 Resource asymmetry and the firm boundary. Since resource asymmetries are usually 
expressed in terms of ‘the firm’ versus ‘the environment’, the firm boundary becomes the 
frontline in the creation and mediation of such resource asymmetries. Systems theory (e.g. 
Luhmann, 2006 and 2013) provides the insight that ‘creating asymmetry’ may be the original 
function of ‘the boundary’. Luhmann (2006, p. 38) notes that asymmetry is essential to the 
existence of a system (e.g. a firm) since “no system can exist without an environment […] it 
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would revert immediately to a state of equilibrium without difference”. Abbott (1995, p. 870) 
provides the insight that boundaries seem to emerge by linking up points of difference: “The 
making of an entity is simply the connecting up of these local oppositions and differences 
into a single whole that has a quality which I shall call "thingness"”. 
The following sketch of the literature on firm boundaries focuses on ways in which firm 
boundaries create ‘asymmetry’. It follows the broad classification of the extant literature into 
four ‘cognitive boxes’ as suggested by Santos and Eisenhardt (2005). Although the concept 
of the semi-permeable firm boundary and its complexity moderating function may be applied 
also to other views of the firm boundary, this paper focuses on the ‘competence view’. 
The main theoretical engine of the (1) competence view on firm boundaries is the resource-
based view of the firm (e.g. Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984). The boundary 
conceptualisation of the competence view states that “boundaries should be set at the point 
that maximizes the value of the firm’s resource portfolio” (Santos and Eisenhardt, 2005, p. 
497). With the resource or a bundle of resources as unit of analysis, the asymmetry using this 
theoretical lens lies in the idiosyncratic resource set of the firm versus the resource set in the 
environment (largely consisting of factors of production or basic resources available on 
strategic factor markets; Barney, 1986; Teece et al., 1997). To create competitive advantage, 
a resource has to create an asymmetry to the environment via value, rarity, inimitability and 
non-substitutability (Kraaijenbrink, Spender and Groen, 2010). Dierickx and Cool (1989) 
suggested that this asymmetry may be built by upgrading and refining resources inside the 
firm whereas Dyer and Singh (1998) point out that resources may span firm boundaries via 
inter-firm collaboration. This chapter draws the attention to the role of the firm boundary as 
key component in creating and maintaining resource asymmetries vis-à-vis its environment. 
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The theoretical engine of the (2) efficiency view is transaction cost economics (TCE, e.g. 
Coase, 1937, Williamson, 1985), with the central argument that firm “boundaries should be 
set at the point that minimizes the cost of governing activities” (Santos and Eisenhardt, 2005, 
p. 492). TCE takes the single transaction as level of analysis and draws the firm boundary 
assessing “one transaction at a time” (Jacobides and Billinger, 2006, p. 249) as a discrete 
‘make or buy’ decision36. The greater the asymmetry (i.e. degree of difference to the average 
market transaction) of the single transaction with respect to (a) asset specificity, (b) 
environmental uncertainty and (c) behavioural uncertainty, the more likely it is that the 
transaction is carried out within the firm boundary (Williamson, 1985, Santos and Eisenhardt, 
2005). Related literature has kept the transaction as unit of analysis (e.g. as a legal contract, 
Masten, 1988) but begun to link up transactions in a concept of the firm as bundle of 
interdependent transactions unified by property rights (e.g. Hart and Moore, 1990). 
Another view on firm boundaries is offered by the (3) power view. It draws on resource 
dependence theory (e.g. Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and industrial organisation (Porter, 
2008), and states that firm “boundaries should be set at the point that maximizes strategic 
control over crucial external forces” (Santos and Eisenhardt, 2005, p. 495). The power view 
takes a more holistic approach than TCE with the unit of analysis being the firm (and its 
relation to the competitive environment) instead of the single transaction. From the 
perspective of the firm, there seem to be two types of asymmetry, a ‘bad’ one where the firm 
is at a disadvantage to the industry and a ‘good’ one where the firm has a stronger standing 
than the average competitor. The power conceptualisation is a largely ‘defensive approach’ 
with its main focus being on the mitigation of the adverse influence of ‘bad’ asymmetry. This 
can be achieved by obtaining ownership or control over crucial assets, competitors, further 
steps in the value chain (e.g. Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009, Porter, 2008) or by curbing the 
                                               
36
 The conceptualisation of a discrete make or buy decision may not necessarily correspond to reality as some 
firms make and buy the same component (concurrent sourcing, e.g. Parmigiani and Mitchell, 2009). 
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influence of important external stakeholders on the firm (e.g. an authoritarian government; 
Meyer and Lu, 2004). The underlying reason of fighting this ‘bad’ asymmetry is to create a 
‘controlled’ environment for the firm with as few sources of uncertainty as possible. 
The (4) identity view of firm boundaries draws on managerial cognition (e.g. Weick, 1995) 
and postulates that “boundaries should be set to achieve coherence between the identity of the 
organization and its activities” (Santos and Eisenhardt, 2005, p. 500). The unit of analysis 
using this theoretical lens seems to be the individual or a group of individuals, which 
constitute ‘the firm’ as entity for collective sensemaking of an uncertain and complex 
environment. The firm boundary is drawn around a group of individuals developing, sharing 
and adhering to the same set of cognitive frames (Santos and Eisenhardt, 2005) for decision-
making under uncertainty. Hence, asymmetry in the identity view seems to manifest itself in 
an asymmetry of cognitive frames of identity and decision making between members of the 
community called ‘firm’ (‘us’) and members of the ‘environment’ (‘them’). 
Table 14 illustrates the presented lenses on firm boundaries and how they may create 
‘asymmetry’ using the empirical setting of the hedge fund industry. Although different in 
their focus and conceptual nature, the four views on firm boundaries are not mutually 
exclusive when illustrated in an empirical setting (i.e. the four lenses may complement each 
other or may be at work at the same time; Santos and Eisenhardt, 2005). 
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Table 14: Illustration of the four theoretical lenses on firm boundaries and how 
‘asymmetry’ to the environment is created using the empirical setting of the hedge fund 
industry 
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4.3.4 Resource acquisition as important part of resource asymmetry. Rarely is the firm 
able to “go it alone” (Schilling and Steensma, 2002, p. 388) and create value without having 
to acquire resources from the environment. Resource acquisition, as well as value creation 
and appropriation seem deeply intertwined (Alvarez and Barney, 2004). It seems that 
“resource asymmetries occur because of the differential flow of resources” and the firm’s 
“differential ability to control such flows” (both quotes: Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001, p. 
431).  
These flows of resources crucially involve the firm boundary as an entity, which, on the one 
hand is open to the inflow of desired resources, but on the other hand does not let pass (a) 
undesired resources into the firm or (b) valuable resources out of the firm. Although not 
widely prevalent, the importance of ‘permeability’ or ‘porousness’ of firm boundaries has 
been mentioned in prior literature. Scholars have approached the attribute of semi-
permeability from a diverse set of angles. Santos and Eisenhardt (2005, p. 497), for example 
note a “permeable view of boundaries”. Meyer and Lu (2004) approach firm boundaries from 
a horizontal lens and assert that in authoritarian regimes in particular, firm boundaries are 
porous to exercise of influence by governmental actors, which may not necessarily benefit the 
firm and its owners. Jacobides and Billinger (2006) approach firm boundaries from a vertical 
lens and see permeability of firm boundaries in various steps along the value chain where the 
firm interfaces with internal and external customers. 
However, an often overlooked aspect refers to the component of ‘semi’ in ‘semi-
permeability’, which implies that resource isolation is as important a function of the firm 
boundary as the enabling of resource flows. Isolation seems important for the component of 
value appropriation since “effective “isolating mechanisms” are […] preventing others from 
competing for a given market opportunity” (Alvarez and Barney, 2004, p. 622). As the world 
changes to be more interconnected, which may enhance resource mobility, resource isolation 
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and protection may increase in importance, as implied by Amit and Zott (2001, p. 497): “As 
information-based resources and capabilities, which have a higher degree of mobility than 
other types of resources and capabilities, increase in their importance within ebusiness firms, 
value migration is likely to increase and the sustainability of newly created value may be 
reduced”. 
4.3.5 Complexity as determinant of resource acquisition. For a successful resource flow 
from the firm’s environment across the firm boundary, the firm boundary has to create 
‘resource acquisition arrangements’, which mediate two types of complexity: (1) the 
complexity of the acquired resource and (2) the ex ante complexity of the internal resource 
setup. Complexity is understood in a sense of Simon (1962) as interconnectedness of parts 
which interact. More specifically, Simon (1962, p. 468) defines a complex system as “one 
made up of a large number of parts that interact in a nonsimple way”. 
This focus on complexity seems to shed light on an essential part of strategy, as Schoemaker 
(1990, p. 36) notes: “strategy, at its core, concerns the development and testing of heuristics 
for high stake decisions in environments too unstable and complex to be optimized”. 
First, the level of complexity of the acquired resource may be determined by (a) the visible 
interdependence of the resource with other resources in the environment or (b) a causal 
ambiguity (Barney, 1999) of how the resource may interact with other resources in the 
environment. An interdependence of a resource with another may imply that it either only 
realises its value generation potential in combination with another resource or that it is 
embedded in a set of other resources and cannot be easily isolated from these other resources 
while still in the environment and not under the full control of the firm. Certain resources for 
example may not be traded individually due to imperfections in resource markets (Barney, 
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1986, Schilling and Steensma, 2002). Hence the desired resource may only be available in a 
bundle with other, potentially not desired resources. 
Second, the level of complexity of the internal resource setup ex ante (i.e. before the new 
resource is brought into the firm) depends on the existing interdependencies between 
resources already employed in the value creation and appropriation activities of the firm. The 
basic principle of these interdependencies seems to rest on complementarity, because the 
bundle of resources “together provides more value than the total value of having each” of the 
resources in isolation (Amit and Zott, 2001, p. 505). 
Applied to hedge funds, a complex resource, which the hedge fund firm may want to import, 
may be a team of experts at another firm (for example an investment bank), who have in-
depth knowledge and experience in a specific investment area, in which the firm would like 
to build a resource asymmetry. The team of experts seems to be a complex resource since 
there are complementarities and interdependencies between the experts and their individual 
value creation may be difficult to assess or less valuable if delivered in isolation. 
A complex resource set inside a hedge fund firm may relate to the interdependencies in the 
value creation between different products the hedge fund firm offers. These 
interdependencies may occur in a sense that multiple products of the hedge fund firm draw on 
similar resources. For example research insights on the economic development of a specific 
sector in a country (e.g. the for-profit education sector in North America) may be relevant to 
both a long-short equity fund, as well as a special situations fund aiming to profit, for 
example, from mergers and acquisitions. 
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4.4 Firms and Cells: ‘Ontological Communalities’ Underlying the Boundaries of Social 
and Biological ‘Units’ 
4.4.1 Establishing context-independent generalisations from cell biology. Similar to other 
interdisciplinary approaches, the conceptualisation of the firm boundary as a semi-permeable 
membrane, which shares attributes of a cell membrane, “does not claim that social or 
economic phenomena can be explained in biological terms” (Aldrich, Hodgson, Hull, 
Knudsen, Mokyr and Vanberg, 2008, p. 579). However, in its abstract form, moderation of 
complexity via a semi-permeable membrane seems to have general applicability beyond 
biology37. 
On a conceptual level, the paper looks at two types of complex, boundary maintaining 
systems: one from the social world (i.e. the firm) and one from the biological world (i.e. the 
cell). Both entities (firms and cells) need to “consume materials and energy in order to 
survive” (Aldrich et al., 2008, p. 583). Since these ‘materials’ come from outside the entity, 
the choice of acquisition mode is crucial in both contexts. The boundaries of both entities are 
engaged in moderating external and internal complexity, which is why interesting conceptual 
insights might be gained from cell biology. 
The biological context provided in this paper is for illustration only. In the words of Metcalfe 
(1998, p. 22): “we can learn from the debates on evolutionary biology in order to understand 
better the logical status of concepts […] without in any sense needing to absorb the 
associated biological context”. This paper compares firm boundaries to cell membranes on a 
conceptual level, where “common principles will be highly abstract and will not reflect 
detailed mechanisms unique to any particular domain” (Aldrich et al., 2008, p. 580). 
                                               
37
 This argument is in line with reasoning presented in essays on ‘Generalised Darwinism’, e.g. Aldrich et al., 
2008; Hodgson and Knudsen, 2010. 
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4.4.2 Ontological communality, not just analogy. This paper does not attempt to impose a 
simple biological analogy on the workings of firm boundaries, which may not fit very well 
once the critical observer delves into the details of the social and biological world. With the 
comparison to biology, this paper tries to tease out “abstract features in both the social and 
the biological world; it is essentially a contention of a degree of ontological communality, at a 
high level of abstraction and not at the level of detail” (Aldrich et al., 2008, p. 579, emphasis 
in original). In other words, there may be “real and severe ontological differences at the level 
of detail, there are also nevertheless common ontological features at an abstract level” 
(Hodgson and Knudsen, 2006, p. 14). 
There may be critics arguing that the context is important for generalisation, but “the dangers 
of reckless overgeneralization do not mean that generalizations should be avoided when they 
are appropriate” (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2010, p. 2). In a sense, by teasing out abstract 
features across biological and social boundary maintaining systems (e.g. cells and firms), this 
paper may sketch out basic features of a model (Baden-Fuller and Morgan, 2010) describing 
how boundaries of complex systems may be designed and governed. 
4.5 The Membrane Metaphor 
The following paragraphs establish general insights from cell biology, and conceptualise the 
firm boundary as semi-permeable membrane. This paper is not the first one to propose this 
conceptualisation. Fey and Birkinshaw (2005) are to the author’s knowledge the first 
researchers to conceptualise the firm boundary as semi-permeable membrane (for knowledge 
flows). However, their paper did not explore the metaphor in further depth as it focused on an 
empirical assessment of governance modes for external R&D.  
4.5.1 Semi-Permeability. In order to ensure a smooth operation of the firm, its boundary 
needs to unite two opposing functions: separation and permeability. On the one hand, the firm 
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boundary serves as a separating barrier, upholding asymmetry, i.e. the unequal distribution of 
resources between the firm and the environment. On the other hand, the firm boundary serves 
as a connecting bridge to the environment, enabling permeability and resource flows. 
The cell membrane seems to serve as a resourceful metaphor for the firm boundary. The firm 
boundary, as well as the cell membrane, are ‘borders’, which contain a living and 
dynamically changing entity. Both firms and cells are deeply intertwined with their 
environment, yet also have mechanisms in place, which build and keep up asymmetries to the 
environment. In biology, a “prerequisite for life is the ability to maintain electrochemical 
imbalances across biomembranes” (Pedersen, Buch-Pedersen, Morth, Palmgren and Nissen, 
2007, p. 1111). Also for the firm, building and upholding resource asymmetries to the 
environment seems to be a fundamental building block for value creation and appropriation. 
Membranes “protect and organize cells” and “serve as barriers and gatekeepers” (Nature 
Education, 2012a). The firm boundary acts in a similar sense by serving as important 
architectural element, which unifies two opposing functions: isolation and permeability. This 
duality is a fundamental attribute of the biomembrane, which is defined by the Oxford 
English Dictionary as a “thin sheet of tissue or layer of cells, usually serving to cover or line 
an organ or part, or to separate or connect parts” (OED Online 2014c, emphasis added). 
4.5.2 Focused resource acquisition across the firm boundary. Briefly considering the 
biological context, cell membranes consist of a double layer of phospholipids (fat based 
molecules; University of Utah GSLC, 2012, Nature Education, 2012a and 2012b, Hurtley, 
2005, Lee, 2005). Most molecules cannot cross this phospholipid bilayer due to their size, 
charge, or polarity. Hence, membrane proteins are responsible for the molecule transport in 
and out of the cell. This transport can happen passively via ‘channels’ (diffusion with the 
concentration gradient) or actively via ‘transporters’ (consuming energy by ‘pumping’ 
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molecules against the concentration gradient). The membrane is semi-permeable since only 
molecules, which fit exactly with the appropriate transport proteins, can cross while other 
types of molecules are excluded. Each transport protein is tailored to the transport of one 
molecule (Nature Education, 2012b) or a very narrowly specified set of two molecules (e.g. 
Na+/K+ co-transporters). As proteins are heavy in mass, their position and distribution across 
the membrane influences the shape of the membrane (Zimmerberg and Kozlov, 2006). 
In the context of firms, this seems to correspond to focused resource acquisition via transport 
across the firm boundary. Generalising from the biological context, the required resource to 
modify the firm’s resource set has to be known and explicated in detail before an 
organisational arrangement to access and acquire the resource is created. For focused 
resource acquisition to work, the cause and effect relationship between imported resource 
(cause) and desired modification of the firm’s resource set (effect) must be clear. 
4.5.3 Bundled resource acquisition across the firm boundary. It may not always be 
possible to specify which resources are needed in order to complement, refine or reconfigure 
the firm’s resource set. A reason for this may be causal ambiguity (Barney, 1999) and the 
imperfect link between the import of a new resource and the resulting effects on the firm’s 
overall resource set. If causal ambiguity is present, the focused import of resources via the 
creation of tailored organisational arrangements may not be the most efficient way to go. 
Instead, bundled acquisition of heterogeneous resources or tightly interlinked systems of 
resources may be preferable. This section introduces bundled resource acquisition, which is 
developed via abstraction from endocytosis38, the biological processes of bundled molecule 
or macromolecule ‘import’ across the biomembrane. 
                                               
38
 The reverse process to endocytosis is exocytosis, in which cell waste or other unwanted baggage is engulfed 
by the cell membrane and ejected into the environment. Exocytosis plays a key role in expelling cell waste 
products and is, alongside endocytosis, essential to everyday functioning of the cell. 
139 
 
Briefly considering the biological context, if a large molecule (e.g. protein or 
polysaccharides) is transported across the cell membrane, a fold in the membrane engulfs the 
macromolecule and digests it into the cell (Pamies, 2012; Nature Education, 2012a). 
Endocytosis can be mediated by receptors on the cell membrane, which help to bind 
macromolecules tightly to the cell membrane before they are engulfed. These receptors 
ensure that endocytosis, despite the comparably large molecules being transported, is still a 
highly controlled and selective process, which reduces the import of ‘unwanted baggage’. 
The key insight for resource flows across the firm boundary is that bundled resource 
acquisition does not require a detailed explication, which resources are needed to modify the 
firm’s resource set. Explicit knowledge how exactly sets of acquired or accessed resources 
interact with each other is not necessary. In the business world, this process of bundled 
resource transport across the firm boundary may be approximated with organisational 
arrangements to acquire large, potentially interacting sets of resources (e.g. acquisitions of 
whole firms, subunits or teams of people – the ‘acq-hire’ phenomenon is prevalent among 
firms in Silicon Valley 39 ). The process is highly resource intensive, given substantial 
acquisition premia (in the US, premia of approximately 30-50% above the target’s market 
value are paid by acquirers; Laamanen, 2007). 
In addition to resource intensity, an acquisition of a bundled set of resources may bring in 
‘unwanted baggage’ (Barney, 1999) that may be useless or even harmful to the overall fit and 
interdependence of the firm’s existing resources and hence has to be bundled, isolated and 
ejected into the environment. This process resembles the acquisition strategy of several 
companies, which are aware that certain desired resource sets cannot be easily isolated from 
                                               
39
 An example is Facebook’s 2010 acquisition of ‘Chai Labs’, a deal that was widely suspected to be almost 
exclusively about the team of people rather than the other ‘assets’ of the business (Guardian, 2010). 
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unwanted parts before the acquisition without creating excessive acquisition premia40. Hence, 
the ‘cherry picking’ may happen after the target has been acquired (see for example GE’s 
acquisition strategy; Mitchell, 2008). This deliberate exclusion of resources from the firm 
may be a driver of ‘organisational forgetting’ (de Holan and Philips, 2004). 
4.6 Modes of Resource Acquisition and the Complexity Moderating Function of the 
Firm Boundary 
4.6.1 Summary and assessment of the resource acquisition modes. Overall, the proposed 
mode of focused resource acquisition is a rather specific, easily reversible and comparatively 
inexpensive mode of accessing or acquiring resources. Its potential downside is the 
requirement to precisely articulate (1) which specific resource is needed and (2) how it fits 
with the firm’s existing resource set. Furthermore, in case a swift re-orientation of the firm’s 
entire resource configuration is needed, creating a single or even multiple organisational 
arrangements for focused resource import may be a ‘drop in the ocean’ that is not fast and 
transformative enough to enable a profound reconfiguration of the firm’s resource set. 
By comparison, bundled resource acquisition is a resource intensive, rather permanent and 
not easily reversible mode of acquiring resources. Compared to the focused acquisition of 
carefully specified resources, it runs a higher risk of bringing in resources as part of the 
bundle, which the firm considers as ‘unwanted baggage’. In addition, bundled resource 
acquisition addresses the problem of causal ambiguity in a sense that the complete blueprint 
of an activity, with all its required resources and the interactions between them, does not need 
to be known as long as a ‘functioning’, interdependent set of resources is acquired. 
                                               
40
 For example due to merger arbitrage traders (e.g. hedge funds) betting on a successful acquisition (Mitchell 
and Pulvino, 2001). They want to capture the ‘arbitrage spread’ and usually follow the strategy of going short 
the acquiring firm while going long the acquired firm (often even before a formal announcement of an 
acquisition is made). 
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Figure 6: The two proposed modes of resource acquisition enabling semi-permeability 
of the firm boundary: bundled and focused resource acquisition41 
                                               
41
 Sources of schematic graphical illustrations: Public Domain and Northern Arizona University 
http://www2.nau.edu/~lrm22/lessons/endocytosis/endocytosis.html (first accessed October, 2012). 
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4.6.2 A note on resource path dependence. Resource path dependence refers to the 
condition that a stock of valuable resources may be built within the firm over time, for 
example, in a process of augmenting undifferentiated ‘factors of production’ (Dierickx and 
Cool, 1989 and Teece et al., 1997). Hence, the resource distribution at any point in time may 
reflect past resource acquisitions or internal upgrading (inspired by reasoning of Argyres and 
Zenger, 2012 and Dierickx and Cool, 1989). Applying this thinking to the future instead of 
the past, Wernerfelt (2011, p. 1369) notes that a firm’s resource setup creates “asymmetries 
in competition for new resources”. 
The membrane metaphor and its proposed modes of resource acquisition show that path 
dependence in some cases may be desired. In other cases, however, the firm may want to 
‘break’ the path dependence in its resource set. This may be advantageous in cases where a 
shift in the environment requires a repositioning of the firm’s resource set. From the lens of 
‘resource path dependence’, it may seem fair to note that the mode of focused resource 
acquisition allows for a gradual adjustment of the firm’s resource set, hence it emphasises 
continuity and strengthens the firm’s resource path dependence. By comparison, the mode of 
bundled resource acquisition allows for the swift and profound repositioning of the firm’s 
resource set, hence it gives the firm the opportunity to disrupt or ‘break’ path dependence. 
Hedge fund firms aim to profit from inefficiencies in markets, which are continuously 
changing, dynamic social systems. In these markets, inefficiencies (i.e. profit opportunities 
for hedge funds) disappear once enough money is engaged in exploiting them (Beunza, 
Hardie and MacKenzie, 2006). Hedge fund firms may use deliberate upsetting of the internal 
resource configuration in order to swiftly adjust their resource set to changed profit 
opportunities. As Thompson (1967) noted, this agility in response to changed conditions in 
the environment is key for firm survival in complex and unpredictable environments (such as 
the hedge fund industry). This deliberate upsetting of the resource configuration may be 
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understood as spontaneous “self-stabilization” (‘homoestasis’; Thompson, 1967, p. 7) from a 
holistic view of the organisation in its environment (i.e. the organisation restores ‘fit’ with the 
environment through reconfiguration of the internal resource set). 
4.6.3 Isolation – the resource protection function of the firm boundary. The best 
‘protection’ of firm-internal resources could be achieved if the firm boundary were an 
impermeable barrier as it would allow for absolute control and “avoid uncertainties 
associated with external relations” (Yang et al, 2010, p. 239). Without this vital isolation 
function of firm boundaries, firms’ efforts to create an asymmetry vis-à-vis their competitors 
(e.g. via internally built resources, cf. Dierickx and Cool, 1989) would be in vain as the 
asymmetry would diffuse across the fully permeable firm boundary until the resource 
concentration in and outside the firm boundary is in equilibrium again. Although stable 
equilibria are the desirable state of many models in neoclassical economics, the key function 
of the firm boundary is to avoid resource equilibrium. Thompson (1967) illustrates the 
importance of resource protection. Regarding a firm’s technical core 42 , which may be 
understood a specialised set of resources, Thompson (1967) suggested that a firm attempts to 
protect or ‘buffer’ it from the environment (Hargadon, Davis and Weick, 2003). 
The hedge fund industry illustrates the potential benefits of low permeability of the firm 
boundary (for example with respect to information; for an illustration please see Figure 7). 
Prior literature (e.g. Aggarwal and Jorion, 2012; Hedges, 2005) identified three main 
categories why some “hedge fund managers […] fiercely resist offering transparency” 
(Aggarwal and Jorion, 2012, p. 108). First, information revealed though transparency may 
encourage competitors to replicate or reverse engineer the trading strategy of a hedge fund 
                                               
42
 As Hargadon, Davis and Weick (2003, p. 499) note, “Thompson himself is vague in defining the technical 
core”, however Thompson seems to use the term rather broadly, as his understanding of ‘technology’ suggests: 
“We are thus using the term technology in its broad sense as a system of techniques” (Thompson and Bates, 
1957, p. 325).  
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firm (free riding). Second, understanding the idea behind a trading strategy may give 
competitors the chance to forecast future trades and enter positions before the hedge fund 
firm, hence artificially increasing prices (front running). Third, if the hedge fund firm is 
transparent about specific securities holdings, especially short positions, it may be at risk of 
corporate retaliation since the management of the shorted company may start a public 
campaign or exit the dialogue with the hedge fund firm (cf. Hedges, 2005). 
 
Figure 7: Illustration of the benefits of resource isolation in the hedge fund industry: 
secrecy avoids free riding, front running and corporate retaliation. 
Compared to bundled resource acquisition, firms concerned about the protection of their 
internal resources seem to be better able to avoid uncontrolled diffusion of their tightly held, 
valuable resources using focused resource acquisition. This highly controlled mode of 
resource acquisition minimises the chances that resources can cross the firm boundary by 
accident or malicious intent. A high level of resource protection, however, is not guaranteed 
in less controlled modes of resource acquisition (i.e. bundled acquisition). Here, precious 
resources may ‘leak’ into the environment, especially when seemingly worthless resources 
are packaged to heterogeneous bundles of ‘unwanted baggage’ to be ejected into the 
environment. 
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Jacobides, Knudsen and Augier (2006, p. 1201) show an interesting boundary condition to 
this notion that ‘protection of resources is good’ since sometimes firms may actually 
encourage other firms to mimic their resource setup and activities: “innovators may be better 
off if they encourage imitation […] instead of beating the others to the punch in providing the 
good or service”. 
4.6.4 How does the firm boundary moderate internal and external resource complexity? 
The firm boundary seems to moderate two types of complexity in order to augment the 
internal resource set via resource flows from the environment. The first type of complexity 
refers to the acquired resource, whereas the second type refers to the firm’s internal resource 
set (ex ante to the integration of the new resource). 
With regard to the acquired resource, complexity may be characterised by a high 
interdependence of the target resource with other resources in the environment (i.e. external 
complexity). This can also be combined with causal ambiguity (Barney, 1999), where it may 
not be clear whether the target resource is interacting with other resources in order to realise 
its full value creation potential. Furthermore, the resource may not be traded individually but 
only in bundles with other, potentially less desirable resources. 
As far as the firm internal resource set is concerned, complexity (i.e. internal complexity) 
may be higher if the resources are complementary (Amit and Zott, 2001) and form a tightly 
interlinked bundle, which creates more value than the value creation of the sum of the 
individual resources. However, if a new resource joins a tightly interlinked and carefully fine-
tuned system, this may upset the system, which either harms the firm or may be used 
deliberately in order to ‘break the path dependence’ in the internal resource set. 
Focused and bundled resource acquisition may be useful to moderate these two types of 
complexity. The following paragraphs distinguish between four resource acquisition modes, 
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depending on the degree (high/low) of internal and external complexity. For this distinction, 
it may be helpful to take a slightly more differentiated view on resources. The firm may 
require basic resources (e.g. commodities, raw materials, basic factors of production; Teece et 
al., 1997) as pure input to its value creation process. These basic resources ‘flow through’ or 
are transformed in the value creation process. ‘Flow resources’ are vital for the firm, however 
they are fairly basic and homogenous in their nature and do not alter the value creation 
process. In short, these ‘flow resources’ do not contribute to creating a resource asymmetry 
vis-à-vis the environment. Conversely, ‘architectural resources’ alter the firm internal 
resource set, i.e. the ‘architecture’ of the value creation process. Architectural resources, their 
level of interdependence and their fit with each other are crucial elements for creating a 
resource asymmetry. 
i. Low complexity of acquired resource and low complexity of internal resource 
set: acquisition of flow resources. Whereas the following three acquisition modes apply to 
the acquisition and integration of architectural resources, the first mode of resource 
acquisition (low/low) applies to the attainment of flow resources. These fairly homogenous 
and abundant resources (e.g. commodities, basic factors of production; Teece et al., 1997) are 
important as inputs, which flow through the production process, but they do not interfere with 
the internal configuration of architectural resources. Flow resources may be cost effectively 
acquired via a regular market transaction with the counterparty that offers the best price. 
ii. Low complexity of acquired architectural resource and high complexity of 
internal resource set. Here, the complexity of the internal resource set is high (i.e. the 
internal resource set is an interacting, carefully fine-tuned system) whereas the complexity of 
the acquired resource is low. Focused resource acquisition in this case seems to ensure 
minimum disruption to the ‘running system’ of internally well configured, interdependent 
resources. This focused mode of acquisition of carefully selected architectural resources 
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seems to pose a low risk of upsetting the internal resource configuration and even when some 
disturbance occurs, it can be rectified speedily by expelling the problematic resource. The 
acquired resource may be used to complement the internal resource set and to further enhance 
the resource asymmetry compared to the environment. Hence, this configuration seems to 
reinforce the path dependence of the resource set. 
iii. High complexity of acquired architectural resource and low complexity of 
internal resource set. This is the opposite scenario to the previous point. In this 
configuration of complexity, the acquired target resource is characterised by high complexity 
(e.g. it is interdependent with a bundle of other resources or it is not individually traded) 
whereas the internal resource configuration may be described to be of low complexity (i.e. 
internal resource set with low interdependence; resource set fairly robust to addition of new 
resources). Here, bundled resource acquisition may be adequate. This bundled acquisition 
may help a firm to develop a more complex internal resource set in a short amount of time, 
which in turn may be a way to quickly build a resource asymmetry in a specific field, hence 
overcoming time compression diseconomies (Dierickx and Cool, 1989). 
iv. High complexity of acquired architectural resource and high complexity of 
internal resource set. In this scenario of high complexity on both sides, it seems necessary 
for the firm to determine whether it wants to (a) build on or (b) reposition its resource base. 
In case the firm wants to build on its resource base without substantial disruption of the 
internal resource set, the firm may want to break down the complexity on the side of the 
acquired resource. To do so, the firm would create a set of focused resource acquisition 
arrangements, which in their combination mirror or constitute the originally complex 
resource to be integrated (principle of decomposability (Simon, 1962); importing resource 
components and ‘assembling’ them internally). Due to causal ambiguity, some 
experimentation or ‘selective trial and error’ (Simon, 1962, p. 472; emphasis in original) may 
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be necessary to discover the ‘components’ of a complex resource. This reverse engineering 
avoids upsetting the tightly interlinked internal resource setup as it might happen with 
bundled import. In case it is difficult or undesired to decompose the complex resource, it may 
cross the firm boundary via bundled acquisition. This however can upset the internal resource 
configuration, which may be desirable in cases where the firm intends to reposition its 
resource set (i.e. build a modified resource configuration with the available resources). 
 Figure 8: Different modes of resource acquisition depending on different complexity 
levels of (a) the acquired resource and (b) the internal resource set. 
 
Figure 9 provides an illustration of how the different acquisition mechanisms may moderate 
internal and external resource complexity using examples from the hedge fund industry. An 
example for the import of a flow resource with low complexity on both sides would be 
largely standardised, easily interchangeable services by non-vital service providers such as 
subscriptions to databases or information services (e.g. Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters; 
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Albinus, 2011) for market data, market analytics and communication with other market 
participants (e.g. Bloomberg Messaging for trade confirmations). 
A situation in a hedge fund firm, which may involve the acquisition of an interdependent 
architectural resource into a low complexity internal environment may happen when a fund 
hires an interdependent, functioning team of experts (for example from an investment bank) 
in order to quickly build an internal expertise in a novel area of activity for the hedge fund 
firm. A recent example comes from the US hedge fund firm Fortress, which in May 2014 
hired the global investment team of another hedge fund, Centaurus Capital, in order to 
establish and manage an event-driven investment strategy (Johnson, 2014). Here, the high 
complexity of the imported resource (interdependent team of experts) is integrated into low 
complexity internal resource configuration (i.e. no existing internal resource set up to offer 
event-driven strategy). 
The opposite case occurs when the acquired architectural resource is of low complexity but 
the internal resource configuration is highly interdependent. This case may happen when a 
hedge fund firm requests specialised knowledge and insights from a specific ‘expert’ investor 
on a narrowly defined investment idea (low complexity of imported resource; e.g. hedge fund 
firm enquires with expert investor regarding a potential investment into a biotech firm 
developing a cure for a particular type of vision impairment) generated by the hedge fund 
firm’s internal research department (interdependent with other functions in the firm, hence, 
high complexity of internal resource configuration). 
The acquisition and integration of a complex architectural resource into a complex internal 
resource configuration is challenging for the hedge fund firm. A case, in which the firm may 
decide to ‘upset’ and restructure the internal configuration is when it invests into a new (and 
often fairly expensive) accounting software to substitute or restructure the interdependent and 
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fine-tuned work of internal hedge fund accountants with the goal to enhance efficiency or 
save cost over the long-run. Another example, where the hedge fund firm may decide for 
focused import in order to build on a carefully configured internal resource set is when the 
hedge fund firm aims to organically expand its investment expertise into related areas and 
where it has to orchestrate the existing knowledge inside the firm (often created by a 
carefully built up and collaboratively organised research department) with the (sometimes 
conflicting) knowledge input from a complex array of external sources: most importantly 
investors, but also service providers (e.g. prime brokers; Baden-Fuller et al., 2013), other 
fund managers (Simon et al., 2010), commercial databases or regulators. In this case, the 
hedge fund firm may decide to reduce the complexity of the externally available knowledge 
and limit its outreach to a few trusted, competent and experienced investors, whose 
knowledge, experience and incentive alignment helps to successfully build a new area of 
investment competence (i.e. an asymmetry vis-à-vis the environment). 
Figure 9: Illustration of the different modes of resource acquisition (depending on 
complexity) using the example of the hedge fund industry. 
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4.7 Discussion and Wider Implications 
This chapter starts from the firm’s decision to acquire a resource, which implies that this 
chapter does not address arrangements that allow access but not control over a resource (e.g. 
the building of interfirm resources (Dyer and Singh, 1998) via alliances or interfirm 
cooperation). The conceptual analysis sheds light on how the firm boundary may enable a 
differential flow of resources and how the firm boundary moderates the complexity of the 
acquired resource and the complexity of the internal resource set. Generalised insights from 
cell biology helped to flesh out important determinants of semi-permeability and the 
successful moderation of complexity. 
It seems important to note that the function of the firm boundary as a resource gatekeeper and 
a moderator of complexity seems to be dynamic. The firm boundary has to stay adaptable and 
responsive since firms are complex systems open to the environment, and requirements in 
terms of resource asymmetry are likely to change as environmental conditions change 
(Thompson, 1967).  
The conceptualisation of the firm as ‘open system’ (Thompson, 1967) with its boundary 
acting like a semi-permeable membrane illustrates how the firm boundary contributes to 
maintaining flexibility and responsiveness to changed internal and external complexity. As 
internal and external resource complexity may vary within a firm (over time) or across firms 
(at a given moment in time), the acquisition mode of a resource may change (i.e. in terms of 
the acquisition modes presented in Figure 8, a resource may ‘change quadrant’). In this way, 
the firm reaches “self-stabilization” (i.e. homeostasis), which “keeps the system viable in the 
face of disturbances stemming from the environment” (both quotes: Thompson 1967, p. 7).  
Complexity of a resource for example may vary since technological change may create or 
eliminate interdependencies with other resources (Afuah, 2003 and Siggelkow and Rivkin, 
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2005). The casual observer may assume that resource complexity is ever increasing due to, 
for example, the “quickened pace of innovation and international competition” (Jacobides, 
Knudsen and Augier, 2006, p. 1200). However there also are environmental changes, which 
“standardize some interfaces” (Siggelkow and Rivkin, 2005, p. 101) and may lead to 
decreased resource complexity.  
4.7.1 Boundary Conditions. Despite the potentially useful insights derived from the 
membrane metaphor and the firm boundary’s ability to moderate complexity, the concept has 
to be applied carefully. First of all, if all the resources required for value creation are 
available inside the firm already (Alvarez and Barney, 2004) resource import from the 
environment and hence moderation of resource complexity becomes a less important question 
for the firm. 
Furthermore, the dichotomy of bundled versus focused resource acquisition is stylised. In 
reality, there may be various other resource acquisition modes that lie between these 
extremes. Schilling and Steensma (2002, p. 388) however remind the reader of the potential 
virtues of a dichotomy: “As Conner and Prahalad (1996, p. 478) argued, “the polar cases are 
basic particles from which more elaborate arrangements are constructed.” Thus, insights 
gained from studying the polar cases can potentially be applied to a broader realm of 
governance modes that include the more complex hybrid structures”. 
Borders of social and biological systems, such as firm boundaries and cell membranes may 
be comparable in many characteristics and the study of one may lead to interesting insights 
and enhanced understanding of the other. However, when using a metaphor from the 
biological world in order to better understand a social-organisational phenomenon, a note of 
caution seems appropriate. 
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It is important for the theorist to keep in mind boundary conditions, which apply to the 
potentially fruitful intersection of fields, in this case organisational theory and cell biology. 
Penrose (1952) provided a note of caution regarding the use of biological analogies to 
economic phenomena, such as the concept of a ‘life cycle’ in the theory of the firm. Her main 
criticism of biological analogies is that they impose a notion of pre-determination on firms, 
which are social entities, created by the interaction of individuals. In her view, analogies from 
the biological world may “implicitly deny, the fact that firms are institutions created by men 
to serve the purposes of men” (Penrose, 1952, p. 809). 
With respect to Penrose’s (1952) note, the proposal of the modes of resource acquisition does 
not deny conscious human decision – it rather emphasises carefully considered, conscious 
choice43 . Managers decide on how the firm boundary looks like and how it moderates 
resource complexity. Whereas this ‘anti-determinism’ critique seems to be an important point 
given the state of biology in the 1950s, modern biology has pointed out that even in the 
biological world, processes are not as deterministic as they may have seemed initially (e.g. 
Clancy, 2008). 
Another boundary condition to the conceptualisation of the firm boundary as membrane may 
be imposed by regulators mandating boundaries to be strictly impermeable instead of semi-
permeable. ‘Chinese walls’ in the finance industry (particularly in investment banking) serve 
as example to illustrate this point: “Mindful of intrafirm interdependencies and resulting 
conflicts of interest, banks have set up "Chinese walls" between departments, which, despite 
their picturesque name, are not physical barriers. Instead, they are a metaphor to describe a 
set of internal rules and procedures to prevent one department from obtaining information 
prejudicial to the clients of another” (Hayward and Boeker, 1998, p. 5). An example for a 
                                               
43
 Please note that even Darwin, who discovered evolution to be a fairly mechanistic process, did not deny 
intentionality or the ‘power of reasoning’: As Darwin “believed that animals had powers of reasoning, then he 
would hardly have belittled or denied them for humans” (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2006, p. 11). 
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firm-internal ‘Chinese wall’ in an investment bank is the prohibition of information exchange 
between the M&A advisory team (which is likely in possession of material non-public 
information), and the brokerage team of the bank, which releases research reports on specific 
firms or industries (strictly using publicly available information). Financial regulators such as 
the Financial Conduct Authority44 (2013) in the UK provide specific guidance on how a firm 
has to put in place impermeable boundaries (i.e. Chinese walls) in order to deal with firm-
internal, inter-departmental conflicts of interest. 
The example in the previous paragraph on regulator mandated impermeable ‘intra-firm’ 
boundaries points to a promising avenue for future research: the multi-dimensionality of 
boundaries. It seems fruitful for future research to build on some of the excellent prior work 
in the literature on the multi-dimensionality of boundaries. Some examples of prior work 
alluding to the multi-dimensionality of boundaries are provided below: 
Evocative of Simon (1962), Meyer and Lu (2004, p. 57) for example view firms as “open, 
loosely coupled, hierarchically nested systems”, which serve as the touching point between 
the realms of state-controlled and private enterprise. Looking inside the firm, Bidwell (2012) 
for example notes the phenomenon that firm units ‘outsource’ their work to other units within 
the same firm. In a similar vein, Jacobides and Billinger (2006) note that firm-internal 
boundaries may exist between steps in the value chain and that certain departments may sell 
their intermediate product to the market or the departments located in adjacent value chain 
steps, which results in a ‘permeable vertical architecture’. Going beyond the firm boundary, 
O’Mahony and Bechky (2008) provide an interesting example of ‘boundary organisations’, 
which are specialised entities enabling the cooperation of organisations with partially 
conflicting goals. 
                                               
44
 Formerly the Financial Services Authority (FSA). 
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4.7.2 Contributions. This paper attempts to make three contributions to the literature on firm 
boundaries:  
First, the analysis sheds light on how the boundary attribute of semi-permeability may help to 
create resource asymmetries, which in turn may be a key antecedent of value creation and 
appropriation. Along the lines of Thompson’s (1967) suggestion that organisations combine 
elements of open and closed systems, the firm may ‘isolate’ or keep secret within the firm 
boundary the plan/blueprint of how to create a resource asymmetry. However, the execution 
of building an asymmetry involves the active interaction with and the import of resources 
from the environment. Semi-permeability of the firm boundary is examined as a key attribute 
helping to create a resource asymmetry via the contemporaneous isolation and inflow of 
resources.  
Second, whereas it is established that a key function of the firm boundary is to demarcate and 
isolate the firm from the environment, there remains room to develop our understanding of 
how the firm boundary moderates complexity between the acquired resource (i.e. its 
interdependence with other resources in the environment) and the overall internal resource 
setup of the firm (i.e. the interdependence of resources inside the firm). This enquiry seems 
relevant since the fit of (a set of) resources and activities may impact the value creation and 
appropriation potential of the firm (e.g. Siggelkow, 2002). The analysis considers four 
combinations of these two types of resource complexity and suggests specific resource 
acquisition modes. 
Third, this paper zooms in on the acquisition of resources under hierarchical governance and 
illustrates that the firm faces important choices regarding how to ‘import’ a resource in a way 
that preserves, enhances or reconfigures the functioning of the firm-internal resource set. The 
chapter illustrated how the firm boundary helps to (1) build and uphold asymmetry but also 
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(2) maintain flexibility to react to changed internal or external resource complexity. Hence, 
the chapter provides insights on the potential mechanisms on the level of the firm boundary 
behind Thompson’s (1967) notion that firms are both open (natural) and closed (rational) 
systems. The firm boundary and its characteristic of semi-permeability seems to be an 
interesting example of how organisational structure adjusts to and coevolves with resource 
complexity. 
On a wider note, which regards the relationship between the ‘boundary’ and the ‘entity’, 
boundaries and their underlying mechanics may describe key aspects of the overall entity. 
Santos and Eisenhardt (2005, p. 505) conclude that “boundaries reflect the essence of 
organization […], no topic more deeply engages scholars in the fundamental attributes of 
organizations”. In a similar vein, Abbott (1995, p. 862) points out the related meaning of 
‘boundary’ and ‘entity’ and notes that “in formal topology, boundaries and entities are more 
or less logically equivalent”. Selective bridging of the boundary or ‘communication’ across 
the boundary with the environment is crucial for the emergence of a social system, which 
Luhmann (2006, p. 47) interestingly compares with proteins in biology: ”‘Communication’ is 
the structural equivalent of biochemical statements by means of proteins and other chemical 
substances”. It is important to note, that ‘communication’ is understood in a very general 
sense as any sort of interaction with the environment, hence including flows of resources. 
According to Luhmann (2006 and 2013), it is this attribute of communication of an entity, 
which leads to the emergence of an interdependent social system instead of the parallel 
existence of closed-off, isolated, autarkic entities. Drawing on an analogy to the biological 
membrane, this paper sketched out how an important part of the firm’s ‘communication’ (i.e. 
resource acquisition) with the environment may work. Staying with this abstract 
interpretation of ‘communication’, the complexity moderating function of the firm boundary 
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seems to be comparable to ‘translation’ between the acquired resource and the firm’s internal 
resource set. 
4.7.3 Potential implications for practice. Although the reasoning in this chapter was more 
on a conceptual level, it seems important for managers to develop a deeper understanding of 
(1) the role of the firm boundary in creating resource asymmetries and (2) the factors, which 
influence how resources may be acquired without upsetting the existing internal 
interdependence between resources. If a manager wants to reform the organisation, resource 
import can also be used to deliberately upset and restructure the internal resource 
configuration. 
Since hedge fund firms aim to profit from inefficiencies in markets, which are continuously 
changing, complex social systems, they may use this deliberate upsetting of the internal 
resource configuration in order to swiftly adjust their resource set to changed opportunities 
for value creation. As Thompson (1967) noted, this agility in response to changed conditions 
in the environment is key for firm survival in complex and unpredictable environments. 
Hedge fund investors may observe this adjustment of the resource set as ‘drift’ in investment 
style, which despite some investors’ concerns about a potentially changed risk and return 
profile, may actually be positive (or at least not harmful; e.g. Gibson and Gyger, 2007) for 
hedge fund performance. 
Whereas it may be intuitive that the complexity of the acquired resource influences the 
resource acquisition decision, this paper flagged that another important component is the 
complexity of the internal resource set. Depending on the configuration of each type of 
complexity, four modes of resource acquisition were suggested, which may help managers as 
high-level heuristics in environments that are uncertain and ‘chaotic’ in a sense that they 
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“never reach equilibrium but yet are lawful” (Schoemaker, 1990, p. 1188). Management of 
complexity seems to be a key part of successful resource integration (Gary, 2005). 
4.8 Conclusion 
This paper conceptualised the firm boundary as semi-permeable membrane. It provided 
insights on resource acquisition via transport across the firm boundary and proposed that the 
firm boundary moderates complexity between the acquired resource and the existing firm-
internal resource set. Semi-permeability of the firm boundary seems important for the 
creation and maintenance of resource asymmetries, which may be considered as a key 
antecedent to the creation and appropriation of value.  
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion to the Thesis 
This thesis took the empirical setting of the hedge fund industry, which is characterised by 
small, entrepreneurial, knowledge-intensive and asset-light firms, and studied the 
performance and survival implications of intra-industry diversification and an active 
relationship between hedge fund firms and their customers (i.e. investors). Furthermore, a 
theoretical chapter conceptualised the firm-boundary as semi-permeable membrane and 
investigated the role of the firm boundary in creating resource asymmetries and moderating 
resource complexity. 
The insights from the chapters inform and contribute to the nascent literature stream on intra-
industry diversification (advanced for example by Dovev Lavie and colleagues), as well as 
theories on the active involvement of customers (advanced for example by Eric von Hippel 
and colleagues). Furthermore, the insights drawn from the membrane metaphor inform and 
contribute to resource-based theories on the firm-boundary (advanced for example by Jay 
Barney and colleagues). 
Whereas the three main chapters of this thesis are constructed and presented as stand-alone 
papers, three overarching insights may be drawn from the empirical evidence and conceptual 
reasoning presented: 
First, intra-industry diversification may be divided into the two sub-categories of 
diversification (a) within and (b) beyond a sub-sector of the industry. The results indicate a 
positive effect of intra-industry diversification on firm survival, which may be driven by the 
risk reducing effect of beyond sub-sector diversification. By comparison, the results provide 
evidence for a negative effect of intra-industry diversification on performance, which may be 
driven by diversification within the sub-sector. Overall, the empirical and theoretical analysis 
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contributes to the emerging literature on intra-industry diversification (e.g. Zahavi and Lavie, 
2013; Tanriverdi and Lee, 2008; Li and Greenwood, 2004; Stern and Henderson, 2004). 
Second, the relationship of investment firms and their investors seems to be much more 
multifaceted than the views of ‘investors as providers of capital’ or ‘investors as passive 
consumers of the hedge fund service’ would suggest. Some investors seem to be in an 
ongoing conversation with the fund management as far as the identification, assessment and 
execution of new investment ideas is concerned. The evidence presented in chapter 3 
indicates that hedge fund firms with an active firm-investor network beyond the provision of 
capital tend to show enhanced performance and survival. Regarding theory development, 
these insights inform and contribute to theories on the active involvement and tangible added 
value of a firm’s customers as for example discussed in the literatures on ‘customer 
innovation’ (e.g. Thomke and von Hippel, 2002; Harhoff et al., 2003; von Hippel, 2007; 
Hienerth et al., 2014) or ‘product co-creation’ (e.g. Prahalad and Ramaswamy 2004; 
Nambisan, 2002; Hoyer et al., 2010). 
Third, an important yet underappreciated function of the firm boundary seems to be the 
selective acquisition of resources and the moderation of two types of resource complexity: 
the complexity of the acquired resource and the complexity of the internal resource set. The 
moderation of these two types of resource complexity shapes how the firm boundary enables 
a differential flow of resources, which in turn contributes to the creation of resource 
asymmetries as a basis for delivering value to customers and capturing a part of the created 
value. The analysis contributes to the discourse about resource-based theories of the firm and 
its boundary (e.g. Barney, 1986; Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Barney, 1999; Gnyawali and 
Madhavan, 2001; Schilling and Steensma, 2002; Alvarez and Barney, 2004; Wernerfelt, 
2011). 
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The empirical findings and conceptual insights not only aim to build on and contribute to the 
scholarly body of literature, they may also hold potentially insightful implications for 
managers (of financial services companies, especially investment funds), investors and 
regulators: 
Regarding insights for managers, the analysis of qualitative as well as quantitative data in 
chapter 3 showed that engaging with investors can be a source of potentially sustained 
competitive advantage in an environment where profit opportunities are temporary (e.g. 
exploitation of imperfections in financial markets). Since the connection to and ongoing 
conversation with investors seems to be a key task, which impacts hedge fund performance 
and survival, investment management firms may want to categorise the grooming of ‘investor 
relations’ as a key responsibility of the partners in the fund. First, because an informed 
conversation with the chief investment officers of, for example, endowment funds or pension 
funds requires the key decision makers of the hedge fund firm to be part of the conversation 
instead of a ‘sales specialist’ from the investor relations department. Investment fund 
managers may want to consider assigning to the investor relations department only the 
mechanistic/operational part of the firm-investor conversation. Second, partners in an 
investment fund may want to groom the ongoing conversation with investors since they are 
guarding a key competitive asset of the firm. If they give it out of their hands it may happen 
that investors leave alongside with ‘their’ trusted investment manager, who has been in 
charge of the ongoing conversation. 
When managers consider increasing the scope of their operations via intra-industry 
diversification, it may be helpful to know that diversification beyond the sub-sector of an 
industry, although potentially more challenging to execute and communicate to investors, 
seems to be far more rewarding in terms of enhanced survival and performance than 
diversification within the same sub-sector. 
163 
 
Furthermore, managers and entrepreneurs (in the hedge fund industry or other knowledge-
intensive industries) may think of the boundary of their firm as semi-permeable border to the 
environment when considering how to build or strengthen their resource advantage. In order 
to build a resource advantage, managers have to ‘import’ valuable resources into the firm – 
hence the firm boundary should be open and permeable. However, the firm boundary should 
also be a strong barrier around the imported or internally built and carefully interconnected 
resources in order to protect them from diffusing into the environment. A manager’s choice 
of how to acquire a new resource should not only reflect the complexity of the acquired 
resource but it should also take into account the effect of the imported resource on the 
existing internal resource configuration. This seems important as sometimes a seemingly 
beneficial new resource may not fit with or may even upset the carefully fine-tuned internal 
resource setup, leading to a loss of resource asymmetry or competitive distinctness. 
Regarding insights for investors, chapters 2 and 3 provided evidence for the suggestion that 
investors may not only consider their (hedge fund) investment from the standpoint of a 
passive consumer. Widening the perspective from the single fund to the overall investment 
management firm with its various products seems to ensure a more holistic due diligence (for 
example with respect to the hedge fund firm’s degree of intra-industry diversification) and a 
wider ground to engage in an active and ongoing conversation with the hedge fund firm, 
which seems to be associated with enhanced investment returns for investors, as well as an 
improved assessment of operational risk. Topics of this ongoing conversation between 
investors and the hedge fund firm seem to be the identification, assessment and execution of 
new investment ideas, as well as potential areas for improvement in the firm’s organisational 
structure. 
Regulators, just like investors, have often focused on the perspective of the product (i.e. the 
fund) instead of the firm since one of their primary goals is the protection of the investor, 
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who normally invests in funds, not firms. The adjustment of the regulator’s level of analysis 
from the fund to the firm may yield an enhanced insight as it may uncover hitherto less 
attended, yet potentially important interlinkages between financial actors (for example the 
relationship of the hedge fund firm with its investors). In times of market turmoil, these 
interlinkages seem to be important for the regulator in order to gauge the ‘systemic 
implications’ of the collapse of a financial actor and its knock-on effects on the ‘real 
economy’ (e.g. non-financial services or the producing sector). 
The network with investors potentially needs more regulatory attention and supervision. 
Although hedge funds are restricted to sophisticated institutional investors, a large scale 
hedge fund failure can substantially hurt ‘ordinary’ people since the large institutional 
investors (e.g. insurance companies or pension funds) administer the money of ordinary 
people who are neither ‘sophisticated investors’ nor do they seem to have enough financial 
resources to be able to absorb a substantial investment loss without compromising their daily 
lives, their savings for their children’s education or their retirement provision. 
 
Overall, the author hopes that the honourable reader found this thesis an insightful read. 
Executing this research and sparring it with supervisors, peers, as well as scholars from other 
institutions was an exciting endeavour and an academically as well as personally enriching 
experience for the author. On a final note, the author would like to thank his supervisors, 
Charles Baden-Fuller and Hans Frankort, for their helpful advice and the interesting 
discussions over the past four years. 
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